By Konstantina Nikou, Analyst KEDISA
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has long counted on the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to counter potential threats in the Middle East. The two allies have worked closely to push back impending democratic changes during the Arab uprisings, and both are broadly opposed to political Islam. The UAE joined the 2011 Saudi intervention in Libya and united with the 2015 Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Then, they both imposed a blockade on Qatar in 2017 over alleged Doha support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups across the region. However, recent escalation has exposed the fragility of the Saudi-Emirati relations, and the two allies have faced minor tensions. The two Gulf countries seem to back conflicting parties in Sudan, Syria and Somalia, but the case that mainly revealed the depth of distrust between them is that of Yemen.
Since 2015, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been the two main pillars of the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi militias in Yemen. After a decade of alliance, the two partners seem to have developed competing policies as they support different actors inside the Republic of Yemen. The Emiratis are backing the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group that seeks the creation of a state of “South Arabia.” Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, supports the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which aims to unify all the anti-Houthi political functions of Yemen under one group. The PLC, which is comprised of 8 members, including the STC, was created in 2022 to serve as the executive body of the internationally recognized government.
Riyadh accused the UAE of supplying STC separatists with weapons, putting both the stability of Yemen and regional security at stake. In early December 2025, the STC launched a major offensive, taking control of the provinces of Hadramawt (which shares a long land border with Saudi Arabia) and of Al-Mahra without the PLC’s approval. The highlight of the Saudi-Emirati rift was the air strike conducted by the Saudis against an alleged UAE weapons shipment in Yemen’s Mukalla Port on December 30. While the UAE denied the accusations, it agreed to remove its remaining counterterrorism units from Yemen after the presidential council’s demand. Following the Emirati’s withdrawal, Yemeni government forces, in combination with Saudi air support, managed to take back lost military positions.
STC leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi was called to meet with the PLC and coalition forces in Riyadh to address the reasons behind this escalation, however, his delegation arrived without him at the meeting point, and he is believed to have fled the country. The PLC revoked al-Zubaidi’s membership, accusing him of high treason and of forming armed groups to destabilize the republic, while Saudi Arabia has accused the UAE of smuggling him out of the country. He is believed to have departed from the Port of Aden in Yemen to the port of Berbera in Somaliland and then boarded a plane from Mogadishu to Abu Dhabi.
While previous Saudi-Emirati disagreements over Yemeni politics were not considered as challenging, the recent alleged UAE-backed military assistance to the STC seems to have crossed the red line. The Saudis took the capture of Hadramawt by STC as a national security threat, as they would have a non-friendly group controlling a province in their backyard, but also prefer that Yemen remains unified. Emiratis on the other side could benefit from the emergence of a state of South Arabia in Yemen. A new proxy in the south of Yemen would provide them greater access to the port of Aden and would facilitate their connection to their bases on the other side of the Red Sea. The UAE has built a wide network of allies and investments, creating its own sphere of influence across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
However, it has been criticized and accused of supporting separatist groups to weaken the states in the region and boost its own power as an indispensable partner in MENA politics. It has cultivated security ties with Somaliland, along with major investments, especially in the Port of Berbera, gaining a strategic foothold in the area. They are also believed to have facilitated the Israeli recognition of Somaliland, an accusation they deny. Ιn Sudan, the UAE has also been accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group opposing the internationally recognized government.
These moves seem to undermine the Saudi leadership in the region, deepening the competition between the two Gulf states and leading to regional fragmentation. Countries in the region already appear to be taking sides, with Egypt stating that it is aligned with the Saudis regarding the conflicts unraveling in Yemen and Sudan. The UAE’s rapid withdrawal of forces indicates that they do not wish to escalate the tensions with the Saudis. However, the decision of Saudi Arabia to bomb the Emirati shipments in the port of Mukalla constitutes an indirect strike on the UAE, revealing that the Kingdom is running out of patience with Abu Dhabi’s independent foreign policy. This friction, if deepened, could destabilize the Arab front and create opportunities for states like Iran and Turkey, as well as non-state actors like the Houthis, to exploit emerging power vacuums.
Sources
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia. (2025, December 25). Retrieved from X: https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/2004054792222437664
Schaer, C. (2026, January 6). Saudi Arabia, UAE and a new ‘Cold War’ in the Middle East. Retrieved from: DW: https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-uae-tensions-relations-yemen-sudan-middle-east-cold-war/a-75409779
United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defence. (2026, January 2). Retrieved from X: https://x.com/modgovae/status/2007176702607380899
