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**ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΕΩΝ
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ANALYSES**

**Strategic documents on Security, Defence & Intelligence
issued by regional & international actors in 2025**

Research Paper No. 128

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March 2026

ΚΕΔΙΣΑ KEDISA

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Heraklion (Crete, Greece), 26 March 2026

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Abstract

The research paper reviews several security, defence and intelligence documents of strategic nature that were published in 2025 by state and non-state actors such as China, the European Union (EU), Denmark, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (USA). Its purpose is to provide a brief overview of the content of these documents in order to highlight the actors' goals and intentions, and identify the dynamics and emerging trends of the contemporary security environment. Moreover, it provides links to the official websites of each actor, through which readers can access the original documents and further investigate its content depending on the their research interest.

Key words: Security, Defence, Intelligence, Strategy, Foreign Policy, United States, France, United Kingdom, China, Denmark, European Union

Abbreviations

ATA	Annual Threat Assessment
CNRLT	National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination
DDIS	Danish Defence Intelligence Service
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
EDIS	European Defence Industrial Strategy
EU	European Union
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIB	European Investment Bank
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
GSMS	Global Strategy for Maritime Security
IC	Intelligence Community
NEC	National Escape Clause
NSC	National Security Council
NSR	National Strategic Review
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODNI	Office of Director of National Intelligence
PRC	People's Republic of China
SAFE	Security and Action for Europe
SCIO	State Council Information Office
SDAP	Security and Defence Action Plan
SDP	Security and Defence Partnerships
SGDSN	General Secretariat for Defense and National Security
SGP	Stability and Growth Pact
S&D	Security & Defence
UK	United Kingdom
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
USA	United States of America
WPED	White Paper for European Defence
WPNS	White Paper on National Security

1. Introduction

Investigating the content of regional and international actors' strategic documents provides useful insight to their strategic objectives, facilitating analysts, researchers and/or scholars that deal with International Relations (IR) to map the emerging dynamics and identify geopolitical trends. Therefore, it allows a more accurate assessment of the impact that their interaction has on several policy fields, regions, and domains. Acknowledging this, the author has published a number of research papers that analyse the content of several strategic documents, as follows:

- a. International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022.¹
- b. National Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Cybersecurity, National Defence, Maritime Security, Risk Analysis and Foresight Strategic Documents Issued by Regional and International Actors in 2023.²
- c. Intelligence strategic documents issued by international & regional state actors in 2024.³
- d. Security & Defence Strategic documents issued by regional & international actors in 2024.⁴

Building upon the aforementioned research papers, the current one presents (in chronological order) several strategic documents issued by regional and international actors in 2025, highlighting their institutional framework, content (chapters, parts, etc.), and key points. These documents include the following:

¹ Koukakis, G. (2023). International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022 [Research paper No. 90]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26099.60969>

² Koukakis, G. (2024). National Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Cybersecurity, National Defence, Maritime Security, Risk Analysis and Foresight Strategic Documents Issued by Regional and International Actors in 2023 [Research paper No. 104]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11150.13121>

³ Koukakis, G. (2025). Intelligence strategic documents issued by international & regional state actors in 2024 [Research paper No. 113]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19847.30888>

⁴ Koukakis, G. (2025). Security & Defence Strategic documents issued by regional & international actors in 2024 [Research paper No. 116]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27781.26085>

- a. The *Global Strategy for Maritime Security* of Denmark.
- b. The *National Intelligence Strategy* of France.
- c. The *White Paper for European Defence* of the EU.
- d. The *Annual Threat Assessment* of the United States.
- e. The *European Preparedness Union Strategy* of the EU.
- f. The *European Internal Security Strategy* of the European Union.
- g. The *White Paper on National Security* of China.
- h. The *National Security Strategy* of the United Kingdom.
- i. The *National Strategic Review* of France.
- j. The *National Security Strategy* of the United States.

2. Basic terminology

In order for the content of this research paper to be fully comprehended, certain terminology related to security, defence & intelligence –depending on the reader’s academic and/or professional background– needs to be clarified. Nevertheless, since the basic terms have been explained in several of the author’s published work, they will only be listed, also citing the research papers in which the reader can refer to for further details. Hence, the basic terms that need to be understood are the following:

- a. *Security* and its difference from the similar term *defence*.⁵
- b. *Threat* and its difference from the similar term *risk*.⁶
- c. *Foreign policy* and its connection with *strategy*.⁷

⁵ Koukakis, G. (2024). National Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Cybersecurity, National Defence, Maritime Security, Risk Analysis and Foresight Strategic Documents Issued by Regional and International Actors in 2023 [Research paper No. 104]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11150.13121>

⁶ Ibid.

- d. *Foresight* and its importance for *risk assessment/analysis* and *strategic planning*.⁸
- e. *Intelligence* and its different categories.⁹

Figure 1. The Global Strategy for Maritime Security of Denmark (front cover)



Source: <https://www.fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/2025/-global-strategy-for-maritime-security-1-.pdf>

3. The Global Strategy for Maritime Security of Denmark

The Global Strategy for Maritime Security (GSMS) of Denmark is a strategic document that was published on 6 February 2025.¹⁰ Its institutional framework, content,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Koukakis, G. (2025). Intelligence strategic documents issued by international & regional state actors in 2024 [Research paper No. 113]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19847.30888>

¹⁰ Denmark MFA [@DanishMFA]. (2025, February 6). "Today we launch the Global Strategy for Maritime Security. Threats to international shipping continue to rise. Important that Denmark continue to engage in strong international cooperation to actively safeguard the freedom of navigation." [Tweet]. Twitter. <https://x.com/DanishMFA/status/1887509730228060519>

and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

3.1 Institutional framework

The Danish 2025 GSMS was published by the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (MFA) and is an unclassified document developed by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Business and Industry, that “sets the direction for and ensures a coordinated Danish effort for global maritime security. It ensures that the Danish instruments and efforts to counter threats to the freedom of navigation are coordinated”.¹¹

3.2 Content of the document

The 2025 GSMS is a 32 pages-long document,¹² comprising the following parts:

- a. **Part 1:** Introduction (p. 2).
- b. **Part 2:** Principles and Focus (pp. 3-6), comprising the following three subparts:
 - (1) Principles (*Figure 2*).
 - (2) Priorities.
 - (3) Areas of action.
- c. **Part 3:** Threats to Maritime Security (pp. 7-17), comprising the following three subparts:
 - (1) Wars and conflicts.
 - (2) Criminal attacks.
 - (3) Exploitation of vulnerabilities by criminals.

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (n.d.). Maritime Security. <https://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/global-strategy-for-maritime-security>

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2025). *Global Strategy for Maritime Security 2025-2028* [Official document]. <https://www.fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/2025/-global-strategy-for-maritime-security-1-.pdf>

d. **Part 4:** Denmark's Strategic Initiatives (pp. 18-29), comprising the following three subparts:

(1) Efforts and activities at sea.

(2) Partnerships on information sharing and effective monitoring of the maritime domain.

(3) Capacity building and international cooperation.

e. **Part 5:** Implementing Authorities and Audit Mechanism (pp. 30-32).

Figure 2. The principles of the Global Strategy for Maritime Security of Denmark



Source: Denmark's GSMS (2025: 3)

3.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author's perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the Danish 2025 GSMS are the following:

a. Denmark –acknowledging that maritime security is a vital component of its national security– established in 2021 a *Special Representative for Maritime Security* in an effort to coordinate all governmental policies and actions in order to promote issues relevant to maritime security.

b. The private sector plays an important role in maritime security issues; therefore the public sector must cooperate closely with the former in order to increase the effectiveness of the respective policies.

c. The promotion of International Law –specially the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS)– is an integral part of Denmark’s GSMS.

d. Maritime security is closely related to *freedom of navigation*, and can be enhanced not only by addressing threats and risks, but also by minimising the state’s *vulnerabilities*.

e. Cooperation with third parties as far as information sharing and capacity-building is concerned can significantly enhance a state’s maritime security.

f. Wars and conflicts can severely affect maritime security, by disturbing the free passage of ships through several *choke points* (Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan Strait, etc.) and the proper functioning of respective infrastructure.

g. Denmark contributes to a number of maritime operations around the world, such as in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Horn of Africa. It also participates in several maritime forums such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum.

h. Maritime threats include traditional threats such as piracy and criminal attacks, but also non-traditional ones such as cyberattacks, cyber-espionage, etc.

I. Maritime security requires the cooperation of many Danish agencies, such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), the Danish Maritime Authority, and the National Police.

4. The National Intelligence Strategy of France

The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) of France is a strategic document that was published on 24 February 2025.¹³ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points


¹³ Élysée. (2025, February 24). National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination. <https://www.elysee.fr/en/national-intelligence-and-counter-terrorism-coordination>

regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

4.1 Institutional framework

The French 2025 NIS was published by the *National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination* (CNRLT) and is an unclassified document that acts as roadmap for the French Intelligence Community, guided and coordinated by the CNRLT whose mission is “*the coordination of the general activities of the intelligence services, and [...] the steering of all the services contributing to the fight against terrorism*”.¹⁴

Figure 3. The National Intelligence Strategy of France (front cover)



Source: <https://www.dirittoue.info/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/France-National-intelligence-strategy-1.pdf>

4.2 Content of the document

The 2025 NIS is a 40 pages-long document, comprising the following parts:

- a. **Part 1:** The intelligence community (p. 4).

¹⁴ Ibid.

- b. **Part 2:** What is the public intelligence policy? (p. 5).
- c. **Part 3:** Forward by the National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Pascal Mailhos (p. 6).
- d. **Part 4:** Pillar 1 - Understanding global developments and preparing for strategic challenges (pp. 7-12).
- e. **Part 5:** Pillar 2 - Intelligence for decision-making and action (pp. 13-18).
- f. **Part 6:** Pillar 3 - Sharing, cooperating and working for our security in France, in Europe and worldwide (pp. 19-24).
- g. **Part 7:** Pillar 4 - Intelligence within the rule of law (pp. 25-30).
- h. **Part 8:** Pillar 5 - Harnessing all the necessary technologies for intelligence activities (pp. 31-36).
- i. **Part 9:** Pillar 6 - Attracting and promoting skills in the French intelligence community (pp. 37-40).

4.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the French 2025 NIS are the following:

- a. The contemporary *strategic environment* is deteriorating, while some of its main characteristics are the persistence of global threats, the unbridled economic competition, the development of hybrid strategies, and the unrestrained use of force in addition to the intensification of armed conflicts.
- b. Some of the most dangerous *threats* to the society of France are violent extremism, separatist ideologies and disinformation, while the most pressing *challenges* include the identification of emerging threats, cooperation between the IC and the private sector.

c. Intelligence is a necessity for policy-makers, as it allows them to make more effective decisions by minimising risk, and cooperation between the respective services is a must.

d. The work of the French IC must not be seen isolated in national level, but in the context of the EU and NATO as well, exercising its basic principles of: *cohesion*, *suitability*, and *decompartmentalization*. Collaboration is a key element of success, and as far as intelligence is concerned France has exhibited that through its *Intelligence College in Europe* initiative that was launched in 2019.

e. The work of IC must be legitimate, that is why has taken specific measures that inter alia provide for the oversight of the intelligence services and guarantee human rights.

f. Intelligence activities are closely related to technological development, therefore the IC needs to invest in innovation (especially AI) in order to mitigate vulnerabilities, and leverage opportunities.

g. Personnel is the foundation of every intelligence service, therefore upgrading its skills, attracting talents, fostering mobility, and rewarding its work is crucial for retaining the IC's high standards.

5. The EU's White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030

The White Paper for European Defence (WPED) of the EU is a strategic document that was published on 19 March 2025.¹⁵ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

5.1 Institutional framework

The 2025 WPED was published by the *European Commission* and the *High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission* (HR/VP) and is an unclassified document that was developed in the context

¹⁵ European Commission. (2025, March 19) Commission unveils the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_793

of the EU's effort to enhance the defence sector in national (member states) and collective (European) level, and address the emerging security challenges. According to the document, its purpose is to *“strengthen the defence industry by closing important gaps and ensuring long-term readiness. It also suggests ways for Member States to invest heavily in defence, buy necessary equipment, and support the industry’s growth over time”*.¹⁶

Figure 4. The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 of the EU (front cover)



Source: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%202030.pdf

5.2 Content of the document

The 2025 *WPED* is a 21 pages-long document,¹⁷ comprising the following parts:

¹⁶ European Commission. (2025, December 23). Introducing the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan- Readiness 2030. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en

¹⁷ European Commission. (2025). White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 [Official document]. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%202030.pdf

- a. **Part 1:** Introduction (pp. 2-3).
- b. **Part 2:** A rapidly deteriorating strategic context (pp. 4-5).
- c. **Part 3:** European Readiness 2030 (p. 6).
- d. **Part 4:** Closing the gaps (pp. 6-10).
- e. **Part 5:** Increased military support for Ukraine (“Porcupine strategy”) (pp. 10-12).
- f. **Part 6:** A strong & innovative defence industry in Europe (pp. 12-16).
- g. **Part 7:** A surge in defence spending (pp. 16-18).
- h. **Part 8:** Enhanced security through partnerships (pp. 18-19).
- i. **Part 9:** The way forward for European Defence (pp. 20-21).

5.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the EU 2025 WPED are the following:

a. The security environment is characterised by Russia’s perception that the War in Ukraine is a war between itself and the West, China’s non-transparent military build-up, geopolitical rivalries in the Middle East, instability and increasing violent extremism in Africa, growing hybrid threats, competition for technological dominance, and critical infrastructure insecurity (especially as far as critical raw materials supply is concerned).

b. According to the document, the EU’s main goal is to:


(1) Facilitate greater collaboration and efficient scale for the European defence industry in developing, producing and marketing weapons systems.

(2) Facilitate efficiencies, interchangeability and interoperability, lowering costs by avoiding competitive purchasing and improving purchasing power for Member States, while helping to generate stability and predictability with multi-year industrial demand.

(3) Support dual-use infrastructure for mobility and space-based communications, navigation, and observation.

(4) Enable partnerships.

Figure 5. The Critical Defence Capability Areas for action at EU level (initial priority)



Source: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en

c. The European Defence needs to focus on several areas in order to close its capability gaps, starting from nine critical defence capability areas (*Figure 5*).

d. Defence regulations must be simplified and harmonized throughout the EU member states, and strategic stockpiles in addition to defence industrial readiness pools need to be created.

e. Military support for Ukraine needs to be increased in order to enhance its resilience, as “*The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole*”.

f. The European defence industrial productivity (especially as far as disruptive technologies are concerned) needs to be increased, dependencies must be reduced to ensure security of supply, an EU-wide defence market must be created, and innovation needs to be facilitated via skills and talent attraction.

g. The EU aims to facilitate its member states’ defence spending through several instruments such as the *Security and Action for Europe (SAFE)*, the *National Escape Clause (NEC)* of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the *Security and Defence Action Plan (SDAP)* of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the *European Stability Mechanism (ESM)*,

h. Security challenges can be achieved more efficiently through collaboration with European, American and Indo-pacific partners (such as the NATO, the EU, the UK, Norway, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand), as well as like-minded and candidate states (such as Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia, Switzerland, and Türkiye).

6. The Annual Threat Assessment of the United States

The *Annual Threat Assessment (ATA)* of the United States is a strategic document that was published on 25 March 2025, under Trump 2.0 administration.¹⁸ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

6.1 Institutional framework

ATA is an unclassified strategic document of the U.S. *Intelligence Community (IC)*¹⁹ published annually by ODNI,²⁰ aiming at providing an “*evaluation of current threats to U.S. national security, including cyber and technological threats, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, crime, environmental and natural resources issues, and economic issues*”.²¹

6.2 Content of the document

The 2025 ATA is a 30 pages-long document,²² comprising the following parts:

- a. An **Introduction** part (p. 2).
- b. A **Foreword** part (p. 4).

¹⁸ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). *2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* [Press release]. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4058-2025-annual-threat-assessment>


¹⁹ The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) comprises two independent agencies, nine Department of Defence (DoD) elements, and seven elements of other departments and agencies. For more information visit Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). *Members of the IC*. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>

²⁰ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*. <https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment>

²¹

²² Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* [Official document]. <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf>

Figure 6. The U.S. 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (front cover)



Source: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf>

c. **Part 1:** Nonstate Transnational Criminals and Terrorists (pp. 5-8), divided into the following three sub-parts:

- (1) Foreign Illicit Drug Actors.
- (2) Transnational Islamic Extremists.
- (3) Other Transnational Criminals.

d. **Part 2:** Major State Actors (pp. 9-30), divided into the following five sub-parts:

- (1) China.
- (2) Russia.
- (3) Iran.
- (4) North Korea.

(5) Adversarial Cooperation.

6.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the U.S. 2025 ATA are the following:

a. The main state actors described as *illicit drug* actors’ hosts are Mexico, Colombia, and China.

b. The main regions described as *transnational Islamic* actors’ hosts are South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and West Africa, while ISIS is characterised in the 2025 ATA as “*the world’s largest Islamic terrorist organization*”.

c. The main state actor described as *transnational criminals*’ host is Mexico,

d. *China* is described as the United States’ most capable hostile state actor, threatening the U.S. military, cyber, economic, technological, nuclear, bio, and space security through a large number of malign activities influence operations and disinformation.

e. *Russia* is characterised as a potential threat to the United States through its military, cyber, malign influence, nuclear, technological, and space capabilities, while its objective is assessed to be the restoration of its influence in its near abroad.

f. *Iran* continues to pose a threat to the U.S. national security mainly through its military, cyber, malign influence, and nuclear capabilities, while the document clearly states that it is assessed that “*Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so*”.

g. *North Korea* is the last state actor described as a threat to the United States’ national security, mainly through the former’s nuclear, military and cyber capabilities.

h. The 2025 ATA emphasises on the U.S. adversaries’ coordinated actions against it, referring that:

“This alignment increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another. China is critical to this alignment and its global significance, given the PRC’s particularly ambitious goals, and powerful capabilities and influence in the world. U.S. adversaries’ cooperation has nevertheless been uneven and driven mostly by a shared interest in circumventing or undermining U.S. power, whether it be economic, diplomatic, or military”.

7. The European Preparedness Union Strategy of the EU

The European Preparedness Union Strategy (EPUS) of the EU is a strategic document that was published on 26 March 2025.²³ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

7.1 Institutional framework

The 2025 WPED was published by the *European Commission* and the HR/VP and is an unclassified document that was developed in the context of the EU’s effort “*to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises*”.²⁴

7.2 Content of the document

The 2025 EPUS is a 17 pages-long document,²⁵ comprising the following parts:

- a. An **Introduction** part (pp. 1-3).
- b. **Part 1: Foresight and anticipation** (pp. 3-5).

²³ European Commission. (2025, March 26). EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises [Press release].

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_856

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ European Commission. (2025). *JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the European Preparedness Union Strategy* [Official document].

<https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520-b6a6e0de6986/file.bin>

Figure 7. The European Preparedness Union Strategy of the EU (front cover)



Source: <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520-b6a6e0de6986/file.bin>

- c. **Part 2:** Resilience (*Figure 8*) of vital societal functions (pp. 5-8).
- d. **Part 3:** Population preparedness (pp. 8-10).
- e. **Part 4:** Public - Private cooperation (pp. 11-12).
- f. **Part 5:** Civil - Military cooperation (pp. 12-14).
- g. **Part 6:** Crisis response (pp. 14-15).
- h. **Part 7:** Resilience through external partnerships (pp. 15-17).
- i. **Part 8:** Conclusion and way forward (p. 17).

7.3 Key points of the document


Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the EU 2025 PUS are the following:

a. The 2025 EPUS is based on an *integrated all-hazards* approach,²⁶ a *whole-of-government* approach, and a *whole-of-society* approach.

b. As far as *foresight and anticipation* are concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

- (1) Develop an EU comprehensive risks and threats assessment.
- (2) Set up a ‘crisis dashboard’ for decision-makers.
- (3) Strengthen the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC).
- (4) Develop an EU catalogue for training and a platform for lessons learned.
- (5) Establish an EU Earth Observation Governmental Service (EOGS).

Figure 8. Sectors related to the resilience of vital societal functions



Source: EPUS (2025: 6)

²⁶ The key risks being addressed include *natural disasters* (floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change), *human-induced disasters* (industrial accidents, technological failures, and pandemics), *hybrid threats* (cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and FIMI, and sabotage of critical infrastructure), and *geopolitical crises* (armed conflicts, including the possibility of armed aggression against Member States).

c. As far as *resilience of vital societal functions* is concerned (Figure 8), it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

- (1) Embed preparedness by design into EU policies and actions.
- (2) Adopt minimum preparedness requirements.
- (3) Revise the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
- (4) Propose an EU Stockpiling Strategy.
- (5) Propose a Climate Adaptation Plan.
- (6) Ensure supply of water and other critical natural resources.

d. As far as *population preparedness* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

- (1) Improve early warning systems.
- (2) Increase awareness about risks and threats.
- (3) Develop guidelines to reach a population self-sufficiency of minimum 72 hours.
- (4) Include preparedness in school education curricula and training of educational staff.
- (5) Promote preparedness in youth programmes.
- (6) Attract talent to reinforce the EU's preparedness.

e. As far as *public-private cooperation* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

- (1) Establish a public-private Preparedness Task Force.
- (2) Develop public-private emergency protocols.

(3) Revise the public procurement framework.

(4) Establish a European Centre of Expertise on Research Security.

f. As far as *civil-military cooperation* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

(1) Establish comprehensive civil-military preparedness arrangements.

(2) Develop standards for civilian-military dual use planning and investment.

(3) Organise regular EU exercises to promote comprehensive preparedness.

g. As far as *crisis response coordination* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

(1) Set up an EU crisis coordination hub.

(2) Boost rescEU – EU-level reserve of response capacities.

h. As far as *resilience through external partnerships* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

(1) Advance mutual resilience with candidate countries.

(2) Integrate preparedness and resilience into bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions.

(3) Integrate preparedness and resilience into the cooperation with NATO.

(4) Develop mutual resilience through external economic and development policies.

i. It must also be stressed that the 2025 EPUS is complemented by an Annex containing an *Action Plan* that defines an indicative timeline for each action.²⁷

²⁷ European Commission. (2025). *ANNEX to the JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the European Preparedness Union Strategy*
Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA)

8. The European Internal Security Strategy of the EU

The *European Internal Security Strategy (EISS)* of the EU is a strategic document that was published on 1 April 2025.²⁸ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

8.1 Institutional framework

The 2025 EISS was published by the *European Commission* and is an unclassified document that was developed in the context of the EU's effort to “*address increasing security and hybrid threats like terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, and attacks on critical infrastructure, Europe needs to review its approach to internal security*”.²⁹

8.2 Content of the document

The 2025 EISS is a 28 pages-long document,³⁰ comprising the following parts:

- a. **Part 1:** ProtectEU: A European Internal Security Strategy (pp. 1-3).
- b. **Part 2:** Integrated situational awareness and threat analysis (pp. 3-4).
- c. **Part 3:** Strengthened EU security capabilities (pp. 4-10).
- d. **Part 4:** Resilience against hybrid threats and other hostile acts (pp. 10-18).
- e. **Part 5:** Tightening the net on serious and organised crime (pp. 18-22).
- f. **Part 6:** Combating terrorism and violent extremism (pp. 22-25).

[Official document]. <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/18537b82-f73b-46ff-b1bb-4c7e02d4404a/file.bin>

²⁸ European Commission. (2025, April 1). Commission unveils ProtectEU – a new European Internal Security Strategy [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_920

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ European Commission. (2025). *COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy* [Official document]. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148>

- g. **Part 7:** The EU as a strong global player on security (pp. 25-28).
- h. **Part 8:** Conclusion (p. 28).

Figure 9. The European Internal Security Strategy of the EU (front cover)



Source: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148>

8.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the EU 2025 EISS are the following:

a. Internal security must be guided by three *principles*; (i) a whole-of-society approach, (ii) the integration and mainstream of security considerations effort across all EU legislation, policies and programmes, and (iii) adequate investments by the EU, its member states and the private sector.

b. Key internal security threats include hybrid threats, organised crime, and terrorism.

c. As far as *integrated situational awareness and threat analysis* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to develop and present regular threat analyses for EU internal security challenges, and the EU member states to enhance intelligence sharing with the *Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity* (SIAC), and ensure better information sharing with EU agencies and bodies. Moreover, the document refers that the EU intends to establish an *Integrated Security Operations Centre* (ISOC).

d. As far as *strengthened EU security capabilities* are concerned, it defines that the EU needs to implement the following actions:

(1) Adopt a number of legislative proposals to transform Europol, strengthen Eurojust, reinforce FRONTEX, and establish a European Critical Communications System (ECCS).

(2) Assume several initiatives to enable lawful access to data, strengthen operational law enforcement cooperation, and create a Security Research & Innovation Campus.

(3) Increase interoperability and strengthen the travel information framework.

e. As far as *resilience against hybrid threats and other hostile acts* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure, reinforce cybersecurity, secure transport hubs and ports, and combat online threats.

f. As far as *tightening the net on serious and organised crime* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to propose stronger rules to tackle organised crime networks, decrease youth vulnerability to recruitment into crime in the EU, and minimize access to criminal tools and assets.

g. As far as *combating terrorism and violent extremism* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to prevent radicalisation, secure online and public spaces, throttle financing channels and respond to attacks when they occur.

h. As far as *the role of the EU as a strong global player on security* is concerned, it defines that the EU needs to boost operational cooperation through partnerships with key

regions (Eastern Europe, Latin America, South & Central Asia, West Africa, and the Mediterranean), and leverage EU tools and instruments such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Visa policy and information exchange.

9. The White Paper on National Security of China

The Chinese White Paper entitled “China's National Security in the New Era” is a strategic document that was published on 12 May 2025.³¹ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

9.1 Institutional framework

The Chinese 2025 White Paper on National Security (WPNS) was published by the *State Council Information Office* (SCIO) and is the first of its kind unclassified document regarding national security,³² following the 2013 initiative of establishing a *Chinese National Security Commission* (CNSC),³³ an attempt of China to address national security in a holistic way. The 2025 WPNS “*takes the people's security as its ultimate goal, political security as the fundamental task, and national interests as the guiding principle. It is also one that serves and promotes high-quality development, supports further expansion of high-level opening up, and operates under the rule of law*”.³⁴

9.2 Content of the document

According to the document's abstract that has been published by the SCIO,³⁵ the 2025 WPNS comprises the following parts:

- a. **Part 1:** China injects certainty and stability into a world of change and disorder.

³¹ The State Council of the PRC. (2025, May 12). China releases white paper on national security [Press Release]. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/12/content_WS6821a417c6d0868f4e8f279b.html

³² The State Council Information Office. (2025, May 12). *China's national security in new era* [Official document (in Chinese)]. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202505/t20250512_894771.html

³³ Kejin, Z. (2015). China's National Security Commission. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2015/07/chinas-national-security-commission>

³⁴ The State Council Information Office. (2025, May 13). Abstract of white paper on China's national security in new era. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-05/13/content_117871660.html

³⁵ Ibid.

- b. **Part 2:** A holistic approach to national security guides national security efforts in the new era.
- c. **Part 3:** Providing solid support for the steady and continued progress of Chinese modernization.
- d. **Part 4:** Reinforcing security in development and pursuing development in security.
- e. **Part 5:** Implementing the Global Security Initiative and promoting the common security of the world.
- f. **Part 6:** Advancing the modernization of the national security system and capacity through deepening reforms.

9.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the Chinese 2025 WPNS are the following:

- a. China desires the *rejuvenation* of the Chinese nation, and seeks regional peace and development.
- b. The applied *holistic approach* of national security takes into consideration several of its components such as people’s security, political security, economic security, military security, technological security, cultural security, and social security, also promoting international security.
- c. China aspires to advance its modernisation, focusing on high-quality development, national territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests.
- d. China acknowledges the fact that security and development are two closely interconnected terms, and that cooperation is the foundation of them.
- e. Emphasises on the implementation of the *Global Security Initiative* (GSI) in order to promote world peace and prevent conflicts.

10. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United Kingdom is a strategic document that was published on 24 June 2025.³⁶ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

10.1 Institutional framework

The British 2025 NSS was published by the *Cabinet Office* and is an unclassified document that was developed in the context of the UK's effort to address national security in a comprehensive way, while the government stated that its purpose is “*to identify the main challenges we face as a nation in an era of radical uncertainty, to describe the key principles underlying the government's approach to these challenges, and to explain the actions the government will be taking in response*”.³⁷

10.2 Content of the document

The 2025 NSS is a 51 pages-long document, comprising the following parts:


- a. A **Foreword** by the Prime Minister Keir Starmer (pp. 4-6).
- b. An **Introduction** part (pp. 8-12).
- c. **Part 1: The Strategic Context: Navigating an era of radical uncertainty** (pp. 14-18), comprising the following three subparts:
 - (1) Confrontation.
 - (2) Competition.
 - (3) Cooperation.

³⁶ Government of the United Kingdom. (2025, June 24). National Security Strategy 2025: Security for the British People in a Dangerous World [Press release]. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-2025-security-for-the-british-people-in-a-dangerous-world>

³⁷ Ibid.

d. **Part 2:** Strategic Framework (pp. 20-49), comprising the following three subparts:

Figure 10. The National Security Strategy of the UK (front cover)




Source: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/685ab0da72588f418862075c/E03360428_National_Security_Strategy_Accessible.pdf

- (1) **Pillar (i) – Security at Home**, divided into the following three sections:
 - (a) Defend our territory.
 - (b) Make the UK a harder target.
 - (c) Build resilience to future threats.

- (2) **Pillar (ii) – Strength Abroad**, divided into the following three sections:
 - (a) Bolster collective security.
 - (b) Renew and deepen our alliances.
 - (c) Develop new relationships in new domains.

Figure 11. The UK National Security Strategic Framework



Source: UK NSS (2025: 19)

(3) **Pillar (iii) – Increase Sovereign and Asymmetric Capabilities**, divided into the following three sections:

- (a) Rebuild our defence industrial base.
- (b) Identify, nurture and protect other sovereign capabilities.
- (c) Pursue asymmetric advantage.

e. **Part 3: Conclusion** (p. 51).

10.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the British 2025 NSS are the following:

a. Security culture is essential in addressing national security threats and safeguarding a state’s national interests.

b. National security cannot be achieved in a passive way, by just managing threats. A state must also take active measures to deny its enemy’s capabilities, and utilize the capabilities of its armed forces, intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies.

c. Protecting a state’s people and the homeland –especially from military threats that are growing nowadays– is the core mission of every national security policy.

d. Authoritarianism is emerging as a new threat, as like-minded states are cooperating to out-compete democratic states.

e. Alliances and partnerships enable states to deter and address threats more effectively. The UK will pursue a “NATO first” approach in its defence, highlighting the UK’s strategic role in the Alliance, and seek new partners all around the world.

f. Cooperation between the public and private sector in several fields such as the defence industry increases a state’s resilience, its capacity to address threats, and helps its economy grow.

g. Technology plays a vital role in national security, as it creates vulnerabilities but also helps managing threats. Therefore, a state needs to invest in science & research (S&R) to be able to develop new technologies, and exploit new strategic domains in order to create asymmetric advantage.


h. Ukraine needs to be further supported to be able to defend itself against Russia, and the UK is playing a leading role in this effort.

i. The UK will also seek to strengthen its relations with the EU in several policy fields, starting with the Security & Defence Partnership (SDP) that has signed.

11. The National Strategic Review of France

The National Strategic Review (NSR) of France is a strategic document that was published on 14 July 2025.³⁸ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

Figure 12. The National Strategic Review of France (front cover)



Source: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250713_NP_SGDSN_RNS2025_EN_0.pdf

11.1 Institutional framework

The French 2025 NSR was published by the *General Secretariat for Defense and National Security* (SGDSN), is an unclassified document, and it is an update of the previous version published in 2022.³⁹ As far as its purpose is concerned, the document

³⁸ Cordet, M. (2025). French National Strategic Review 2025: What European Perspectives?. *Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques*. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ProgIndusDef_2025_09_RNS_Note_EN.pdf

³⁹ For more information about the 202 NSR of France see: Koukakis, G. (2023). International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022 [Research paper No. 90]. *Center for International Strategic Analyses*. 11-12. <https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26099.60969>

according to its Introduction part (p. 7) “*analyses the changing strategic context and its consequences for France and its partners, and sets out the ambition to be achieved by 2030 to guarantee the defence and security of our nation and Europe, in conjunction with the efforts made by its partners and allies*”.

11.2 Content of the document

The 2025 NSR is a 96 pages-long document,⁴⁰ comprising the following parts:

- a. A **Foreword** by President Emmanuel Macron (pp. 1-2).
- b. An **Introduction** part (pp. 5-7).
- c. **Part 1:** Evolution of the Strategic context since 2022 (pp. 9-27), comprising the following two subparts:

(1) Assessment of changes in the strategic environment, divided into the following sections:

- (a) A rapid deterioration in global security.
- (b) Transatlantic solidarity and strategic stability under pressure.
- (c) Expansion of areas of conflict, simultaneous and intertwined crises.

(2) Consequences for France, Europe and the international order, divided into the following sections:

- (a) Europeans facing the risk of war and strategic isolation.
- (b) The nuclear factor at the heart of power relations.
- (c) The challenge of regional realignments for French and European interests.
- (d) Security risks that undermine democracies.

⁴⁰ General Secretariat for Defense and National Security. (2025). *National Strategic Review 2025* [Official document]. https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250713_NP_SGDSN_RNS2025_EN_0.pdf

(e) Restricted freedom of action and projection.

(f) Economic and technological warfare.

(g) Conclusion.

d. **Part 2:** An updated 2030 ambition, backed by appropriate resources (pp. 29-81), comprising the following 11 Strategic Objectives (SO):

(1) **SO 1:** A robust and credible nuclear deterrent.

(2) **SO 2:** A united and resilient France: contributing to the moral rearmament of the nation to deal with crises.

(3) **SO 3:** An economy prepared for war.

(4) **SO 4:** First class cyber resilience.

(5) **SO 5:** France as a reliable ally in the Euro-Atlantic area.

(6) **SO 6:** France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy.

(7) **SO 7:** France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security.

(8) **SO 8:** Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty.

(9) **SO 9:** The capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields.

(10) **SO 10:** The ability to achieve decisive outcomes in military operations.

(11) **SO 11:** Supporting French and European sovereignty through academic, scientific and technological excellence.

e. **Part 3:** Ways and Means (pp. 83-96), comprising the following three subparts:

(1) Protecting the Nation and strengthening cohesion and resilience among its key actors.

(2) Strengthening strategic autonomy and ensuring sovereign and credible capacity for action.

(3) Contributing to European and international security.

11.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the French 2025 NSR are the following:

a. In his foreword, President Macron notes that “*we are at a tipping point*” and that “*The time has come for Europeans to take control of their own destiny*”, outlining four *constant elements* in the global instability that is being observed. These are:

(1) The threat posed by Russia..

(2) The use of force as a mean of foreign policy.

(3) The need for states to rely on their own strengths.

(4) The technological revolution that affects national security.

b. It acknowledges the deterioration in the relations of the United States with most of the European states and its possible future impact on NATO, calling for the strengthening of the European pillar within NATO and emphasising on the need for greater defence and national security spending in order for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy. In fact, the document refers in its Introduction part (p. 7) that:

“Europe is at a major turning point in its history. Europeans must therefore take on greater responsibility for the continent’s security and use all the means at their disposal to better defend themselves and deter any further aggression, regardless of how our partnerships with the United States and NATO, to which we remain deeply committed, may evolve”.

c. Regarding to the conditions of the security environment, the 2025 NSR notes that global security has been deteriorated due to the actions of several states –such as

Russia, Iran and China– and the proliferation of conflicts (mainly in Middle East and Africa), nuclear power plays a central role in strategic competition, and contemporary security issues include combating transnational threats (Jihadist-inspired terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and trafficking, separatism and violent extremism, etc.) in addition to other cross-cutting security issues such as migration, climate change, biodiversity collapse and health, demographics, economic challenges, energy and access to raw materials.

d. The 2025 NSR notes that the new conditions of the security environment will have the following *consequences*:

- (1) Europeans will face the risk of war and strategic isolation.
- (2) The nuclear factor will be at the heart of power relations.
- (3) Regional realignments for French & European interests will be challenged.
- (4) Democracies will be undermined by security risks.
- (5) Freedom of action and projection will be restricted.
- (6) Warfare will be transferred in the fields of economy and technology.

e. The 2025 NSR –compared to its 2022 version– is more military-oriented. This is can be easily understood from the beginning of each document, as the ambition that was set by President Macron in the 2022 NSR was “*By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, globally influential power, a driving force for European autonomy, and a power that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law*”, while the ambition set in the updated 2025 NSR was “*By 2030, France will be rearmed, materially and morally, to prevent, confront and win, alongside its allies and partners, a major high-intensity war near Europe, while also preventing and managing the consequences of simultaneous destabilising actions on national territory*”. Moreover, its military orientation is also indicated in SO 3 (see *Table 1*) in which France’s economy was changed from “*contributing to a defence mindset*” to “*prepared for war*”, while SO 10 (see *Table 1*) indicates a shift from defensive to active mindset, as France’s “*Freedom of action*

and the capacity to conduct military operations” was changed to “The ability to achieve decisive outcomes in military operations”.

Table 1. The changes in the SO of the 2022 & the 2025 NSR of France

Strategic Objective	NSR 2022	NSR 2025
SO 1	A robust and credible nuclear deterrent	A robust and credible nuclear deterrent
SO 2	A united and resilient France	A united and resilient France: contributing to the moral rearmament of the Nation to deal with crises
SO 3	An economy contributing to a defence mindset	An economy prepared for war
SO 4	First-class cyber resilience	First-class cyber resilience
SO 5	France as an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area	France as a reliable ally in the Euro-Atlantic area
SO 6	France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy	France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy
SO 7	France as be a reliable sovereignty partner and a credible provider of security	France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security
SO 8	Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty	Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty
SO 9	The capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields	The ability to act across hybrid domains
SO 10	Freedom of action and the capacity to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations in all fields (multi-environment and multi-field)	The ability to achieve decisive outcomes in military operations
SO 11	---	Supporting French and European sovereignty through academic, scientific and technological excellence.
<p>Remarks</p> <p>1. WHITE cells indicate SOs that have NOT changed.</p> <p>2. GREEN cells indicate SOs that have SLIGHTLY changed.</p> <p>3. PURPLE cells indicate NEW SOs or SO that have COMPLETELY changed.</p>		

Source: Created by Georgios Koukakis ©


f. Furthermore, the reference in SO 2 (see *Table 1*) to “*the moral rearmament of the Nation to deal with crises*” indicates the ideological warfare that is being exercised by hostile actors through Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). France’s educational initiatives also indicate the importance of education in cultivating security culture and building resilience through enhancing cohesion among citizens.

g. Finally, the 2025 NSR’s added new SO 11 that focus on research, science and technology indicates the importance of these fields (especially as far as AI, space, and quantum technology are concerned) in promoting national security.

12. The National Security Strategy of the United States

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is a strategic document that was published on 5 December 2025.⁴¹ Its institutional framework, content, and some key points regarding its impact on the security environment are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

Figure 13. The 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States (front cover)



Source: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>

⁴¹ Grieger, G. (2025, December 12). The 2025 US National Security Strategy. *European Parliament Think Tank*. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA\(2025\)779261](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2025)779261)

12.1 Institutional framework

The U.S. 2025 NSS was published by the *White House* and is an unclassified document that was developed under Trump 2.0 administration. As far as the document's purpose is concerned, President Trump refers in its foreword (p. ii) that:

“This document is a roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth. In the years ahead, we will continue to develop every dimension of our national strength – and we will make America safer, richer, freer, greater, and more powerful than ever before”.

12.2 Content of the document

The 2025 NSS of the United States is a 33 pages-long document,⁴² comprising the following parts:

- a. **A Foreword** by President Donald J. Trump (pp. i-ii).
- b. **Part 1:** Introduction – What Is American Strategy? (pp. 1-2), divided into the following two sub-parts:
 - (1) How American “Strategy” Went Astray.
 - (2) President Trump’s Necessary, Welcome Correction.
- c. **Part 2:** What Should the United States Want? (pp. 3-5), divided into the following two sub-parts:
 - (1) What Do We Want Overall?.
 - (2) What Do We Want In and From the World?.
- d. **Part 3:** What Are America’s Available Means to Get What We Want (pp. 6-7).
- e. **Part 4:** The Strategy (pp. 8-29), divided into the following three sub-parts:

⁴² The White House. (2025). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* [Official document]. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>

- (1) Principles.
- (2) Priorities.
- (3) The **Regions**, comprising of the following sections:
 - (a) Western Hemisphere: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
 - (b) Asia: Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation.
 - (c) Promoting European Greatness.
 - (d) The Middle East: Shift Burdens, Build Peace.
 - (e) Africa.

12.3 Key points of the document

Some key points that –according to the author’s perspectives– need to be highlighted regarding the U.S. 2025 NSS are the following:

a. In its Introduction part, President Trump heavily criticizes former Presidents as he refers that their NSSs were ineffective, not promoting the U.S. interests.

b. Part II emphasises on the United States’ economic security, border security, critical infrastructure security, military security, cultural security, technological security, and energy security, declaring that they need to be enhanced.

c. The basic *principles* defined in the 2025 NSS that will guide the United States’ foreign policy are the following:

- (1) Focused Definition of the National Interest.
- (2) Peace Through Strength.
- (3) Predisposition to Non-Interventionism.
- (4) Flexible Realism.

- (5) Primacy of Nations.
- (6) Sovereignty and Respect.
- (7) Balance of Power.
- (8) Pro-American Worker.
- (9) Fairness.
- (10) Competence and Merit.

d. The *priorities* set in the 2025 NSS are the following:

- (1) The Era of Mass Migration Is Over.
- (2) Protection of Core Rights and Liberties.
- (3) Burden-Sharing and Burden-Shifting.
- (4) Realignment Through Peace.
- (5) Economic Security, emphasising on:
 - (a) Balanced Trade.
 - (b) Securing Access to Critical Supply Chains and Materials.
 - (c) Reindustrialization.
 - (d) Reviving our Defense Industrial Base.
 - (e) Energy Dominance.
 - (f) Preserving and Growing America's Financial Sector Dominance.

e. As far as the United States' goals per region are concerned, the 2025 NSS refers that "*not everything matters equally, to everyone [...] we cannot afford to be equally attentive to every region and every problem in the world [...]* The purpose of national

security policy is the protection of core national interests—some priorities transcend regional confines". Keeping this in mind, the document notes the following:

(1) President Trump's goal as far as the *Western Hemisphere* is concerned, is to restore the U.S. preeminence through the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, protect the homeland, ensure access to regions that promote the U.S. national interests, and deter third actors' influence and coercive behaviour, by making use of existing partnerships (enlist) and creating new ones (expand).

(2) In regard to *Asia*, the 2025 NSS refers that the U.S. aspires to lead from a position of strength using its economic, military and technological capacity to out-compete China, and prevent an armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific through deterrence and diplomacy taking advantage of the United States' partnerships in the region and increasing the burden-sharing of actors such as Japan and South Korea.

(3) As far as *Europe* is concerned, the document criticizes its economic and civilizational decline warning European that their survival is at stake, expresses the need for the War in Ukraine to be stopped, and the relations between Russia and Europe to be restored in order to establish stability. Nevertheless, the 2025 NSS refers that "*Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States*", also stating that the overall goal of the United States is "*to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe*".

(4) In regard to the *Middle East*, the document notes that the specific region is no longer the first priority of the United States as military security has been enhanced, but due to economic and energy security issues the Middle East will always be of interest to the United States.

(5) As far as *Africa* is concerned the 2025 NSS stresses that the United States will adjust its foreign policy to jointly address military and economic security issues with selected African states, yet it "*should transition from an aid-focused relationship with Africa to a trade- and investment-focused relationship, favoring partnerships with capable, reliable states committed to opening their markets to U.S. goods and services*".

f. Finally, it needs to be highlighted that the 2025 NSS is similar to the 2017 NSS –issued by the same President during his first administration– in the way that both documents emphasize on the use of force (preserve peace through strength) to promote the U.S. national interests, the protection of the American way of life, and the advancement of the United States’ influence in the world.⁴³

13. Emerging trends & dynamics

Taking into consideration the content of the aforementioned strategic documents on security, defence and intelligence, several trends and dynamics can be identified regarding common goals and strategic competition. These are the following:

a. Hard power is gradually returning to world politics, as a large number of state and non-state actors are trying to enhance their *military security* by increasing their defence expenditures, establish new alliances and partnerships, and develop their defence industry. To this end the EU is constantly adapting its Security Strategy to the conditions of the security environment,⁴⁴ while in 2024 it published its first ever *European Defence Industrial Strategy* (EDIS)⁴⁵ in an effort to coordinate the respective actions of its member states.

b. Great powers competition is mainly between the United States and *China*, as Russia is not considered by the former as a major national security threat, while the war in Ukraine has affected most of Russia’s capabilities in a negative way. On the contrary China economic (primarily) and military (secondarily) rise is one of the main concerns for the U.S. foreign policy.

c. In the context of the aforementioned U.S.-China competition, the indo-Pacific has become the United States’ major priority region (Indo-Pacific pivot). That is the main

⁴³ Koukakis, G. (2022). The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the International Security Environment. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 3(2), 122–132. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33792>

⁴⁴ Koukakis, G. (2024). *The evolution of the European Union Security Strategy: Towards the establishment of a European Army?* [Research paper No. 105]. Center for International Strategic Analyses. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.34521.12648>

⁴⁵ Koukakis, G. (2024). The First Ever 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy: Background, Challenges and Future Considerations Regarding the European Security and Defense [Occasional Paper 2/2024]. *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27247.44961>

reason why the United States wants to put an end to the War in Ukraine, and a stronger Europe that can effectively deter Russia's aggressive behaviour on its own. Being the only European states with nuclear capabilities, France and the UK are trying –as indicated by their strategic documents examined in this research paper– to get advantage of a possible U.S. withdrawal from NATO,⁴⁶ and take the lead in the Alliance.

d. Strategic competition has been transferred to new domains such as *space*, *cyberspace* and the *information space*, leading actors to take several respective initiatives in order to gain dominance in these domains such as the *EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence* which was presented in 2023,⁴⁷ and the establishment of an *EU Commissioner for Defence and Space* in 2024.⁴⁸ Moreover, it has led to the creation of an out-of-the-box novel geopolitical theory entitled *Hyperland*, considering the aforementioned three domains as a comprehensive geopolitical space.⁴⁹

e. Cooperation between state and non-state actors as well as between the public and the private sector in several policy fields is a key factor in addressing common security threats. Acknowledging this, the EU has signed a significant number of Security and Defence Partnerships (SDP) with many states, the first of which was Moldova on 21 May 2024.⁵⁰

f. Maritime security is of vital importance for the economy, trade and the energy sector of most states, as freedom of navigation allows for the transport of goods and people around the world. Moreover, many critical infrastructures are underwater, while the

⁴⁶ President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO on several occasions.

⁴⁷ Koukakis, G. (2025). Sky is Not the Limit: The EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence [Occasional Paper 1/2025]. *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11728.62720>


⁴⁸ European Commission. (2024, December 01). President von der Leyen's mission letter to Andrius Kubilius. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/630c289c-7ff1-4fdd-944f-0f596e7e7914_en?filename=mission-letter-kubilius.pdf

⁴⁹ For further information see: Koukakis, G. (2024). From Heartland and Rimland, to Hyperland: Introducing a New Geopolitical Theory. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 5(2), 81–92. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.40784> and Koukakis, G. (2026). Hyperland: Transforming Past Theories of Geopolitics to Explain Contemporary Strategic Competition. In P. Pietrzak (Ed.), *Strengthening International Relations Through Transformative Theory and Practice* (pp. 33-62). IGI Global Scientific Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-6735-3.ch002>

⁵⁰ Koukakis, G. (2025). The first-Ever EU Security & Defence Partnership with Moldova: Enhancing the European security or provoking Russia? [Occasional Paper 3/2024]. *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29739.04642>

delimitation of maritime zones –mainly the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf– enables states to exploit their water and underwater resources. This is why promoting UNCLOS is crucial for maritime states, especially the ones located in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵¹

Figure 14. The effects of Cognitive Warfare per level of analysis



Source: <https://www.sto.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/chief-scientist-report-cognitive-warfare-final.pdf>

⁵¹ For further information see: Koukakis, G. (2022). The 2020 Exclusive Economic Zone delimitation agreement between Greece & Egypt [Short comments]. *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24965.42725/1>, Koukakis, G. (2025). The Delimitation of Greece's Maritime Zones: Background, Recent Developments & Future Challenges in the Context of the Greek-Turkish Conflict. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 6(1), 108–118. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.43195>, and Koukakis, G. (2026). The Exclusive Economic Zone Delimitation Agreement Between Cyprus & Lebanon, and its Impact to Energy and Regional Security [Breifing note No. 1/2026]. *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11385.94564>

g. The War in Ukraine has transformed to an ideological war between democracy (represented by West) and authoritarianism (represented by Russia). In this context, information has been weaponised by Russia,⁵² in order to achieve the contemporary goals of the novel *Cognitive Warfare* (Figure 14).⁵³

h. Resilience has become a vital a crucial capacity for every actor, as it is related not only to the effective management of security threats and risks, but to the actor's recovery as well.⁵⁴ This is obvious in Ukraine's case, in which its resilience has been enhanced by the EU by implementing the '*porcupine strategy*'.

i. Arctic has emerged as new region of geopolitical tensions, as climate change is gradually opening new sea routes that will change the way maritime trade is conducted. Moreover, the fact that a significant amount of rare earth elements can be found and extracted from the Arctic,⁵⁵ increases even more the geopolitical value of the region.

j. The work of intelligence services has become more important than ever, as the provision of timely and accurate information enables policy-makers to deliver more effective plans and decision-makers to adjust the implementation of strategic planning to the existing conditions of the security environment. Moreover, in order to achieve maximum situational awareness and at the same time ensure the compliance of rule of law, a state needs to establish an Intelligence Community and a strategic information-sharing network with like-minded partners, in addition to adequate oversight by the Judicial and Parliamentary branches.

k. Strategic planning and education provide a long-term solution to every reform that needs to be done, as they help personnel accept change and develop new skills.

⁵² Koukakis, G. (2024). NATO vs Hybrid Threats: The case of Russian disinformation campaign. *NRDC-GR Herald*, 21 (June-December 2023), 42-48.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378085748_NATO_vs_Hybrid_Threats_The_case_of_Russian_disinformation_campaign

⁵³ Blatny, J. & Søndergaard, S. (2025, December 19). Cognitive Warfare. *NATO Science & Technology Organization*. <https://www.sto.nato.int/document/cognitive-warfare/>

⁵⁴ Koukakis, G. (2023). Resilience: Highlighting its Importance for Security and Development through References to (National) Security Strategic Documents of International Actors. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 4(1), 77–87. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.35186>

⁵⁵ Middleton, A. (2026). Geopolitics of Rare Earth Elements (REE) in the Arctic: Study of evolving strategic, scholar, and media discourse. *Polar Record*, 62, e3. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247425100193>

Therefore, every policy must be complemented by a respective action plan that inter alia includes an long-term educational programme.

I. Due a number of factors –such as globalisation, the interconnection between domestic and foreign policy, and the nature of security– most security issues require an integrated all-hazards, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

14. Concluding remarks

To conclude, keeping in mind that we are living in an era of polycrises and permacrises,⁵⁶ establishing a security culture that incorporates information sharing and strategic planning is imperative. Moreover, it is important to remember that even though “*No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength*”,⁵⁷ the alternative of not having a plan is definite failure.⁵⁸ Finally, as far as information sharing is concerned, it also useful to remember Sherman Kent's⁵⁹ quote according to which “*Intelligence does not claim infallibility for its prophecies. Intelligence merely holds that the answer which it gives is the most deeply and objectively based and carefully considered estimate*”.⁶⁰



Bibliography

The sources used to draw data for this research paper are the ones listed in the footnotes.

⁵⁶ Koukakis, G. (2023). Permacrises and Polycrises: Outlining the Contemporary Security Environment through References to Strategic Documents of Regional and International Actors. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 4(2), 55–64. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.36661>

⁵⁷ von Ghyczy, T., von Oetinger, B. & Bassford, C. (2001). *Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist*. Jown Wiley & Sons, 55.

⁵⁸ Shevelyov, N. (2021, March 08). If You Fail To Plan, You Plan To Fail: Why Zero Trust Data Architecture Is A Modern Necessity. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2021/03/08/if-you-fail-to-plan-you-plan-to-fail-why-zero-trust-data-architecture-is-a-modern-necessity/>

⁵⁹ Founder of the Office of National Estimates of the United States.

⁶⁰ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2021, March). *Global Trends 20240: A more contested world (Introduction)*. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction>