By Spyros Tsaparas, Junior Analyst KEDISA
Introduction
The conflict between Iran against the U.S. – Israel alliance has changed the global economy drastically, even as the two sides respect the agreed truce. Despite B2 bombers being used for precision strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the biggest weapon of the war wasn’t dropped from a plane. Specifically, Iran, taking advantage of its geographical position, closed the straits of Hormuz, terminating the connection of the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and effectively halting energy trade passing through the region. As a major passing point of oil tankers, the global economy is experiencing the effects of oil scarcity while Iran is redefining naval blockade theory. This is the case because a nation with a dismantled conventional surface fleet managed to weaponize its natural choke points and turn them into a negotiating tool against the world’s biggest military superpower. As such, Iran’s closure of the Hormuz straits will be used as a case study to argue that Iran itself used a variety of asymmetric tools to create a new type of sustained chokepoint coercion system that managed to strand over 2.000 ships and stall 20% of the world’s oil trade[1].
Iran’s Arsenal for Extortion
What’s unique about the closure of the straits of Hormuz is the way Iran threatens ships that dare to oppose them, even without the threat of escalation. To be exact, four weapons make up Iran’s arsenal and only one of them is actual military response. The first two are the GNSS jamming of the ships navigation systems[2] as well as the IRGC radio warnings[3]. Each tool serves its own purpose, but both play a significant role in diminishing the morale of the crew handling the trapped ships inside the straits. Without having to use bullets, Iran effectively attacks civilians and sends a message to the world by doing so. Third are the mines laid all across the straits. Besides the threat they pose of destroying the ships themselves, the pentagon estimates a 6-month period of clearing the straits even after the war is ended, with no guarantee the mines will be completely cleared [4]. Because of this Iran forces the United States even after the war, in prolonged expenses and creates a permanent financial burden of lives being at risk when crossing the straits even in peacetime. Finally, it’s the actual weaponry Iran threatens to use to ships violating the closure. This remains a textbook tactic, consistent with naval blockade theory because of its simplicity and its effectiveness. Even with a dismantled fleet, Iran still possess firepower from its ground forces, which have made it explicitly clear that it will be used against civilian ships attempting to cross the straits. The combination of these four weapons make a unique case of a naval blockade that shifts the norms for future blockades.
The closure of the straits has turned them, not into a naval blockade in the classical sense but rather an international “toll booth”. This is the case as the Islamic republic is negotiating passage of commercial vessels through the straits in exchange of fees [5]. Although illegal under international law and UNCLOS, Iran has effectively blocked western access of oil shipments through the straits and given preference to Asian vessels. As a result, a noticeable shift has been experienced in the western oil market causing it to lose ground to its counterparts. Given the significance of the Hormuz straits, 20% of global oil shipments passed through it[6], and its exploitation by a hostile state, raises questions that no UN resolution can answer, like the enforcement of innocent passage. It signals that a nation, even with a degraded military like Iran, can turn a geographical choke point against the world’s interests so that it can be used as a negotiating tool on the diplomatic table. Additionally, it also generates revenue for Iran, dragging the war even longer despite US naval presence in the region.
Compellence Through Exhaustion
Regarding classical coercive diplomacy, Iran only partially fits the existing literature making it a unique case in that area as well. Classical coercive diplomacy, as initially developed by Thomas Schelling, states that the cost of a state not cooperating with its adversary exceeds its actual compliance with it. This is the result of one party presenting to the other party an ultimatum with a condition that if not met will be followed by consequences. Iran’s case is different because it demanded a number of conditions to be met with the ultimatum being the straits of Hormuz remaining closed. Where Iran fits better, in terms of existing literature, is compellence through exhaustion. This specific theory argues that the cost of capitulation is lower than the cost of dealing with asymmetric conflict as it utilizes a variety of means to cripple a party without using military force. This is precisely the case of Iran, as mentioned earlier, it uses different means of technology to make passage through the straits impossible. What this means for the United States is the way of handling the crisis. If Iran was a case of classical coercive diplomacy the U.S. would have to either call Iran’s bluff or absorb its impact, both being realistic options due to the U.S. superior economic and military industry. In this case however, being compellence through exhaustion, the U.S. is forced to actively engage with Iran and end the blockade of the straits, as the exhaustion reflects the western economies as a whole and not just the American one.
The European Perspective
Finally, regarding the European perspective of the conflict, it’s important to know how Europe enforces its will in times of maritime crisis. Europe relies on UN security resolutions, and the straits of Hormuz crisis is no exception. It called for a resolution operating under international law seeking a coordinated naval escort[7]. However, actors like China and Russia blocked the resolution effectively halting its way to realization. While the resolution that failed to pass has to do with the recent conflict with Iran, it reveals the bigger picture about Europe’s enforcement mechanisms. While Europe strongly condemns actions against its own interests, it fails to effectively enforce actions against them. This is especially true in maritime crisis where Europe holds an advancement in trade as Greece holds approximately 20% percent of global shipping capacity[8]. Losing such an advantage could trigger a continent-wide crisis.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Iran has redefined what it means to inflict maritime pressure and has given a new blueprint for extortion to revisionist states. This has come as a result from the use of multiple asymmetric tools designed to inflict economic damage for a prolonged period of time. Additionally, it has raised new questions for policy makers regarding the enforcement of maritime laws during crisis. The sanction policies must account for the choke point retaliatory trap which would allow a country to still have revenue rendering the sanctions useless. European policy makers on the other hand, have to reaffirm their enforcement rhetoric so it can be realized as a policy and not just a principle. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, Iran has been a completely new case to what it means exploit the world’s economy through a chokepoint. The manual has been drafted, the answers though, not yet.
Bibliography
Bueger, Christian. ‘Upcoming UN Security Council Resolution on Strait of Hormuz’. Christian Bueger, 7 April 2026. https://bueger.info/5052-2/.
Butler Gavin. ‘Iran War: What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Why Does It Matter?’ 8 April 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno.
Fleming, Eliana. ‘Maritime Nightmare: 2,000 Ships Now Trapped in World’s Most Dangerous Ch’. JFeed, 4 May 2026. https://www.jfeed.com/middleeast/strait-of-hormuz-crisis-4.
‘GPS Jamming: The Invisible Battle in the Middle East’. Accessed 20 May 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3ewwlx9e1xo.
Lloyd’s List. ‘Tehran’s “Toll Booth” System Is Now Controlling Hormuz Traffic’. 25 March 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156720/Tehrans-toll-booth-system-is-now-controlling-Hormuz-traffic.
‘Pentagon Claims Clearing Strait of Hormuz Mines Could Take 6 Months: Report’. Accessed 20 May 2026. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/pentagon-claims-clearing-strait-of-hormuz-mines-could-take-6-months-report/3915178.
Rego, Max. ‘Iran Tells US “this Is the Last Warning” in Radio Message amid Strait of Hormuz de-Mining Push: Report’. Text. The Hill, 12 April 2026. https://thehill.com/policy/international/5827704-us-iran-strait-hormuz-mines/.
‘Union of Greek Shipowners: Greek Shipping Remains a Global Leader’. Accessed 31 May 2026. https://www.naftemporiki.gr/english/2115786/union-of-greek-shipowners-greek-shipping-remains-a-global-leader/.
Endnotes
[1] Fleming, ‘Maritime Nightmare’.
[2] ‘GPS Jamming: The Invisible Battle in the Middle East’.
[3] Rego, ‘Iran Tells US “this Is the Last Warning” in Radio Message amid Strait of Hormuz de-Mining Push’.
[4] ‘Pentagon Claims Clearing Strait of Hormuz Mines Could Take 6 Months: Report’.
[5] Lloyds List, ‘Tehran’s “Toll Booth” System Is Now Controlling Hormuz Traffic’.
[6] Butler Gavin, ‘Iran War’.
[7] Bueger, ‘Upcoming UN Security Council Resolution on Strait of Hormuz’.
[8] ‘Union of Greek Shipowners: Greek Shipping Remains a Global Leader’.
