By Franciszek Kopczewski, Junior Analyst KEDISA
The hybrid tactics witnessed in the Baltic Sea and the Taiwan Strait demonstrate that undersea critical infrastructure is critically vulnerable to deniable civilian shipping. In the shallow, complex archipelago of the Aegean, Greece requires more than passive monitoring. Implementing an “Aramid Shield” based on occlusion drones bridges the gap between grey hulls and law enforcement, securing key interconnectors before damage occurs.
Asymmetric Vulnerability of Greece’s Merchant Power
As the European hegemon of the civil maritime fleet, Greece could become a potential next target of Russian-operated asymmetric warfare. According to UNCTAD, Greece owns approximately 17% of global deadweight tons in carrying capacity, which is heavily dominated by bulk carriers and oil/gas carriers. As a leading merchant fleet, Greece is disproportionately sensitive to any lawfare battles, or even violations of freedom of navigation. Russia, with its shadow fleet conducting ship-to-ship operation near Greek coast – in the Aegean sea – currently poses an ecological threat, with the incessant risk of an environmental catastrophe, ranging from an oil spill to the intentional sinking of an obsolete tanker. With growing escalation, Russia could try to use its tanker fleet to disturb Greek maritime trade, or as incidents in the Baltic Sea show – to destroy undersea critical infrastructure.
The Archipelago Trap: Shallow Waters and Bottlenecks
In the Baltic Sea, shadow fleet ships marked as civilian and with false flags dropped their anchors, dragging them through critical infrastructure such as an Estlink-2 power cable and multiple data links between Finland and Estonia. Aegean and Ionian seas have around 6000 islands, or micro-islands with more than 200 being inhabited. The islands create a unique number of different chokepoints or coastal corridors, because of this the average water depth near cable landing station (CLS) approaches is only between 40 and 150 meters. A deliberate anchor-dragging incident by a shadow fleet vessel traversing the Great Sea Interconnector would inflict severe physical damage, triggering critical disruptions in regional high-voltage transmission. Or more locally, the same ship drags anchor through the ADMIE programme, cutting off Cycladic and Dodecanese islands from continental network. Worldwide, the specialized fleet capable of repairing severed cables is limited to fewer than 60 active vessels. In the event of sabotage, the waiting time for arrival and repair of the damage during the peak tourist season on the islands is from 3 to 8 weeks. The cost of a single repair operation for a broken fiber optic/power cable is on average $1-3 million, not counting the multi-million GDP losses resulting from power/internet outages. The threat, however, extends beyond severed cables. A strategically ‘abandoned’ or purposefully disabled shadow tanker – claiming sudden engine failure or steering loss – could easily block a narrow Aegean chokepoint or the approach to a major island port. In a region where maritime trade and tourism are the lifeblood of the economy, such a deliberate bottleneck could paralyze traffic for weeks, trapping coast guard assets in a protracted legal and logistical stalemate while the adversary hides behind civilian maritime law. Especially with Moscow deliberately avoiding consequences by plausible deniability.
Double threat – Tourism and Energy Sovereignty
Tourism generates roughly 20% of Greece’s GDP, yet the critical maritime infrastructure underpinning this revenue stream remains largely undefended against deniable sabotage. Sustained island-wide power outages during peak seasons would inflict severe macroeconomic shockwaves and lasting reputational damage on the Hellenic maritime economy. Severing subsea connectivity across the archipelago isolates tourist hubs, inducing immediate localized blackouts while simultaneously paralyzing municipal water desalination plants, cellular networks, and digital financial transactions. However, this vulnerability extends beyond civilians locked on blackout islands, it might also impact whole southern Europe. Strategic projects like the GREGY interconnection or trans-Mediterranean pipelines secures European energy independence from Moscow. Leaving these high-voltage corridors exposed to deniable maritime sabotage compromises billions in public-private investment, effectively allowing hybrid aggression to dictate the future terms of continental energy security. As Greece consolidates its role as an energy transit corridor between the Eastern Mediterranean and continental Europe, its subsea transmission nodes emerge as prime vectors for Russian hybrid interdiction. In the current situation, Greece stands as one of most vulnerable chokepoints in Southern Europe, while these risks have not yet materialized, there is still an operational window to establish new deterrence protocols before a crisis occurs.
Operational Void: Beyond Grey Hulls
This threat is precisely where traditional maritime doctrines fail to adapt. Deploying a multi-million-dollar frigate to counter a ‘civilian’ shadow vessel dragging an anchor or blocking a channel is a strategic miscalculation; it plays directly into the aggressor’s escalation narrative and risks political blowback. At the same time, the Hellenic Coast Guard would face total overstretch, with vast maritime zones to cover and limited assets. The Aegean requires an Intermediate Force Capability (IFC) – deployable snare drones operating as an ‘Aramid Shield’. Stationed near cable landing stations or critical chokepoints, these non-lethal UUVs/AUVs can be scrambled the moment anomalous behavior (like illegal anchoring or AIS spoofing over infrastructure corridors) is detected. By deploying high-tensile aramid fibers directly into the suspect vessel’s propulsion system, the drone entangles its propellers. This creates a controlled, immediate tactical halt – disabling the ship’s ability to drag its anchor further or maneuver dangerously, without risking human life, damaging the hull, or triggering an armed conflict.
Pre-emptive Law Enforcement and Legal Resilience
The legal vulnerability of subsea infrastructure was exposed by the District Court of Helsinki in its October 2025 ruling on the Eagle S tanker. Despite the vessel dragging its anchor across critical Baltic interconnectors – including EstLink 2 and C-Lion 1 – the court dismissed all criminal charges against the foreign officers. Citing UNCLOS Articles 97 and 113, the tribunal reaffirmed that coastal states lack penal jurisdiction over foreign-flagged ships operating in the EEZ unless direct intent is proven, classifying deliberate negligence as a mere „incident of navigation.” To remain fully aligned with UNCLOS and avoid regional friction in contested waters, the operational envelope of the Aramid Shield should be strictly bounded to Greece’s six-nautical-mile territorial waters and designated subsea protection corridors directly approaching CLS.
This precedent demonstrates that ex-post legal deterrence is structurally paralyzed in the gray zone. When adversaries exploit the gaps between flag-state sovereignty and coastal jurisdiction, relying on criminal prosecution after interconnectors are severed is a failed doctrine.
This systemic impasse elevates an Intermediate Force Capability from a tactical asset to a strategic necessity. By deploying non-lethal snare drones to mechanically foul an offender’s propulsion system, the Aramid Shield halts the vessel before irreversible severance occurs. Crucially, this physical immobilization alters the legal dynamic: by mechanically halting the vessel within territorial waters, the offender automatically forfeits its right to innocent passage under UNCLOS Articles 19 and 21, establishing an immediate operational window for coastal authorities to board, inspect, and detain the ship for technical non-compliance, environmental hazards, and unverified P&I insurance.
Targeting the Shadow Fleet’s P&I Insurance Architecture
Shadow fleet vessels not only change flags or conduct ship-to-ship (STS) cargo transfers at sea, but also routinely operate with unverified Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance coverage. If drones successfully stop a suspicious ship, it gives the Coast Guard an operational window to verify legitimacy of insurance, and technical conditions according to UNCLOS Article 220. Without valid insurance, the shipowner cannot effectively claim compensation for stopping, which shifts the financial and operational liability entirely onto Russian state charterers. Apart from economically leveraging cost to Russia, the system gives an even more important opportunity – to successfully detain ships that create risk of any pollution threat. That applies not only to shadow fleet ships, but any ships that might produce any risk to the safety of the fragile marine ecosystem. Deploying this capability under a unified EU Critical Infrastructure framework or a multinational maritime mission shields Athens from bilateral lawfare, anchoring physical interdiction in an allied mandate that protects legitimate commerce while stripping shadow operators of unmitigated impunity. Any dangerous incident in the Aegean region could spark a highly negative impact on risk assessment, potentially even rising to war risk rates. Such war rates would directly hit the legal Greek merchant fleet by increasing freight costs and hitting the competitiveness of national shipowners. When international classifications like London-based P&I Clubs face unmitigated gray-zone risks, the resulting surge in marine insurance premiums penalizes compliant commercial shipping. By swiftly neutralizing deniable threats, non-kinetic interdiction stabilizes risk profiles across the Aegean and shields lawful European commerce from predatory geopolitical externalities.
A Signal of Strategic Resolve
Greece cannot afford to wait for its first underwater blackout or a paralyzed Aegean corridor to modernize its maritime defense architecture. The maritime backbone of Europe’s economy and the energy security of the Mediterranean cannot rely solely on heavy frigates designed for total war, nor on passive monitoring systems that merely provide a front-row seat to subsea destruction. In the gray zone of hybrid warfare, silence is interpreted as vulnerability, but an aramid net is a clear signal of strategic resolve. It is time for Greece to shift from passive monitoring to active occlusion, ensuring that the Aegean remains a sanctuary of free navigation, not a laboratory for deniable aggression.
Sources & Bibliography
- Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). Kopczewski, Franciszek. “The Aramid Shield: Snare Drones for an Active Undersea Defense Capability.”.
https://cimsec.org/the-aramid-shield-snare-drones-for-an-active-undersea-defense-capability/ - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “Review of Maritime Transport 2025.”United Nations Publications, 2025.
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025_en.pdf - “Ship-to-ship loadings of Russian diesel pick up in northern Aegean.” August 13, 2024.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ship-to-ship-loadings-russian-diesel-pick-up-northern-aegean-2024-08-13/ - Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (Traficom). “Traficom and other authorities investigate cable damage in the Gulf of Finland.” December 2023.
https://traficom.fi/en/news/traficom-and-other-authorities-investigate-cable-damage-gulf-finland - Great Sea Interconnector. “Project Overview and Regional Connectivity Architecture.”
https://www.great-sea-interconnector.com/en - “Greece: ADMIE’s Transmission Investments Plan.” November 2023.
https://reglobal.org/greece-admies-transmission-investments-plan/ - Data Center Dynamics. “The Cable Ship Capacity Crunch.”
https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/the-cable-ship-capacity-crunch/ - Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS). “Greek Shipping and Economy: Strategic Overview and Global Fleet Metrics.”
https://ugs.gr/en/greek-shipping-and-economy/greek-shipping-and-economy-2021/ - Ecofin Agency. “EU funds new studies for Egypt-Greece GREGY power interconnection.” January 2024.
https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/3001-52417-eu-funds-new-studies-for-egypt-greece-gregy-power-interconnection - Council of the European Union. “Working Document: Critical Subsea Infrastructure Resilience and Legal Frameworks (WK 14133/2025 INIT).” Brussels, 2025.
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/WK-14133-2025-INIT/en/pdf
