English
By Ioannis Sokos, Analyst KEDISA
Introduction
Since 2016, China and Iran attempted to upgrade their bilateral relation[1]. This fact is illustrated in the signing of the “Strategic Cooperation Partnership Agreement” in 2021, the Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2023[2], and the Chinese proposal[3] for the Iranian membership at BRICS[4]. Admittedly, through their recent approach Beijing can fulfill its geoeconomic interests and reinforce its connectivity with Arab Sea[5], while Tehran overcomes the international isolation, and strengthens its economic performance[6]. However, Sino-Iranian cooperation has raised concerns about its potential impact on Persian Gulf [7] security order. Thus, this analysis examines how Sino-Iranian recent approach influences the security architecture of the Persian Gulf region. The main thesis is that Sino-Iranian convergence exerts moderate influence in Persian Gulf security order driving to a temporary stability with the United States (US) maintaining its position as security provider and China emerging as a honest broker. Proceeding to the course of the analysis, it will be examined the impact of the approach on US and the regional actors. After that, it will be scrutinized the Chinese attitude regarding the security architecture and its military cooperation with Iran.
- US as Security Provider of the Persian Gulf
One core dynamic is the impact of Sino-Iranian relations on the US approach towards the Persian Gulf. Despite the “Asia Pivot” of US foreign policy, Washington renews its security guaranties rendering itself as the sole security provider for the Gulf states[8]. Particularly, the potential emergence of Chinese security footprint and the surge of Iranian harassment against US military presence and trade flows[9] circumvent the US interest to control the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz provoking an active US reaction[10].
Precisely, US are concerned that the strategic cooperation between China and Iran can expand the Chinese military presence and neutralize its monitoring in the region. Indeed, China attempts to indirectly infiltrate in the region through its participation at crucial infrastructural projects[11]. For instance, China invested for the construction of Iranian naval base at the coast of Makran[12] and the Chabahar port[13]. Through these critical infrastructures, China will be able to exert greater control in the trade flows, and undermine the US containment in Asia circumventing the Straits of Malacca and expanding its navy presence in the Arab Sea[14].
In parallel, US are aware about the surge of Iranian harassment against its troops sourced from Sino-Iranian approach. Substantially, China capitalizing the Iranian anti-American sentiment underpins the Iranian military pressure against US reinforcing Iranian navy and missile capabilities[15]. Indeed, Beijing provided technological equipment and scientific expertise for enhancing Iranian missile program. Proof of this fact is the Chinese permission to Iran for exploiting the Beidou 2 Navigation Satellite System in 2020 shoring up Iranian intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and ameliorating the missile efficiency. Additionally, since 2014 China and Iran conducted six navy drills[16] facilitating the information transmission concerning asymmetric warfare and terrorism[17] combat[18]. The result of its recent Chinese support is demonstrated on twenty incidents of Iranian harassment against US navy and commercial ships since 2021 in the Hormuz Straits[19].
Subsequently, the combination of Chinese infiltration and emerging Iranian harassment contradicts the US interest to control the Persian Gulf and contain China’s expansion[20]. In particular, US seek to safeguard the free flow of international commerce, which traverses the region in order to avert any potential crisis. In fact, 20% of oil flows crosses the “choke point” of Hormuz Straits increasing the geopolitical gravity of the region for the international economy and the US interests[21]. Moreover, in the frame of containment strategy US intends to deter China from the Persian Gulf, which provides access to the “deep waters”[22]. Needless to say, US intents to inhibit the Chinese navy presence in the Indian Ocean to uphold its naval dominance.[23]
With the purpose of protecting its interests towards the growing impact of Sino-Iranian approach, US reassure its commitments as the security provider of the region[24]. Apart from its already solid presence[25], US reinforced its military power deploying 3000 navy and marine personnel[26], reinforcing the 5th Fleet with new warships[27] (USS Bataan and USS Carter Hall) and adding new aircrafts[28] (a squadron of F-35 and undisclosed number of F-16 and F-22 Raptors). Concurrently, US proceeded to the advancement of security cooperation and integration of its air, missile and navy capabilities with the Gulf states. In this way, US signed the “Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement”[29] with Bahrain to expand their cooperation in technological and security field[30]. Lastly, US supported the creation of an Arab-Israeli front to reinforce the US allies’ security towards Iranian aggression. In the context of 2023 National Defence Authorization Act US Congress voted the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act in order to facilitate the security cooperation of Gulf states and Israel[31].
- Temporary Stability Between Iran and Gulf States
Another striking dynamic in the regional security order is the contribution of Sino-Iranian approach to a temporary stability between Iran and Gulf monarchies[32]. What is important to understand for this development is that China promotes stability in order to fulfill its geoeconomic interests presenting itself as credible partner[33]. In this way, the Chinese economic leverage to Iran and the Gulf states’ concerns for a potential increase of Iranian regional activities reinforce the tendency of normalization[34].
Particularly, China capitalizes the Iranian economic distress and its approach with Iran to pressure the latter in favor of normalization. To elucidate more the domestic situation, Iran is experiencing a social and economic distress[35] with currency deposit shortages, high inflation (47,5% in 2023) and poverty rates, and a deep popular resentment against the regime[36]. Given the economic pressure and public grievances, China provides a concrete alternative overcoming international sanctions and isolation[37]. Regarding the Sino-Iranian trade relations, their trade volume from January to March 2023 reached at 25,3 billion dollars[38]. Moreover, their relation is expanded also to the energy sector. China is the first importer of Iranian oil[39] increasing its imports at almost 60%[40] in 2023[41], while China National Petroleum Corporation participates in the oil field development providing equipment for extractions[42]. Another striking aspect is the inclusion of Iran in the regional transportation network. Proof of this is the proposals for the road connection between Iran and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the construction of high-speed train line from Chabahar to China and the land oil pipelines from Iran to China[43].
The above-mentioned Sino-Iranian economic relations can prompt an escalation of Iranian regional aggression pressuring Gulf states to temporarily normalize their relation with Iran[44]. In fact, Iran’s economic governance and resources management is guided from conservative clusters[45], which intend to crystallize their geopolitical ambitions without attaching weight on the economic development[46]. Subsequently, the revenues sourced from Sino-Iranian approach are distributed mainly to reinforce Iranian military activities[47]. A striking example is presented on Iran’s newly deployments in Northern Syria to counter anti-regime demonstrations[48], and the attempts to construct hypersonic Cruise Missiles[49]. At this point, it is crucial to note that China is concentrated on constraining Iranian aggression against the Gulf states, without focusing on Iranian activities in the broader Middle East[50]. Furthermore, instead of supporting recent Iranian incremental concessions[51] China provides scientific expertise, technological equipment, and supportive diplomacy in United Nations for Iranian nuclear activities[52]. Subsequently, the Iranian emerging aggression combined with US declining security footprint in Middle East enhance[53] the normalization perspective[54].
Proof of the normalization tendency is the recent agreements among Iran and Gulf monarchies. In March 2023 Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a normalization agreement with China as honest broker[55]. In fact, they accomplished the reopening of embassies, the reestablishment[56] of previous agreements[57] and the upholding of ceasefire in Yemen[58]. In addition, Iran restored its relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait in 2022[59], while China involved in UAE-Iran island dispute[60] calling for the peaceful resolution in the Joint Communique of China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in 2022[61]. Nevertheless, the dependency of Gulf states from US military power[62], the Iranian geopolitical ambitions and the regional developments[63], such as the recent Israeli-Palestinian armed conflict[64] can interrupt this fragile security vacuum.
- China as Emerging Mediator in the Persian Gulf
Regardless of the impact of Sino-Iranian approach on US and regional actors, China did not exploit its relation with Iran in order to project substantial military power. In contrast, Beijing has a soft military footprint without challenging the US military dominance yet[65]. Although both China and Iran adopt an anti-American perspective and pursuit an alternative security architecture, China acts cautiously as honest broker and not as alternative security provider[66].
In other words, China’s infiltration in Persian Gulf is related to the fulfilling of its geoeconomic interests, which are accompanied to a certain extent with a demand of regional stability[67]. Indeed, China intents to integrate the region in BRI with the creation of economic ties with all the regional actors so as to expand its economic footprint. This is illustrated not only on the 400 billion dollars strategic agreement with Iran[68], but also on the investments and commercial exchanges with the Gulf states. Indicatively, the trade volume between China-GCC member-states reached 180 billion dollars in 2021[69], while Beijing invests in 650 infrastructural projects in UAE, and in renewable energy resources infrastructure in Saudi Arabia (5,5 billion dollars)[70]. Along with the economic ties, China pursuits to safeguard its energy flows from the region. In other words, Gulf states and Iran cover almost 50% of Chinese oil imports[71] and a considerable part of its gas[72] imports[73]. However, the Chinese investments and the energy imports raise the need for stability on the basis of security-development nexus[74].
According to Professors Degang Sun and Yahia H. Zoubir, China is presented as “latent power”[75]. That is to say, that Beijing intends to protect its “soft” geoeconomic interests promoting security cooperation without either challenging other military power or integrating militarily with the regional actors[76]. This stance is crystallized in Sino-Iranian approach. Precisely, China avoids the surging of arms sales to Iran reaching at less than 30 million dollars annually since 2020[77]. Furthermore, China does not have any overseas military base in Persian Gulf and demonstrates a limited military presence[78]. On the contrary, Beijing attempts to implement a multilateral approach regarding the regional security. Substantially, China aims to cooperate with the regional actors playing the mediator’s role to resolve regional disputes. Apart from that, Beijing contributes to multilateral security schemes underpinning the SCO’s counterextremism[79] endeavors and the UN peacekeeping operations as the second troops contributing county[80].
Conclusions
Taking every aspect of the analysis into account, Sino-Iranian recent approach can be considered as a factor of moderate influence regarding the security architecture of the Persian Gulf. Precisely, the approach influences thr US to maintain and reinforce its leadership position as a security provider of the region[81]. Concurrently, the regional actors are experiencing an era of temporary stability in their relations as a result of Sino-Iranian approach[82]. On the contrary, the role of China as “latent power” of the region declining the potential instrumentalization of this bilateral approach as a way for expanding Chinese military presence and challenging the US dominance in the region[83]. Nevertheless, the trajectory of US-Chinese competition, the regional developments and the perpetual geopolitical transformation can be considered as unforeseen factors, which will be able to change the Persian Gulf security order in the future.
Endnotes
[1] YILDIRIMÇAKAR, E. (2023). THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-CHINA “NEW” STRATEGIC COOPERATION. Alternatif Politika, 15(2), pp. 350-351.
[2] Saikal, A. (2023, 4, 12). Russia and China are edging out the US in the Middle East. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-are-edging-out-the-us-in-the-middle-east/
[3] Shahidsaless, S. (2023, 9 31). The Implications of Iran’s Inclusion in BRICS. Stimson Center. Retrieved 10 23, 2023, from https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-implications-of-irans-inclusion-in-brics/#:~:text=Iran%20stands%20to%20benefit%20on,more%20trade%20with%20growing%20economies.
[4] The BRICS is an informal group of major emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which engage with economic and development issues.
[5] Ehteshami, A. (2023, 3, 7). China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf. Istituto Affari Internazionali, 23, pp. 10-13.
[6] Shahidsaless, The Implications of Iran’s Inclusion in BRICS
[7] Persian Gulf region comprises Iran, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen.
[8] Aftandilian, G. (2023, 8, 15). US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power. Arab Center Washington DC. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/us-troop-buildup-in-the-gulf-reemphasizes-military-power/
[9] Aftandilian, US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power
[10] Andersen, L. (2023). CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF. Is a New Security Architecture Evolving? In Y. Zoubir (Ed.), ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (pp. 104-106). New York: Routledge.
[11] Therme, C. (2023, 4 3). The Ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Pacific. Institut français des relations internationales, 104, pp. 1-5.
[12] Saleh, A., & Yazdanshenas, Z. (2023). China-Iran strategic partnership and the future of US hegemony in the Persian Gulf Region. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, pp. 12-15.
[13] Primarily, Iran cooperated with India for the construction of Chabahar port. However, after US involvement India step down and China initiated its support to the project.
[14] Fantappie, M., & Nasr, V. (2023, 3 22). A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Retrieved 10 23, 2023, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-relations
[15] United States Institute of Peace. (2023, 6, 28). Iran & China: Military Ties. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran-china-military-ties
[16] United States Institute of Peace, Iran & China: Military Ties
[17] YILDIRIMÇAKAR, THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-CHINA “NEW” STRATEGIC COOPERATION, p. 360
[18] In 2014 China and Iran signed an agreement for bilateral cooperation regarding counterterrorism issues.
[19] Aftandilian, US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power
[20] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 104-106
[21] Taspinar, O. (2023, 9, 5). US Military’s Strategic Doctrine and its Approach to Gulf Security. Emirates Policy Center. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://epc.ae/en/details/brief/us-military-s-strategic-doctrine-and-its-approach-to-gulf-security
[22] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 104-106
[23] According to Mackinder, sea powers (US) need to contain the Eurasian Land power (China) from getting access to deep waters in order to avoid its global dominance.
[24] Heiran-Nia, J. (2023, 9, 19). US offers new guarantees to Arab states to bolster Persian Gulf security order. Stimson Center. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.stimson.org/2023/us-offers-new-guarantees-to-arab-states-to-bolster-persian-gulf-security-order/
[25] US is the main arms exporter in the region covering the greater part of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports, which was among the top three states with the greater military expenditure in 2020. Furthermore, US has already considerable military presence with the navy base of 5th Fleet in Bahrain, the al-Udaid Air Base in Qatar and few bases in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.
[26] Aftandilian, US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power
[27] Taspinar, US Military’s Strategic Doctrine and its Approach to Gulf Security
[28] Dashtgard, M. (2023). The New US Military Step in the Middle East: Evident and Latent Goals. Middle East Political and Economic Institute. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://mepei.com/the-new-us-military-step-in-the-middle-east-evident-and-latent-goals/
[29] US conducts the same negotiations with Saudi Arabia in order to renew their security cooperation and renew American security footprint in the region.
[30] Heiran-Nia, US offers new guarantees to Arab states to bolster Persian Gulf security order
[31] Taspinar, US Military’s Strategic Doctrine and its Approach to Gulf Security
[32] Fantappie & Nasr, A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region
[33] Gerecht, R., & Takeyh, R. (2023, 9, 7). Iran’s New Patrons. Why China and Russia Are Stepping Up Their Support. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-new-patrons
[34] Figueroa, W. (2023, 3, 24). Iran-Saudi Normalization: A Regional Process with Chinese Characteristics. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/iran-saudi-normalization-a-regional-process-with-chinese-characteristics/
[35] Fulton, J., Foley, P., & Gering, T. (2023, 2, 19). China-Iran relations are warming. Here’s what the rest of the world should know. Atlantic Council. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-iran-relations-are-warming-heres-what-the-rest-of-the-world-should-know/
[36] Moore, J., Ganzeveld, A., Soltani, A., & Carl, N. (2023, 8, 16). IRAN UPDATE, AUGUST 16, 2023. INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2023
[37] Gerecht & Takeyh, Iran’s New Patrons. Why China and Russia Are Stepping Up Their Support
[38] Figueroa, Iran-Saudi Normalization: A Regional Process with Chinese Characteristics
[39] Mubarak, H. (2023, 6, 5). Saudi Arabia and Iran Restore Relations: A Victory of Necessity. Wilson Center. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-arabia-and-iran-restore-relations-victory-necessity
[40] From 917,000 barrels per day in January 2023 to 1,5 billion barrels per day in August 2023.
[41] Moore, Ganzeveld, Soltani, & Carl, IRAN UPDATE, AUGUST 16, 2023
[42] Saleh & Yazdanshenas, China-Iran strategic partnership and the future of US hegemony in the Persian Gulf Region, pp. 15-16
[43] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 108-109
[44] Mubarak, Saudi Arabia and Iran Restore Relations: A Victory of Necessity
[45] One of the core centers of Iranian economy is the Khatam al-Ambiya, the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls the revenues from oil and gas exports.
[46] Saleh & Yazdanshenas, China-Iran strategic partnership and the future of US hegemony in the Persian Gulf Region, pp. 6-7
[47] Sariolghalam, M. (2023, 6, 1). Diagnosing Iran’s emerging pivot toward Russia and China. Middle East Institute. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.mei.edu/publications/diagnosing-irans-emerging-pivot-toward-russia-and-china#:~:text=Still%2C%20it%20is%20possible%20to,continuity%20of%20the%20political%20system.
[48] Parry, A., Ganzeveld, A., & Carl, N. (2023, 9, 7). IRAN UPDATE, SEPTEMBER 7, 2023. INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-7-2023
[49] Aftandilian, US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power
[50] Gerecht & Takeyh, Iran’s New Patrons. Why China and Russia Are Stepping Up Their Support
[51] Sariolghalam, Diagnosing Iran’s emerging pivot toward Russia and China
[52] YILDIRIMÇAKAR, THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-CHINA “NEW” STRATEGIC COOPERATION, p. 351
[53] Figueroa, Iran-Saudi Normalization: A Regional Process with Chinese Characteristics
[54] In this way, Gulf states gain time to boost their military power and pressure US for a greater security commitment.
[55] Mubarak, Saudi Arabia and Iran Restore Relations: A Victory of Necessity
[56] Figueroa, Iran-Saudi Normalization: A Regional Process with Chinese Characteristics
[57] Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a General Agreement for cooperation in economic, commercial, and investment fields in 1998. In 2001, both states signed also a Security Cooperation Agreement.
[58] Fantappie & Nasr, A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region
[59] Fantappie & Nasr, A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region
[60] UAE and Iran compete about the control of the disputed islands: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf
[61] Fulton, Foley, & Gering, China-Iran relations are warming. Here’s what the rest of the world should know
[62] Leoni, Z. (2023). US- CHINA RIVALRY IN THE MENA REGION. In Y. Zoubir (Ed.), ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (pp. 94-95). New York: Routledge.
[63] Iranian-backed group Houthis launched three land attack cruise missiles and several drones potentially headed toward Israel, which were intercepted by the US navy in the Red Sea.
[64] Copp, T., & Baldor, L. (2023, 10, 20). US military shoots down missiles and drones as it faces growing threats in volatile Middle East. Associated Press. Retrieved 10, 23, 2023, from https://apnews.com/article/yemen-navy-warship-missiles-intercepted-2f5fc9c8a3737f762b29d5c53ec08a5b
[65] Leoni, US- CHINA RIVALRY IN THE MENA REGION, pp. 94-96
[66] Sariolghalam, Diagnosing Iran’s emerging pivot toward Russia and China
[67] Ehteshami, China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf, pp.13-16
[68] Ehteshami, China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf, pp.10-13
[69] Dashtgard, The New US Military Step in the Middle East: Evident and Latent Goals
[70] Ehteshami, China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf, pp. 6-9
[71] Dashtgard, The New US Military Step in the Middle East: Evident and Latent Goals
[72] Ehteshami, China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf, p. 12
[73] China signed a 27-year agreement with Qatar to import 4 million tons of liquified natural gas.
[74] Fantappie & Nasr, A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region
[75] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 111-112
[76] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 111-112
[77] United States Institute of Peace, Iran & China: Military Ties
[78] Leoni, US- CHINA RIVALRY IN THE MENA REGION, pp. 94-96
[79] YILDIRIMÇAKAR, THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-CHINA “NEW” STRATEGIC COOPERATION, p. 356
[80] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 108-109
[81] Heiran-Nia, US offers new guarantees to Arab states to bolster Persian Gulf security order
[82] Fantappie & Nasr, A New Order in the Middle East? Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region
[83] Andersen, CHINA AND US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, pp. 111-112
