English
By Francesco Mereu, Analyst KEDISA
Introduction
The decade-long civil war in Yemen has seen the emergence of the Houthis as one of the most powerful actors in the country and a pivotal force in the region with great power projection capabilities. The group, officially known as the Ansar Allah movement, captured Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014, after a prolonged conflict with the country’s Republican regime that started in 2004 amid President Saleh’s violent targeting of protesters affiliated with the group (Al Jazeera, 2015).
Over the course of the past year, the armed militia has made the headlines several times for their attacks on cargo vessels crossing the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a critical passage for international trade. As the Houthi spokesperson states, the attacks are motivated by support for the Palestinian cause and an intent to inflict damage on the United States and Israel as a form of retaliation. These actions created considerable disruption to international commerce, prompting a military response from two consecutive US administrations, Biden’s first and Trump’s later. Since taking office, President Trump has adopted a more confrontational policy than his predecessor, scaling up the use of air-strikes and threatening to expand the campaign against Iran for its role in backing the Houthis. Although the ties between Tehran and Ansar Allah are well documented, the posture of the Trump administration is underpinned by a conception of the Houthis-Iran relations entirely in proxy-patron terms.
This framing not only misses the nuance of a much more complex dynamic between the two entities, but results in a total conflation of the Iran and Yemen dossiers, as pointed out by ISPI analyst Eleonora Ardemagni (ISPI, 2025). While Iran has been supplying the Houthis with offensive and defensive weaponry, intelligence material, and financial support (UnHerd, Ostovar, 2025), one should not overlook the transactional nature of these exchanges and the different set of interests motivating the Islamic Republic and the Yemeni rebels, despite some overlap. This article delves into the Houthis’ ideology and mobilisational strategy, demonstrating that the group exercises independent agency and defines its own political agenda, both in the realm of foreign and domestic policy.
Houthis’ ideology and goals
The dominant narrative portraying the Houthis as an Iranian proxy in the Arabian Peninsula has been shaped by various intersecting geopolitical dynamics. Firstly, as Maria-Louise Clausen notes (2015), Saudi Arabia had a vested interest in overplaying the Houthis’ link to the Iranian regime to legitimise its military intervention in Yemen beginning in March 2015. By intervening in the Yemen civil war, the Saudis aimed to regionalise the conflict, gaining the upper hand in their broader rivalry with Iran. Furthermore, collocating the Houthis in the so-called “Axis of Evil”, namely the coalition of state and non-state actors led by the Islamic Republic against the West, served to exacerbate sectarian competition in the region. Saudi Arabia conveniently exploited the Houthis’ identification with Shiism to back its claim of the existence of a “Shia crescent”. This term was first used by King Abdullah the II of Jordan to characterise the Shia communities living in Arab countries as an Iranian fifth column and accusing them of undermining the region’s stability. The Saudis advanced this narrative with a twofold purpose, namely to securitise the Shia minority living within their own borders and to portray Iran as a rogue and destabilising element. In a similar way, the US’ weaponisation of the same discourse has helped justify the Yemeni campaign, despite its association with widespread civilian casualties.
One consequence of this trend has been the emphasis placed on the shared Shia identity between the Houthis and Iran. However, closer scrutiny of the group’s doctrine reveals both commonalities and divergences from Tehran’s official ideology. The perspective that there is ideological overlapping due to affiliation to Shiism ignores the fact that Twelver Shiism, the Islamic Republic’s official religion, and Zaydi Shiism, professed and practised by the Houthis’, differ considerably in terms of theology, jurisprudence, and political thought. While Twelver Shias believe that the ruler should be a religious scholar, Zaydis uphold the institution of the imamate. The imam office, according to tradition, must be held by a direct descendent of the Prophet, therefore a person of Arabic descent, who enjoys great popularity among the community of believers (Haykel, 2022). This contrasts with the Iranian constitution, which, at least officially, elevates clerical credentials over lineage and ethnicity, designating its Supreme Leader as the official guide of the Islamic world. The fundamental implication of these differences is that, unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis do not recognise Iran’s Supreme Leader as the highest authority in terms of religious and political matters. Thus, from an ideological point of view, the Houthi-Iran alliance is not one of direct influence, as often portrayed in Western media.
Moreover, the Houthis have reinterpreted traditional Zayidism, deviating from its canonical teachings to construct an ideology that draws heavily from other doctrines, such as Khomeinisim, the work of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of al-Qaeda ideologues (Ibid). The Malazim, Ansar Allah’s doctrinal text and a collection of the ideas of the group’s founder, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, contains an incoherent assemblage of ideologies. Among these, a third-worldist and anti-colonial outlook, with clear Khomeist influences, stands out for its denunciation of American and Israeli encroachment in the Middle East. This worldview informs the movement foreign policy, which resembles that of Iran for its aims of liberating the region from Western imperialism. The anti-western sentiment uniting Tehran and the Houthis shapes their perception of common adversaries, and, by extension, of common goals, but not without limitations. While Iran’s harsh rhetoric against the United States is motivated by the country’s hegemonic regional aims, the Houtis’ adoption of an anti-western posture is largely determined by the group’s intent to consolidate its power in the domestic arena.
As Jonah Carlson noted (2024), “the extent of this overlap in adversaries [between the Houthis and Iran], combined with the military support received, appears to have heavily contributed to the perception of Ansar Allah as an Iranian proxy, especially among Western news sources”. This interpretation, however, is analytically unfruitful in that it overshadows what Ardemagni defines “the centrality of the local power struggle in the group’s political agenda” (ISPI, 2023). As Alexander Weissenburg highlighted (2024), the Houthis’ bid to cement their rule in Yemen has gone through a discursive appropriation of the crucial moments of the country’s history, framing their seizure of power as the successful outcome of the people’s resistance against foreign encroachment. This process underscores the group’s efforts to build soft power and its entanglement in local political dynamics. Moreover, the Houthi’s use of historical narratives and claimed ownership of the country’s culture gives the extent of the movement’s agency in defining its goals independently from Tehran.
Conclusions
A close scrutiny of the Houthis’ doctrine suggests that there are a number of differences between the Ansar Allah’s movement and the Islamic Republic’s official ideology. These, in turn, reveal the absence of a shared framework that would indicate the group’s alignment with Iran. Contrary to the official position of Hezbollah, the Houthis do not view the Iranian Supreme Guard of the Revolution as their spiritual leader, thereby following his directives out of political calculations. While there is significant overlap on views around the US as an imperial force in the region and on support for the Palestinian cause, the reasons for endorsing these ideas are entirely different. Iran aims to capitalise on its anti-imperial posture to increase its influence throughout the region, particularly in a time where Arab leaders are perceived as subservient to America. Instead, the Houthis’ foreign policy actions, such as their operations in the Red Sea, are a reflection of their overarching aim to craft a narrative that legitimises their rule at home. By portraying their actions as the pinnacle of the movement’s commitment to free Yemen, and the entire Middle East, from foreign invaders, Ansar Allah seeks to create a “rally around the flag” momentum. This is what the group desperately needs in the face of a population that resents the Houthis’ repressive rule.
The role played by Iran in helping the Houthis maintain their position of power is undeniable, as it is their provision of military equipment and training, such as UAVs, that turned the tide in their struggle against America (Spencer, 2022). Yet, it is important to recognise the material and political motives behind this support, which point to the existence of a marriage of convenience. Understanding this distinction is as crucial for analysts as it is for policymakers, as treating Iran and the Houthi movement as separate entities—each with its own worldview, goals, and discourses—adds necessary complexity to the development of effective strategies.
References
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