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CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ANALYSES

National Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Cybersecurity, National Defense, Maritime Security, Risk Analysis and Foresight Strategic Documents Issued by Regional and International Actors in 2023.

LTC Georgios KOUKAKIS

Research Paper no. 104

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February 2024

Disclosure Statement

The opinion expressed in this paper represents the author's personal views and in no way reflects the official position of the Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), the Hellenic Army, the Greek Government or any other Institute or Organization he is affiliated with.

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Abbreviations

ACD	Active Cyber Defence
ADF	Australian Defence Forces
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand and United States
ASCA	Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator
ATA	Annual Threat Assessment
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom and United States
BMVI	Border Management and Visa Instrument
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CfNS	College for National Security
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
CVEs	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CYCS	Check your Cyber Security
C4	Command, control, communications and computers
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DSR	Defence Strategic Review
EDF	European Defence Fund
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMFAF	European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund
EPF	European Peace Facility
ERDF	European Regional Development and Fund
EU	European Union

EUMSS	European Union Maritime Security Strategy
EU/SAC	European Union Special Area of Conservation
EYP	National Intelligence Service
FIMI	Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency *[Frontières Extérieures (in French)]*
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HARPO	Hellenic Army's Printing Office
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IR	Integrated Review
IRR	Integrated Review Refresh
ISF	Internal Security Fund
IUU	Illegal, unreported and unregulated (fishing)
JRC	Joint Research Centre
KETYAK	Technological Support, Development and Innovation
KYSEA	Governmental National Security Council
ML	Machine Learning
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NCSC	National Cyber Security Centre
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NGO	Non-governmental organization

NIS	National Intelligence Strategy
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSRA	National Security Risk Assessment
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCG	Organised Crime Gang
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PRC	People's Republic of China
SFR	Strategic Foresight Report
SIGNIT	Signals Intelligence
S&T	Science and Technology
UK	United Kingdom
UKTL	UK Telecoms Lab
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VRS	Vulnerability Reporting Service
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Abstract

The present research paper reviews the strategic documents related to international, national, maritime and cyber security, foreign policy, intelligence, risk analysis, and foresight, which were published in 2023. Its purpose is to briefly review the content of these documents in order to inform the readers about the ongoing developments regarding the international security environment and highlight the essential role of strategy, contributing to the establishment of a security culture among the academic community.

The structure of the research is based on the chronological order that the strategic documents were published by international and regional actors (USA, EU, Australia, UK, Russia, Germany, FRONTEX and Greece), while its bibliography is mostly based on the official documents published by them.[1] Given the fact that the research paper highlights only the most important parts of each document, their original source (link) is provided as a reference, so that it can be accessed further studying.

Key words: Australia, Concept, Cybersecurity, EU, EYP, Foreign Policy, Foresight, FRONTEX, Germany, Greece, Intelligence, Maritime Security, National Defence, National Security, Risk Analysis, Russia, Strategy, UK, USA

[1] In some cases several actors have issued a related complementary classified document in addition to the unclassified one presented in this paper.

Introduction

Monitoring the publication of new official strategic documents of several regional and international actors (states, organizations, etc.) and understanding their context is of vital importance for every international relations analyst, researcher and/or scholar, as it provides them with the basic knowledge regarding the actors' strategic planning. This allows a more accurate evaluation of the actors' (foreign) policy and the assessment of future implications as far as several fields (foreign policy, defence, economy, energy, etc.), regions (such as the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, etc.) and domains (space, cyberspace, etc.) are concerned.

Basic Terminology

Before proceeding to the presentation of the context of the official strategic documents, it is necessary to clarify the main terms related to them, in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of their context and minimize the possibility of jumping into irrational conclusions.

The first term that needs to be clarified is the term **security**, which is related to the (effective) tackling of threats and/or risks, by applying effective preventive, administrative and recovery measures depending on the nature of the threat and/or risk. Although security is an extremely broad term, it can be defined as "*[…] the state of being protected or safe from harm, […] the state of being closely watched or guarded, […] the state of being free from anxiety or worry : the state of being or feeling secure*".[2]

It must also be stressed that the difference between threats and risks in international relations is that the term **threat** usually refers to a certain actor that has the capabilities and intention to harm the security of another actor by exploiting possible vulnerabilities (weaknesses and/or flaws), while the term **risk** usually refers to an unintentional condition

[2] The Britannica Dictionary, "security". https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/security (14/01/2024).

or phenomenon (e.g. climate change, earthquake, economic crisis, etc.) that may harm the security of another actor.[3]

Taking into consideration the formentioned definitions, it is concluded that the term **national security** refers to the protection of a state against all threats/risks that may harm its functioning, territorial integrity, political independence or the well-being of its citizens,[4] **cybersecurity** refers to the protection of an actor against all cyber threats/risks that may harm its electronic means, systems and/or infrastructures, and **maritime security** refers to the protection of an actor against all threats/risks that may harm its maritime means, systems and/or infrastructures.

Another term that needs to be clarified is the term **foreign policy**, which is defined as the general objectives of a state –influenced by several considerations such as domestic interests, the state's participation in regional or international organizations, the strategies implemented by other actors, etc.– that guide its activities and relationship with other states.[5] The formentioned general objectives are broken down to several long term goals (political, economic, military, etc.) that are achieved through specific plans or methods called **strategies**,[6] that define the necessary **ends** (what is to be achieved?), **means** (what kind of capabilities must be uses in order for the ends to be achieved?), and **ways** (how must the means be used in order for the ends to be achieved?).

[3] Wallander Celeste & Keohane O. Robert, Risk, threat, and security institutions. in Keohane O. Robert (Ed.), *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, (London: Routledge, 2002). p. 91. https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486331/mod_resource/content/0/Robert%20Keohane%20Power%20and%20Governance%20in%20a%20Partially%20Globalized%20World.pdf (14/01/2024).

[4] **National security** is comprised of national defence, economic security, internal security (social cohesion, public order, etc.), energy security, health security (public health), food security, cyber security, climate security, environmental security, cultural security, information security, protection of national critical infrastructure, etc. For further information visit: Pikramenos Kostas & Koukakis Georgios, *National Security: Myths and Reality* [In Greek]. Infognomon, Athens, 2023. p. 32.

[5] The Editors of Encyclopaedia, "foreign policy". Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 January 2024. https://www.britannica.com/topic/foreign-policy (14/01/2024).

[6] The Britannica Dictionary, " strategy". https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/strategy (14/01/2024).

In addition to the ends, means and ways, most strategies usually include **risk analysis** (a term synonymous to **risk assessment**),[7] which is the second component of risk management,[8] having as a purpose to:

> "*[…] identify: (i) threats to organizations (i.e., operations, assets, or individuals) or threats directed through organizations against other organizations or the Nation; (ii) vulnerabilities internal and external to organizations;14 (iii) the harm (i.e., consequences/impact) to organizations that may occur given the potential for threats exploiting vulnerabilities; and (iv) the likelihood that harm will occur*".[9]

Intelligence is processed information being produced through the intelligence cycle,[10] and is categorized into Signals Intelligence (SIGNIT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), depending on the intelligence source or the collection disciplines.[11] According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) intelligence is:

> "*[…] information gathered within or outside the U.S. that involves threats to our nation, its people, property, or interests; development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction;*

[7] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Control Baselines for Information Systems and Organizations". October 2020. p. 63. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53B.pdf (14/01/2024).

[8] Risk management is defined as "*[…] a comprehensive process that requires organizations to: (i) frame risk (i.e., establish the context for risk-based decisions); (ii) assess risk; (iii) respond to risk once determined; and (iv) monitor risk on an ongoing basis using effective organizational communications and a feedback loop for continuous improvement in the risk-related activities of organizations*". National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View". March 2011, p. 6. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-39.pdf (14/01/2024).

[9] Ibid, p. 7.

[10] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Hoe the ?". No date. https://www.intelligence.gov/how-the-ic-works (14/01/2024).

[11] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "What is intelligence?". No date. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/what-is-intelligence (14/01/2024).

> *and any other matter bearing on the U.S. national or homeland security*".

Finally, **foresight** is defined as the approach that aims at investigating the mid-term and long-term future through a systematic, participatory and interdisciplinary way, by the use of methods that usually involve the processing of alternative future scenarios. It aims at the proper preparation to help the actor address challenges, risks or even opportunities, and in governmental level contributes to the enhancement of a country's resilience through the definition of respective policies that emphasize on adaptability and sustainable development.[12]

As far as **strategic foresight** is concerned, the EU stresses that it is not a method of predicting the future but exploring different aspects of it– through several techniques such as horizon scanning, megatrends analysis, scenario planning and visioning– in order to spot opportunities and challenges, and help decision makers take all the necessary measures, as it:

> "*Anticipates trends, risks, emerging issues, and their potential implications and opportunities in order to draw useful insights for strategic planning, policy-making and preparedness. Informs the design of new Commission initiatives and the review of existing policies in line with the revamped Commission Better Regulation toolbox*".[13]

[12] Special Secretariat of Foresight, "Foresight". No date. https://foresight.gov.gr/en/special-secretariat/#foresight (14/01/2024).

[13] European Commission, "Strategic foresight". No date. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight_en (17/01/2024).

The Annual Threat Assessment of the USA

The latest **Annual Threat Assessment (ATA)** of the USA was issued by the ODNI on **8 March 2023** (*Annex A*).[14] ATA is an unclassified intelligence product of the US Intelligence Community (IC)[15] that is published annually in order to provide:

> "*[…] an unclassified summary the Intelligence Community's evaluation of current threats to U.S. national security, including cyber and technological threats, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, crime, environmental and natural resources issues, and economic issues*".[16]

The 2023 ATA is a **40 pages** long strategic document,[17] comprising the following parts:

1. **Introduction** (page 2).
2. **Foreword** (pages 4-5).
3. **China** (pages 6-11).
4. **Russia** (pages 12-16).
5. **Iran** (pages 17-19).
6. **North Korea** (pages 20-21).
7. **Climate Change and environmental degradation** (pages 22-23).

[14] Blinde Loren, "ODNI Releases 2023 IC threat assessment". *Intelligence Community News*, 9 March 2023. https://intelligencecommunitynews.com/odni-releases-2023-ic-threat-assessment/ (15/01/2024).

[15] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Members of the IC". No date. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic (08/01/2024).

[16] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community". No date. https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment (08/01/2024).

[17] Koukakis Georgios, "Η Ετήσια Εκτίμηση Απειλής κατά των ΗΠΑ για το 2023". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 14 March 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74058/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-ektimisi-apeilis-kata-ton-ipa-gia-to-2023 (15/01/2024).

8. **Health security** (pages 24-25).

9. **Additional transnational issues** (pages 26-33).

10. **Conflicts and fragility** (pages 34-39).

Despite the fact that in the 2023 ATA Introduction it is stated the importance or the magnitude of the threats presented is not necessarily indicated by their order inside the document, the number of pages devoted to the analysis of each threat indicates that **China** (6 pages) is the main threat to US national security, especially as far as technology and economy are concerned. This is confirmed by the US National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in October 2022,[18] which states that:

> "The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world's leading power".[19]

As secondary –but by no means negligible– threats, ATA defines **Russia** (5 pages), **Iran** (3 pages) and **North Korea** (2 pages), mainly due to their military capabilities, position of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the conduction of malign influence operations, in addition to their growing cyber and space capabilities. Moreover, ATA draws attention to the risk of **climate change and environmental degradation** (2 pages) where China and India play a critical role,[20] and **health security** issues (2 pages) such as infectious diseases, biological weapons and anomalous health incidents.

[18] Koukakis Georgios, "The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the InternationalSecurity Environment". *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, December 2022, Vol. 3(2) , pp. 122-132. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33792 (15/01/2024).

[19] The White House, "National Security Strategy". 12 October 2022. p. 23. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf (15/01/2024).

[20] China is 1st and India the 3rd largest emitting country in the world.

ATA also emphasizes on several **transnational issues** (8 pages) such as new technologies, digital authoritarianism and malign influence, nuclear proliferation, global economic consequences, migration, transnational organized crime, global terrorism that act as destabilizing factors. Finally, the document stresses the dangers posed by **conflicts and fragility** (6 pages) indicating: (1) India-China, India-Pakistan and Azerbaijan-Armenia as some of the potential interstate conflicts, (2) Iraq, Burma, East Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as the states/regions that struggle with stuggle with internal strife, and (3) Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and Tunisia as regions that may put at stake the future of international order and security, due to the governance challenges that they face.

The European Union Maritime Security Strategy

The **European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)** (*Annex B*) was endorsed by the European Commission on **10 March 2023**,[21] and approved by the European Council on 24 October 2023.[22] EUMSS is based on the overall guidance provided by the **Strategic Compass**,[23] and is the second strategic document of the European Union (EU) regarding maritime security,[24] having as a goal to:

[21] European Commission, "Maritime Security: EU updates Strategy to safeguard maritime domain against new threats". 10 March 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483 (09/01/2023).

[22] European Council, "Maritime security: Council approves revised EU strategy and action plan". 24 October 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/24/maritime-security-council-approves-revised-eu-strategy-and-action-plan/#:~:text=The%20Council%20today%20approved%20a,plan%20being%20updated%20in%202018. (15/01/2024).

[23] Koukakis Georgios, "Προς τα που δείχνει η Στρατηγική Πυξίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης". Center for International Strategic Analysis, 01 April 2022. https://kedisa.gr/pros-ta-pou-deichnei-i-stratigiki-pyksida-tis-evropaikis-enosis/ (15/01/2024).

[24] The 1st EUMSS was published in 2014. For further information visit: Council of the European Union, "European Union Maritime Security Strategy". *General Secretariat of the Council*, 24 June 2014. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011205%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf (15/01/2024).

> "*[…] promote international peace and security, as well as respect for international rules and principles, while ensuring the sustainability of the oceans and the protection of biodiversity*".[25]

The 2023 EUMSS is a **16 pages** long strategic document,[26] is comprised of the following parts:

1. **Introduction** (pages 1-2).
2. **Evolving and growing threats to maritime security** (pages 2-3).
3. **EU maritime security interests** (pages 3-4).
4. **Strengthening the EU's response** (pages 4-14).
5. **Tools and instruments to support EU action on maritime security** (pages 14-15).
6. **Way forward** (page 15).

As far as the **maritime threats** are concerned, the EUMSS underlines intense geopolitical competition (especially in the Indo-Pacific region), climate change and marine pollution, hybrid and cyber-attacks targeting maritime infrastructure, and several illicit activities, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, organised crime (including smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings), trafficking of arms and narcotics, terrorism, unauthorized exploration in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of EU Member States, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) at sea.

The EUMSS also defines the following 10 **maritime security interests**:

[25] European Commission, "Maritime security strategy". *Oceans and fisheries*. No date. https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/ocean/blue-economy/other-sectors/maritime-security-strategy_en (15/01/2024).

[26] Koukakis Georgios, "Η νέα Στρατηγική Θαλάσσιας Ασφάλειας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης". *Geopolitics & Daily News*, 20 April 2023. https://geopolitics.iisca.eu/2023/04/20/%ce%b7-%ce%bd%ce%ad%ce%b1-%cf%83%cf%84%cf%81%ce%b1%cf%84%ce%b7%ce%b3%ce%b9%ce%ba%ce%ae-%ce%b8%ce%b1%ce%bb%ce%ac%cf%83%cf%83%ce%b9%ce%b1%cf%82-%ce%b1%cf%83%cf%86%ce%ac%ce%bb%ce%b5%ce%b9%ce%b1%cf%82/ (15/01/2024).

1. The security of the European Union, its Member States, citizens and partners.

2. The preservation of global peace and stability, and keeping maritime shipping routes free and open.

3. The upholding international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the overarching legal framework governing all activities in the ocean, and promoting sound international ocean governance, including through regional sea conventions, as well as the implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on fisheries subsidies.

4. The protection of natural resources and the marine environment, and managing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on maritime security

5. The assurance of the resilience and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure (onshore and offshore), including by addressing the risks and threats related to climate change, and those that arise from foreign direct investments.

6. The strengthening the resilience and protection of logistical hubs, i.e. ports, including addressing risks associated with corruption and illicit activities.

7. The protection of economic activities at sea, thereby contributing to a sustainable blue economy (both onshore and offshore).

8. The protection of the EU's external borders, and its internal security, to address the smuggling of migrants, trafficking of human beings, and other illegal activities including unauthorized exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons

9. The assurance of the capacity to act promptly and effectively in the maritime domain, and in other operational domains (i.e. land, air, cyber and outer space)

10. The assurance of the safety and security of seafarers in line with the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention and other relevant conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

As far as strengthening the EU's response is concerned, in order to step up actions the EUMSS defines the following six **strategic objectives**:

1. The stepping up of the EU activities at sea,
2. The promotion of cooperation with partners,
3. Taking the lead on maritime domain awareness,
4. The management of risks and threats,
5. The enhancement of the EU capabilities, and
6. The provision of high level of education & training.[27]

Finally, the necessary **tools** for achieving the formentioned objectives include the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Peace Facility (EPF), the Horizon Europe programme, the Internal Security Fund (ISF), the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI), the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), the European Regional Development and Fund (ERDF), and Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics (MAOC-N).

The Integrated Review Refresh of the United Kingdom

On **13 March 2023**, the Government of the United Kingdom published its **Integrated Review Refresh (IRR2023)** (*Annex C*).[28] The UK's new strategic document builds upon the former 2021 Integrated Review (IR2021), integrates several assessments and horizon-scanning products, UK policy and strategy lessons learned, war-gaming conclusions,

[27] Eropean Council, " Maritime security: Council approves revised EU strategy and action plan". ibid.

[28] HM Government, "Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world". 13 March 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world (08/01/2024).

recommendations form the Parliament, allies and partners, and adjusts the UK's national security and international policy to the latest geopolitical changes by setting out:

> "*[…] four ways in which the UK will protect its core national interests – the sovereignty, security and prosperity of the British people – as well as its higher interest in an open and stable international order of enhanced cooperation and well-managed competition based on respect for the UN Charter and international law […]*".[29]

The IRR2023 is a **63 pages** long strategic document,[30] comprising the following parts:

1. **Foreword from the Prime Minister** (pages 2-4).
2. **Overview** (pages 5-14).
3. **Updated Strategic Framework** (pages 15-59).
   - 3.1. **Pillar 1: Shape the international environment** (pages 19-32).
   - 3.2. **Pillar 2: Deter, defend and compete across all domains** (pages 33-44).
   - 3.3. **Pillar 3: Address vulnerabilities through resilience** (pages 45-52).
   - 3.4. **Pillar 4: Generate strategic advantage** (pages 53-59).

As far as the **1st pillar** (Shape the international environment) is concerned, IRR2023 emphasizes on the global perspective of the UK that is based on the fact that it is a permanent member of the UNSC, a member of G7 and the size of its economy, the commitment to multilateralism, and cooperation with like-minded states. Moreover, it sets

[29] HM Government, "Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world". Ibid.

[30] Koukakis Georgios, "Η στρατηγική εθνικής ασφάλειας και διεθνούς πολιτικής του Λονδίνου". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 15 May 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74157/georgios-koykakis/i-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-kai-diethnoys-politikis-toy-lond (15/01/2024).

as geographic priorities the regions of Euro-Atlantic, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Africa and the Arctic, while the thematic priorities referred in the document include climate change, environmental damage and biodiversity loss, sustainable development, global economic order, emerging digital and technology order, cyberspace, space, and the maritime domain. Finally, the IRR2023 defines a special policy towards **China** –by running three strands (protect, align and engage)–stating that:

> "*China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses an epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people*".

The **2nd pillar** (Deter, defend and compete across all domains) of the IRR2023 emphasizes the fact that the UK must be able to deter and counter any threat, repel it and adapt its response to its context, using not only its armed forces, but security services, cyber and space capabilities as well. It also points out that the fundamental element of the holistic approach to defence and security is nuclear deterrence, increasing its defence expenditures over 2.5%, supporting Ukraine, and establishing channels of communications and strategic dialogue with several international actors.

As far as the **3rd pillar** (Address vulnerabilities through resilience) is concerned, IRR2023 stresses that the UK's openness –in terms of trade, investment and the exchange of people, ideas and cultures– is fundamental to the well-being of its citizens. However, the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) identified risks to the economy, society, technology, the environment and infrastructure, which require the development of resilience. The **priority areas** for addressing the UK's **vulnerabilities** are the following:

1. Energy security.
2. Climate change and environmental damage.
3. Health resilience.
4. Economic security.

5. Democratic and wider social resilience.

6. Education sector.

7. Protective security.

8. Cyber security and resilience.

9. UK border.

The **4th pillar** (Generate strategic advantage) of the IRR2023 emphasizes the fact that UK is a globally-engaged power, aiming at developing science and technology (S&T) in order to generate a strategic advantage, exploiting its economic strength, renewing its diplomatic capability, developing the capabilities of the UK's intelligence agencies, establishing a new OSINT hub, and educating national security practitioners through the College for National Security (CfNS).

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

The **Concept of the Foreign Policy** of the Russian Federation (*Annex D*) was published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on **31 March 2023**.[31] Russia's new strategic document was approved by No. 229 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation and replaces the former Concept that was published in 2016,[32] and:

> "*[…] provides a systemic vision of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the domain of foreign policy, basic principles, strategic goals, major objectives and priority areas of the Russian foreign policy […] specifies certain provisions of the National Security*

[31] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Press release on the publication of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia". 31 March 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1861023/ (08/01/2024).

[32] Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma, "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)". The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 30 November 2016. https://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/foreign-policy-concept-of-the-russian-federation-approved-by-president-of-the-russian-federation-vladimir-putin-on-november-30-2016/ (16/01/2024).

> *Strategy of the Russian Federation and takes into account basic provisions of other strategic planning documents pertaining to international relations […]*".[33]

The Russian Concept of the Foreign Policy is a **76 paragraphs** long strategic planning document,[34] is comprised of the following parts:

1. **I. General provisions** (paragraphs 1-6).

2. **II. Today's world: major trends and prospects for development** (paragraphs 7-14).

3. **III. National interests of the Russian Federation in the foreign policy domain, strategic goals and key tasks set by the foreign policy of the Russian Federation** (paragraphs 15-17).

4. **IV. Foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation** (paragraphs 18-48).

5. **V. Regional tracks of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation** (paragraphs 49-65).

6. **VI. Formation and implementation of foreign policy of the Russian Federation** (paragraphs 66-76).

As far as **part II** (major trends and prospects for development) is concerned, the 2023 Concept stresses that the world order is gradually becoming multipolar, several illegal measures such as sanctions are being used by states that do not want to lose power, the leading powers are trying to impose a rules-based order in their favor, economic problems are deteriorating, conflicts are multiplying, new cooperation schemes are established, the Western states are conducting a new type of hybrid war against

[33] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation". 31 March 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/ (16/01/2024).

[34] Koukakis Georgios, "Πώς βλέπει η Μόσχα τον κόσμο". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 10 April 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74100/georgios-koykakis/pos-blepei-i-mosxa-ton-kosmo (15/01/2024).

Russia due to their anti-Russian policy, and that Russia will use every mean necessary to defend itself. Finally, it is of great interest that the document states that:

> "*Russia does not consider itself to be an enemy of the West, is not isolating itself from the West and has no hostile intentions with regard to it; Russia hopes that in future the states belonging to the Western community will realize that their policy of confrontation and hegemonic ambitions lack prospects, will take into account the complex realities of a multipolar world and will resume pragmatic cooperation with Russia being guided by the principles of sovereign equality and respect for each other's interests. The Russian Federation is ready for dialogue and cooperation on such a basis*".

Part III (National interests of the Russian Federation in the foreign policy domain, strategic goals and key tasks set by the foreign policy of the Russian Federation) of the 2023 Concept defines the following nine **national interests**:

1. Protect the constitutional system, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation against any destructive external influence.

2. Maintain strategic stability, strengthen international peace and security.

3. Strengthen the legal foundations of international relations.

4. Protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens, and to protect Russian entities against foreign illegal encroachment.

5. Develop safe information space, protect Russian society against destructive informational and psychological influence.

6. Preserve the Russian nation, build human capital, and improve the quality of life and well-being of citizens.

7. Promote sustainable development of Russian economy on a new technological basis.

8. Promote traditional Russian moral and spiritual values, preserve cultural and historical heritage of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation.

9. Ensure environmental protection, conservation of natural resources and environmental management, and adapt to climate change.

Moreover, the document defines three **goals**,[35] as follows:

1. Ensure security of the Russian Federation, its sovereignty in all domains, and territorial integrity.

2. Create favourable external environment for sustainable development of Russia.

3. Consolidate Russia's position as one of the responsible, powerful and independent centres of the modern world.

As far as **part IV** (Foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation) is concerned, the 2023 Concept stresses the following nine **priorities**:

1. Establishment of an equitable and sustainable world order.

2. Rule of Law in International Relations.

3. Strengthening international peace and security.

4. Ensuring the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, outer space and airspace.

5. International economic cooperation and support of international development.

6. Environmental protection and global health.

7. International humanitarian cooperation.

[35] The three goals are broken down into 14 main tasks.

8. Protection of Russian citizens and organizations from foreign unlawful infringements, support for compatriots living abroad, international cooperation in the field of human rights.

9. Information support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation cooperation.

Part V (Regional tracks of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation) of the 2023 Concept expresses the intent to strengthen its relations with other states and enhance its presence in the following regions:

1. The **Near Abroad**, which includes the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

2. The **Arctic**.

3. The **Eurasian continent** and particularly in the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Asia-Pacific region, the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the European region, the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon states, and Antarctica.

Finally, as far as **part VI** is concerned, the 2023 Concept specifies the role of each state institution regarding the formation and implementation of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, including the President, the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly, the Government, the State Council, the Security Council,[36] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

[36] According to the Concept of Foreign Policy the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which is similar to the National Security Council of the USA "*[…] defines main directions of the foreign and military policy, forecasts, identifies, analyses and assesses threats to Russia's national security, develops measures to neutralize them, prepares proposals for the President of the Russian Federation regarding the adoption of special economic measures with a view to ensuring national security, examines issues of international cooperation related to maintaining security, coordinates efforts by federal executive bodies and executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to implement decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation with a view to ensuring national interests and national security, protecting the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, preventing external threats to national security*".

The Defence Strategic Review of Australia

On **24 April 2023**, the Albanese Government published Australia's **Defence Strategic Review (DSR)** (*Annex E*),[37] a strategic document related to National Defence that:

> "*[…] sets the agenda for ambitious, but necessary, reform to Defence's posture and structure. The Review includes specific directions to Defence with immediate effect, while establishing a methodical and comprehensive process for long-term and sustainable implementation. The strategic direction and key findings from the Review will strengthen Australia's national security and ensure our readiness for future challenges*".[38]

The 2023 DSR is a **116 pages** long strategic document comprising the following parts:

1. **National Defence Statement 2023** (pages 5-9).
2. **National Defence – Defence Strategic Review** (pages 11-14).
3. **Executive Summary** (pages 17-21).
4. **Current Strategic Circumstances** (pages 23-25).
5. **Our Defence Strategic Environment** (pages 27-28).
6. **National Defence – A Whole-of-Government Approach** (pages 31-34).
7. **Deterrence and Resilience** (pages 37-38).

[37] Australian Government, "Release of the Defence Strategic Review". 24 April 2023. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-04-24/release-defence-strategic-review (19/01/2024).

[38] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023". No date. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review (19/01/2024).

8. **Climate Change and Support to Domestic Disaster Relief** (pages 41-42).

9. **Defence Partnerships** (pages 45-47).

10. **Defence Strategy and Force Design** (pages 49-51).

11. **Force Structure and Capability** (pages 53-69).

12. **Technology and Asymmetric Advantage** (pages 71-73).

13. **Force Posture and Accelerated Preparedness** (pages 75-84).

14. **Workforce** (pages 87-88).

15. **Capability Acquisition, Risk and Accountability** (pages 91-93).

16. **Finances and Resources** (pages 95-96).

17. **Implementation, Oversight and Future Planning** (pages 99-100).

18. **The Albanese Government's Response to the Defence Strategic Review Recommendations** (pages 103-110).

As far as **part 1** (National Defence Statement 2023) is concerned, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence stresses shares his thoughts regarding Australia's strategic environment, Australia's strategic posture, Capability and resources, Working with our partners and the region, and the Way ahead, also stating that:

> "*There is no more important and consequential task for Government than protecting the security, interests and livelihoods of its people*".[39]

Part 2 (National Defence – Defence Strategic Review) of the 2023 DSR includes: (1) A forward from Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston AK AFC (Ret'd) and His Excellency, Hon Stephen Smith, (2) The DSR terms of reference, (3) Acknowledgements, (4) The DSR

[39] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 5.

Team, and (5) The DSR Team Secretariat. As far as **part 3** (Executive Summary) is concerned, the 2023 DSR highlights Australia's Strategic Circumstances, National Defence - A Whole-of-Government Approach, the Alliance and regional defence partnerships, Force design and force structure, Posture and Preparedness, Workforce, Capability acquisition, risk and accountability, Finances and Resources, National security coordination, as well as Implementation, oversight and future planning.

Part 4 (Current Strategic Circumstances) of the 2023 DSR analyzes 11 topics related to Australia's strategic circumstances and 8 topics related to the loss warning time. As far as **part 5** (Our Defence Strategic Environment) is concerned, the 2023 DSR emphasizes on the Indo-Pacific region, stating that:

> "*The Indo-Pacific is the most important geostrategic region in the world. It is a region whose stability and global integration has ushered in decades of prosperity and enabled the incredible growth of regional economies, including China*".[40]

As far as **part 6** (National Defence - A Whole-of-Government Approach) is concerned, the 2023 DSR focuses on National Defence, Defence of Australia and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Transition to National Defence, the Whole-of-government approach, and Statecraft. Moreover it recommends that:

> "*The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) should be appropriately resourced to lead a nationally determined and strategically directed whole-of-government statecraft effort in the Indo-Pacific*".[41]

Part 7 (Deterrence and Resilience) is concerned, the 2023 DSR analyzes 13 topics related to Australia's deterrence and resilience, also highlighting the 12 **requirements of resilience** that include an informed public, national unity and cohesion, democratic assuredness, robust cyber security, data networks and space capabilities, supply chain

[40] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 27.

[41] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 34.

diversity, economic security, environmental security, fuel and energy security, enhanced military preparedness, advanced munitions manufacturing (especially in long-range guided weapons), robust national logistics, and a national industrial base with a capacity to scale.

As far as **part 8** (Climate Change and Support to Domestic Disaster Relief) is concerned, the 2023 DSR focuses on climate change and disaster relief and defence and clean energy transition, recommending that:

> "*Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances. Defence should accelerate its transition to clean energy to increase our national resilience, with a plan to be presented to the Government by 2025*".[42]

Part 9 (Defence Partnerships) is concerned, the 2023 DSR highlights the United States Alliance that was enabled through the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty,[43] regional defence partnerships such as ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum and AUKUS, and Australia's Defence Cooperation Program in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, stating that it should be expanded in the Indian Ocean focusing on its north-eastern part.

As far as **part 10** (Defence Strategy and Force Design) is concerned, the 2023 DSR recommends the adoption of a Strategy of Denial,[44] emphasizes on the whole-of-government approach that needs to be adopted in order to support the three objectives set in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update,[45] stresses the fact that defence planning must be

[42] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 42.

[43] The National Museum of Australia, "ANZUS Treaty". 04 May 2023. https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/anzus-treaty (20/01/2024).

[44] According to the 2023 DSR, the strategy of **denial** is a defensive approach designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force, or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance. Denial is associated with the ability and intent to defend against, and defeat, an act of aggression.

[45] According to the 2023 DSR the **objectives** set in the **2020 Defence Strategic Update** include: (1) Shape Australia's strategic environment, (2) Deter actions against Australia's interests, and (3) Respond with credible military force, when required.

based on risk management and the assessment of different potential levels of conflict, and the reform of the force design in order to adapt to the available resources and timeframes in addition to current bias towards platforms.

Part 11 (Force Structure and Capability) of the 2023 DSR stresses the need to transform the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) from a Balanced to a Focused Force,[46] from a Joint to an Integrated Force,[47] defines several Force Structure design priorities related to defence infrastructure, the maritime domain, the land domain, the air domain, the space domain, command, control, communications, computers (C4) and architectures, the cyber domain, theatre logistics, capability timeframes, the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway, the National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise, guided weapons and explosive ordnance, integrated air and missile defence, and the respective immediate investments in the formentioned domains.

As far as **part 12** (Technology and Asymmetric Advantage) is concerned, the 2023 DSR underlines the need for maintaining parity or a qualitative advantage in critical military technology areas and focusing on asymmetric advantages,[48] the advanced defence capabilities that the second pillar of AUKUS provides, the demand for developing defence science and technology, and the Government's intent to establish an Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA). It also emphasizes the vital role of technology, stating that:

> "*Technology has a significant impact on the character of warfare and deterrence, and will shape the changing balance of power*".[49]

[46] According to the 2023 DSR a **balanced force** is designed to be able to respond to a range of contingences when the strategic situation remains uncertain, while a **focused force** is designed to address the nation's most significant military risks.

[47] According to the 2023 DSR a **Joint Force** results in the combined effect of Navy, Army and Air Force working together, while an **Integrated Force** harnesses effects across all of the five domains (maritime, land, air, space and cyber).

[48] According to the 2023 SDR **asymmetric** refers to the application of dissimilar capabilities, tactics or strategies to circumvent an opponent's strengths, causing them to suffer disproportional cost in time, space or material.

[49] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 71.

Part 13 (Force Posture and Accelerated Preparedness) of the 2023 DSR analyzes the following topics: Force posture – Australia's north, Depth in force posture, Basing, Fuel, Preparing for nuclear-powered submarines, Shipyard reform, East coast nuclear-powered submarine facility, Exercises and operations, Accelerated Preparedness and logistics, Information and communications technology, Estate and infrastructure, and security. As far as **part 14** (Workforce) is concerned, of the 2023 DSR expresses major concerns about the challenges faced related to ADF's **personnel**, emphasizing recruitment and retention of personnel, as well as the Reserve. It also recommends inter alia:

> "*Options should be developed to change Defence's recruitment framework to improve the eligibility pool of potential applications and to align service recruitment requirements to military employment, especially in key technical and specialist trades (cyber, engineering, space, etc.)*".[50]

Part 15 (Capability Acquisition, Risk and Accountability) of the 2023 DSR stresses the importance of timely and strategically relevant capability acquisition, the need to reconceptualize risk across government, and the vital role of indigenous industry groups which the Australian Government must make full use of. As far as **part 16** (Finances and Resources) is concerned, the 2023 DSR stresses the need to manage the **Defence Budget** in order to support the necessary reforms of the ADF and increase the defence funding.

Finally, **part 17** (Implementation, Oversight and Future Planning) of the 2023 DSR recommends that defence policy development should move away from white papers to produce a National Defence Strategy on a biennial basis and the endorsement of a **three-tier system** in order to oversee the implementation of the 2023 DSR as follows:

1. Cabinet-level Oversight.

2. External Oversight Advisers.

[50] Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review". 2023. p. 88.

3. Defence Strategic Review Management Board.

The National Security Strategy of Germany

Germany's first ever **National Security Strategy (NSS)** entitled "Integrated Security for Germany" (*Annex F*) was published on **14 June 2023**.[51] According to Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the goal of the German historic strategic document is to maintain security for the citizens of Germany and contribute to Europe's security. The German NSS is a **76 pages** long document,[52] is comprised of the following parts:

1. **Foreword** (pages 5-7) by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. **Executive summary** (pages 10-17).

3. **Germany in Europe and the World** (pages 18-27).

4. **Integrated security for Germany** (pages 28-72).

5. **Building integrated security together** (pages 73-74).

As far as **part 3** (Germany in Europe and the World) is concerned, the 2023 NSS emphasizes that security is a comprehensive concept, states that Germany bears a special responsibility in regional and international level regarding security, prosperity and stability due to its population and economy, highlights its value-based foreign and security policy, and defines the following **national interests**:

1. Protecting the people, sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, the European Union and our allies.

2. Protecting our free democratic order.

[51] Federal Foreign Office, "National Security Strategy adopted by the German Federal Cabinet". 14 June 2023. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/-/2601730

[52] Koukakis Georgios, "Η πρώτη «ιστορική» Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας της Γερμανίας". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 18 June 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74201/georgios-koykakis/i-proti-%C2%ABistoriki%C2%BB-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-tis-germanias (15/01/2024).

3. Strengthening the European Union's ability to act and its internal cohesion and further deepening the profound friendship we share with France.

4. Consolidating the transatlantic alliance and our close partnership based on mutual trust with the United States of America.

5. Fostering prosperity and social cohesion in our country by protecting our social market economy.

6. Promoting an international order based on international law, the United Nations Charter and universal human rights.

7. Fostering peace and stability worldwide and championing democracy, the rule of law, human development and participation by all population groups as a prerequisite for sustainable security.

8. Promoting the sustainable protection of natural resources, limiting the climate crisis and managing its impacts, securing access to water and food, as well as protecting people's health.

9. Maintaining an open, rules-based international economic and financial system with free trade routes and a secure, sustainable supply of raw materials and energy.

Moreover, the document characterises Russia as the most significant threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival, and identifies several other security threats such as conflicts, terrorism and extremism, cyber-attacks, the erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, economic crises, pandemics, international competition in the technological field, organised crime, intelligence operations, climate crisis, poverty and hunger, and large migration flows.

Finally, **part 4** (Integrated security for Germany) of the 2023 NSS is divided in the following three sections:

1. **Wehrhaft (robust): Defending peace and freedom**, focusing on national and collective defence, civil preparedness, civil protection and disaster prevention and relief,

strengthening the European peace project, engaging the international crisis, supporting development policy to promote security, and preserving and further developing the global arms-control architecture.

2. **Resilient: Safeguarding our values through inner strength**, focusing on protecting and strengthening democracy, defending and upholding the principles of a rules-based international order, safeguarding human rights, boosting economic and financial resilience and raw materials security, protecting and promoting technology and innovation, and enhancing cybersecurity and space security.

3. **Sustainable: Safeguarding our natural resources**, focusing on limiting the climate crisis and protecting biodiversity and ecosystems, strengthening global food security, and improving global pandemic prevention.

EU's Strategic Foresight Report

On **6 July 2023**, the European Union published its fourth **Strategic Foresight Report (SFR)** (*Annex G*).[53] The **36 pages** long strategic document[54] is based on the results of a foresight exercise of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), consultations, discussions and several other activities, and:

> *"[…] analyses how to put 'sustainability and people's wellbeing at the heart of Europe's Open Strategic Autonomy' and suggests ten concrete actions to achieve this aim. […] To equip policymakers with economic indicators which also consider wellbeing, it proposes to*

[53] European Commission, "2023 Strategic Foresight Report: sustainability and wellbeing at the heart of Europe's Open Strategic Autonomy". 6 July 2023. Press Release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3623 (08/01/2024).

[54] Koukakis Georgios, "Η Έκθεση Strategic Foresight της ΕΕ για το 2023". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 21 July 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74240/georgios-koykakis/i-ekthesi-strategic-foresight-tis-ee-gia-to-2023 (15/01/2024).

adjust Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to take account of different factors such as health and the environment".[55]

The 2023 SFR comprises the following parts:

1. **Introduction** (pages 4-5).

2. **Key intersections between social and economic sustainability challenges** (pages 6-21).

3. **Key areas for action** (pages 22-31).

4. **Delivering on the promise of the sustainability transition** (pages 32-33).

5. **Endnotes** (pages 34-35).

As far as **part 2** (Key intersections between social and economic sustainability challenges) is concerned, the 2023 SFR highlights the following **key intersections**:

1. The rise of geopolitics and reconfiguration of globalisation.

2. Quest for sustainable economy and wellbeing.

3. Increasing pressure to ensure sufficient funding.

4. Growing demand for skills and competencies for the sustainable future.

5. Increasing cracks in social cohesion.

6. Threats to democracy and existing social contract.

Part 3 (Key areas for action) of the 2023 SFR defines 10 **areas for action** in order to ensure the wellbeing of people and society,[56] as follows:

[55] European Commission, "2023 Strategic Foresight Report: sustainability and wellbeing at the heart of Europe's Open Strategic Autonomy". 06 July 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3623 (17/01/2024).

[56] Ibid.

1. Ensure a new European social contract with renewed welfare policies and a focus on high-quality social services.

2. Deepen the Single Market to champion a resilient net-zero economy, with a focus on Open Strategic Autonomy and economic security.

3. Boost the EU's offer on the global stage to strengthen cooperation with key partners.

4. Support shifts in production and consumption towards sustainability, targeting regulation and fostering balanced lifestyles.

5. Move towards a 'Europe of investments' through public action to catalyse financial flows for the transitions.

6. Make public budgets fit for sustainability through an efficient tax framework and public spending.

7. Further shift policy and economic indicators towards sustainable and inclusive wellbeing, including by adjusting GDP for different factors.

8. Ensure that all Europeans can contribute to the transition by increasing labour market participation and focusing on future skills.

9. Strengthen democracy with generational fairness at the heart of policymaking to reinforce the support for the transitions.

10. Complement civil protection with 'civil prevention' by reinforcing the EU's toolbox on preparedness and response.

As far as **part 4** (Delivering on the promise of the sustainability transition) is concerned, the 2023 SFR stresses the importance of sustainability transition, as:

> "*For current and future generations of Europeans, this will mean living healthier and longer lives, finding private and professional fulfillment, and having a greater say in the future they want. For EU*

business, using the first-mover advantage of a net-zero economy, with globally leading sustainable products and services". [57]

The National Intelligence Strategy of the USA

The **National Intelligence Strategy (NIS)** of the United States (*Annex H*) was published by the ODNI on **10 August 2023**.[58] The NIS is a strategic document vital to the Intelligence Community (IC) of the USA (*Annex H*) and closely related to its national security as it:

"*[…] provides the Intelligence Community (IC) with strategic direction from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the next four years. The NIS is a foundational document for the IC and reflects the input of leaders from each of the 18 intelligence elements, as it guides the operations, investments, and priorities of the collective. It supports the national security priorities outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy as well as other national strategies*".

The 2023 NIS is a **20 pages** long strategic document[59] that is comprised of the following parts:

1. **Foreword from the DNI** (page 1).

2. **The IC Vision and Mission** (page 2).

[57] European Commission, "2023 Strategic Foresight Report: sustainability and wellbeing at the heart of Europe's Open Strategic Autonomy". Ibid. p. 32.

[58] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Director of National Intelligence Avril D. Haines Releases the 2023 National Intelligence Strategy for the Intelligence Community". 10 August 2023. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2023/3714-director-of-national-intelligence-avril-d-haines-releases-the-2023-national-intelligence-strategy-for-the-intelligence-community (08/01/2024).

[59] Koukakis Georgios, "Η νέα Στρατηγική Πληροφοριών των ΗΠΑ για την επόμενη τετραετία". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 16 August 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74265/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-stratigiki-pliroforion-ton-ipa-gia-tin-epomeni-tetraetia (15/01/2024).

3. **Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community** (page 3).

4. **Goal 1: Position the IC for Intensifying Strategic Competition** (pages 4-5).

5. **Goal 2: Recruit, Develop, and Retain a Talented and Diverse Workforce that Operates as a United Community** (pages 6-7).

6. **Goal 3: Deliver Interoperable and Innovative Solutions at Scale** (pages 8-9).

7. **Goal 4: Diversify, Expand, and Strengthen Partnerships** (pages 10-11).

8. **Goal 5: Expand IC Capabilities and Expertise on Transnational Challenges** (pages 12-13).

8. **Goal 6: Enhance Resilience** (pages 14-14).

9. **Organization of the Intelligence Community** (pages 16-17).

As far as the **vision** of the IC is concerned, the DNI expresses the intent to establish:

> "*An Intelligence Community that embodies America's values and is sufficiently agile, integrated, innovative, and resilient to inform national security and foreign policy decisions, resulting in a Nation that is secure and prosperous*".

The formentioned vision of the DNI is based on the **mission** of the IC, which is described in the following statement:

> "*The U.S. Intelligence Community provides timely, rigorous, apolitical, and insightful intelligence and support to inform national security decisions and protect our Nation and its interests.*".

As far as the **principles of professional** ethics for the IC are concerned, the DNI defines the following seven principles that must guide the actions of the IC:

1. Mission.

2. Truth.

3. Lawfulness.

4. Integrity.

5. Stewardship.

6. Excellence.

7. Diversity.

Regarding the **1st Goal** (Position the IC for Intensifying Strategic Competition) of the 2023 NIS, the document emphasizes the role of technology and innovation, the need for embracing new partnerships, promoting interoperability, strengthening the IC capabilities, and the continuing goal of protecting democracy and countering autocratic competitors. As far as the latter reference in concerned, the document underlines the US perspectives regarding China and Russia, stating that:

> "*The PRC is the only U.S. competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and Eurasia and is a source of disruption and instability globally, but it lacks the across-the spectrum capabilities of the PRC*".[60]

The **2nd Goal** (Recruit, Develop, and Retain a Talented and Diverse Workforce that Operates as a United Community) defined in the 2023 NIS, stresses the need for effective recruitment, operating in new ways, and enhancing professional development. As far as the **3rd Goal** (Deliver Interoperable and Innovative Solutions at Scale) is concerned, the 2023 NIS underlines the intent for establishing unified IC procurement authorities, centralized solicitation systems, and a Community-wide contracting system, sustaining

[60] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "2023 National Intelligence Strategy". 10 August 2023. p. 5.

predictable funding for the research and development, and expanding-diversifying the US partnerships.

The **4th Goal** (Diversify, Expand, and Strengthen Partnerships) stresses the importance of the US alliances and partnerships around the world, and the need for greater synchronization to counter interconnected and transnational threats (especially cyberattacks) not only with state actors, but with non-state and sub-national actors as well. As far as the **5th Goal** (Expand IC Capabilities and Expertise on Transnational Challenges) is concerned, the 2023 NIS highlights the broad impact of contemporary threats which are more frequent, intense and interconnected than the past, which is the reason why the IC must recruit, develop, and integrate expertise across a range of disciplines and work across organizational boundaries and collaborate with other government agencies.

Finally, the **6th Goal** (Enhance Resilience) of the 2023 NIS underlines the vital role of the IC as far as the nation's resilience is concerned, which requires a deeper understanding of the contemporary trends in addition to an effective early warning system. Moreover, the document states that the IC will focus on economic security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the sustainment of the IC counterintelligence and counter-espionage capabilities.

The Annual Risk Analysis of the FRONTEX

The **Annual Risk Analysis (ARA)** of FRONTEX (*Annex I*) was published by FRONTEX on **4 September 2023**, under the title "Risk Analysis for 2023/2024". [61] As stated in its Introduction part, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency's strategic document:

> *"[…] presents the key risks to the EU's external borders and their potential impact on European integrated border management (EIBM). The focus is on the threat dimensions of risks according to the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) that will play a*

[61] FRONTEX, "Frontex Risk Analysis 2023/2024 discusses challenges at EU external borders". 04 September 2023. https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-risk-analysis-2023-2024-discusses-challenges-at-eu-external-borders-J6yq05 (08/01/2024).

likely role in the short term, with an approximate time horizon of one year from the time of writing".[62]

The Risk Analysis for 2023/2024 is a **62 pages** long strategic document,[63] comprising of the following parts:

1. **Foreword from the Executive Director** (page 7).
2. **Executive Summary** (page 9).
3. **Introduction** (page 10).
4. **Irregular Migration** (pages 13-22).
5. **Secondary Movements/Returns** (pages 23-28).
6. **Cross-Border Crime** (pages 29-41).
7. **Outlook** (pages 42-43).
8. **Statistical annex** (pages 44-59).

As far as **part 4** (Irregular Migration) is concerned, the 2023 ARA refers inter alia that the Illegal border-crossings at the sea borders increased by 31% in 2022 compared with 2021 in addition to the emergence of new corridors from Lebanon and Syria towards the Central Mediterranean, while the number of detections at the land borders, was increased by 110% mainly on the Western Balkan routes. Clandestine entry attempts were decreased by 36%, and document fraud is characterized as the key enabler of threats at the external borders of the EU.

Part 5 (Secondary Movements/Returns) of the 2023 ARA stresses that the number of secondary movements[64] reported in 2022 was the highest since 2026, and the number of

[62] FRONTEX, "Risk Analysis 2023/2024". 04 September 2023. p. 10.

[63] Koukakis Georgios, "Η Ετήσια Ανάλυση Κινδύνου του FRONTEX για το 2023-2024". *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 25 September 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74304/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-analysi-kindynoy-toy-frontex-gia-to-2023-2024 (15/01/2024).

effective returns was slightly increased by 1,6%. As far as **part 6** (Cross-Border Crime) is concerned, the 2023 ARA refers that large-scale drug trafficking remained a serious security threat (the reported seizures amounted to 252 tonnes of illicit drugs), while other main threats included firearms smuggling, stealing vehicles and parts, tobacco smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism.

Finally, **Part 7** (Outlook) of the 2023 ARA stresses that irregular migration to Europe is expected to rise –facilitating its instrumentalisation (especially on the eastern land border and beyond) by several actors– and that the end of the pandemic will mostly cause an increase in organised crime.

The Annual Cybersecurity Review of the UK

The **Annual Review** (*Annex J*) of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) –a national security agency which is part of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the United Kingdom's technical authority for cybersecurity– was published on **14 November 2023**,[65] and as stated by the NCSC's CEO:

> "*In this year's Annual Review, we reflect on key developments, achievements and trends from the last year. We've also included five areas of specific interest to the cyber security community – setting out the NCSC's thinking on AI cyber security, on securing the UK's Critical National Infrastructure, on defending our democratic processes, the future of UK cyber security services (including the NCSC's role in their provision), and reflecting back on what we have learned from Russia's further invasion of Ukraine*".[66]

[64] Secondary movements are defined as the journeys undertaken by third country nationals from one European Union Special Area of Conservation (EU/SAC) to another, without the prior consent of national authorities and with or without facilitation. This includes travelling without an entry visa, with absent or insufficient documentation normally required for travel purposes, with fraudulent documentation, and overstayers

[65] National Cyber Security Centre, "NCSC Annual Review 2023". 14 November 2023, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/annual-review-2023 (08/01/2024).

[66] Ibid, p. 8.

The 2023 Annual Review is a **74 pages** long strategic document covering the time period from 1 September 2022 to 31 August 2023,[67] comprising the following parts:

1. **Timeline** (pages 2-3).
2. **Ministerial foreword** (pages 4-5).
3. **Remarks from the Director of GCHQ** (page 6).
4. **Remarks from the CEO of the NCSC** (pages 8-9).
5. **Chapter 1: Threats and Risks** (pages 10-21).
6. **Chapter 2: Resilience** (pages 22-46).
7. **Chapter 3: Ecosystem** (pages 47-54).
8. **Chapter 4: Technology** (pages 55-70).
9. **Afterword** (page 71).

As far as **Chapter 1** (Threats and Risks) is concerned, China is characterized as a technology super-power that poses an epoch-defining challenge for UK security, it is stated that Russia has been conducting cyber activities against Ukraine, characterizes Iran as an aggressive and capable cyber actor that will almost certainly use cyber for its objectives, and states that cyber is one of the means through which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) aims to improve its poor economic situation. Moreover, it draws attention in ransomware, cyber proliferation, cyber-enabled fraud, AI/Large language models, and incident management, also presenting a **case study** about **Russia** highlighting the following factors:

1. Russian cyber activity against Ukraine.

[67] Koukakis Georgios, "Η Ετήσια Ανασκόπηση Κυβερνοασφάλειας του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου για το 2022-2023". *Policy Journal*, 04 December 2023. https://policyjournal.gr/world/%ce%b7-%ce%b5%cf%84%ce%ae%cf%83%ce%b9%ce%b1-%ce%b1%ce%bd%ce%b1%cf%83%ce%ba%cf%8c%cf%80%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%b7-%ce%ba%cf%85%ce%b2%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%bd%ce%bf%ce%b1%cf%83%cf%86%ce%ac%ce%bb%ce%b5%ce%b9%ce%b1/ (15/01/2024).

2. Russian information advantage.

3. Russian patriotic hackers.

4. Russian speaking ransomware: organised crime gangs (OCGs).

5. Russian attempts to manipulate democratic institutions.

6. The role of the UK's cyber defenders.

Chapter 2 (Resilience) of the 2023 NCSC Annual Review stresses the importance of supporting government, public and private sector critical national infrastructure (CNI), citizens, and organisations of all sizes across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to raise awareness of cyber threats and improve resilience for the whole of society. It analyzes the established trust groups of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), the NCSC's cyber essentials scheme, the Funded Cyber Essentials Programme, the Cyber Advisor scheme, the Active Cyber Defence (ACD) collection of products and services, the Check your Cyber Security (CYCS) service, and several other assured services. Chapter 2 also presents three case studies, the first of which is entitled "**Securing the UK's critical national infrastructure**" and highlights the following topics:

1. The evolution of the CNI.

2. The evolution of the threats.

3. The importance of situational awareness.

4. The need to prioritize cyber security.

5. The necessary measures to address the challenges related to CNI.

The second case study entitled "**Defending our democracy in a new digital age – at the ballot box and beyond**" highlights the following topics:

1. Responding to threats.

2. Looking ahead.

3. An evolving landscape.
4. Novel threats.
5. High-risk individuals.
6. Defending our values.
7. Collective action.

The third case study entitled "**The next generation of UK cyber security services**" highlights the following topics:

1. Reviewing NCSC role and structure.
2. Focus on innovation, data, and partnerships.
3. The development of government's cyber security capabilities.
4. Develop new schemes.
5. Develop more simple and accessible services.
6. Measurement of the services' impact.
7. Seeking future opportunities.

As far as **Chapter 3** (Ecosystem) is concerned, the document stresses that the sector of cybersecurity is growing, new talents are attracted, several programmes are supporting education related to cybersecurity, innovation is encouraged through respective programmes, the industrial sector is being supported, and several seminars are being conducted. Finally, **Chapter 4** (Technology) of the 2023 NCSC Annual Review underlines the evolution of cyber security threats, especially due to Artificial Intelligence (AI), the vital role of quantum computing and semiconductors, the publication of the NCSC research problem book, the cyber resilience of technology, the establishment of the UK Telecoms Lab (UKTL), the rise in the number of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), the

importance of the Vulnerability Reporting Service (VRS), and the NCSC's best-practice guidance on cloud computing.

Chapter 4 also includes a case-study entitled "**The cyber security of artificial intelligence**" highlighting the following topics:

1. The need for AI to be 'secure by design' and built on secure foundations
2. The machine learning (ML) risks.
3. The cyber security opportunities of AI.
4. The challenges around the fundamentals of AI.
5. The use of AI by hostile adversaries.
6. Risks to organisations using AI.
7. The ways of maximizing the benefits of AI by the NCSC.

The Annual Report of the National Intelligence Service of Greece

On **21 November 2023**, Greece's National Intelligence Service (EYP) published its first **Annual Report of Priorities and Fields of Action** (*Annex K*).[68] It is a **20 pages** long strategic document,[69] comprising the following three parts:

1. **Foreword of the Commander** (pages 3-5).
2. **The Main Challenges and Evolutions, and the Basic Fields of Action of EYP during the Past Year** (pages 6-19).

[68] National Intelligence Service, "Annual Report on Priorities and Fields of Action of the National Intelligence Service".(In Greek) 21 November 2023. https://www.nis.gr/el/news/3579 (08/01/2024).

[69] Koukakis Georgios, "The 9th Trilateral Summit of Cyprus, Greece and Israel: Türkiye's struggle for power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Competition between India and China in the Middle East, and the New Era of 'Economic Peace'". *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*, November 2023. https://nebula.wsimg.com/1ce63b686059fb298514120c8978e0f8?AccessKeyId=401F75AAF8C61A96E174&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (15/01/2024).

3. **Epilogue** (page 20).

As far as **part 1** (Foreword of the Commander) is concerned, Themistocles Demiris stresses that the main objective of the Service was to improve its operational capabilities, re-evaluate its auditing framework, setting as a priority the enhancement of the Service's prestige and reliability and the assurance of maximum possible effectiveness.

Part 2 (The Main Challenges and Evolutions, and the Basic Fields of Action of EYP during the Past Year) of the 2023 Annual Report highlights the complexity of the contemporary security environment and the vital need for addressing hybrid threats through international cooperation, the need for balance between security and human rights, the reform of the Service that has taken place, the preparedness for future challenges through the Centre for Technological Support, Development and Innovation (KETYAK), and the **main threats** to national security of Greece identified that include the following:

1. External threats.
2. Espionage.
3. Terrorism and Violent extremism.
4. Illegal migration.
5. Organized crime.
6. Cybersecurity and New technologies.

Concluding remarks

The first conclusion to be drawn from the context of the strategic documents examined in the present research paper, is the fact that the contemporary security environment is an environment of **polycrises** and **permacrises**,[70] meaning the

[70] Koukakis Georgios, "The Institutional Reform of the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS) and its First Historical 2023 Annual Report: Threats, Challenges and Future Considerations Regarding the National

simultaneously existence of a large number of crises of different mature (military, economic, health, food, energy, etc.) that last for a long period of time. Thus, building **resilience** is a vital factor for every regional and/or international actor, especially as far as supply chain and (national) critical infrastructure is concerned, since they are related to the proper functioning of the state or organization and the well-being of citizens.

Moreover, the world order is gradually transforming **from a unipolar to a multipolar model**, experiencing increased competition between major actors who wish to gain more power and expand their sphere of influence, that can be viewed as a rivalry between **Democracies** and **Autocracies**. For example, Russia was imposed severe sanctions by the 'West' after its invasion of Ukraine, facilitating the deepening of its cooperation with **India** and **China**,[71] a goal described in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. In this context, it must also be stressed that the domains of space and cyberspace are expected to be two of the most actively engaged domains by various actors in order to conduct hybrid warfare.

Another conclusion drawn is the fact that the most common pressing **security threats and risks** identified by the formentioned regional and international actors include climate crisis, cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference, organised crime, terrorism, the instrumentalisation of migration flows and energy resources. This situation has led most actors to focus their efforts on national unity and cohesion, cyber security, economic security, environmental security, energy security, space security and countering disinformation. It must also be stressed that **cyber resilience** is a vital capacity for every actor, as cyber domain in widely used as the main field for conducting malicious activities such as hybrid war, disinformation campaigns, information warfare, etc. Moreover, the integration of new technologies in all fields of national security is considered to be a crucial factor that facilitates the countering of new and emerging threats.

Security of the Hellenic Republic". *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*, January 2024. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.35429.58082 (01/02/2024).

[71] Especially as far as China is concerned, the 'Russia Bear' sealed its strategic cooperation with the 'Red Dragon' during a meeting between the leaders of the two states that took place in Moscow in March 2023. For further details visit: CNN World, "No path to peace: Five key takeaways from Xi and Putin's talks in Moscow". 22 March 2023. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/22/europe/china-xi-russia-putin-talks-five-takeaways-intl-hnk-mic/index.html (08/01/2024).

As far as external security threats are concerned, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel, and the piracy incidents occurred in the Red Sea by the Houthis, have brought '**hard power**' into the spotlight leading most actors to increase their defence spending, enhance their military preparedness, invest more in their industrial base and national logistics, reevaluate their foreign policies and defence strategies emphasizing in strategic autonomy, and promoting maritime security, as it is vital not only for the protection of their territorial integrity but for their economic and commercial development as well.

In addition to that, many actors are beginning to invest more in developing social and economic **sustainability**, ensuring civil protection, developing new technologies and integrating AI in several aspects of every-day life in order to gain an advantage in relation to other actors, allowing them to impose their will and/or influence. Especially as far as AI is concerned, it must be stressed that it is considered to be a crucial factor that will define the future distribution of power, as according to the Russian President **Vladimir Putin**:

> "*Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind […] There are huge opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to foresee today. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world […]*".[72]

A matter of great concern is the enhanced presence of several western actors in the **Indo-Pacific region**, an action that may provoke the reaction of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Indo-Pacific is known to be a region of vital importance for China, which has repeatedly stated that other states should respect PRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity, refraining from interfering in its internal affairs and proceeding in aggressive actions that might endanger the Chinese national interests.[73] The same concern applies for the **Arctic**, which is beginning to draw international interest, as many actors seek to broaden their sphere of influence in the region. The formentioned interest is mainly related

[72] Radina Gigova, "Who Vladimir Putin thinks will rule the world". *CNN World*. 02 September 2017. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world/index.html (21/01/2024).

[73] Jakub Šrámek, "South China Sea Dispute". *Center for International Strategic Analyses*, 15 December 2022. https://kedisa.gr/en/south-china-sea-dispute/ (15/01/2024).

to **theater logistics** and the **supply chain**, as climate change is creating new trade routes in the northern hemisphere that provide alternative ways of transporting goods.

The formentioned climate change is a **common threat** that –in addition to terrorism, violent extremism, organised crime, illegal migration, disinformation, environmental degradation, pandemics and economic crises– affects not only national but international security as well and the prosperity of citizens all around the globe. That is why most state actors are willing to cooperate with other states, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and actors from the private sector in these fields, in order to minimize the negative impact of these common threats/risks

As far as the **Annual Report of EYP** is concerned, it must be stressed that –in addition to the establishment of a Press and Communication Office, an Intelligence Museum, and an Internal Audit Unit– is an important step towards restoring the Greek citizens' trust in the Service. Moreover, the definition of prerequisites regarding the Director of EYP, new procedures for lifting the secrecy of communications, the establishment of an Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Academy and the distinction between External Affairs and Domestic Security intelligence having two Deputy Director-Generals in charge, are also very important measures towards the reform of the national security system of the Hellenic Republic.[74]

Moreover, the **reforms of EYP** endorsed by the Greek government seem to be based on the model used by the Intelligence Service (MI5) of the UK, as the timeframe (September-August) of the Annual Report is the one used by MI5 and the Greek Media published several articles regarding the visit of a former Executive of MI5 in September 2022 in order to advised the Greek Prime Minister on EYP's reform,[75] and an interview of

[74] Koukakis Georgios, "The 9th Trilateral Summit of Cyprus, Greece and Israel: Türkiye's struggle for power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Competition between India and China in the Middle East, and the New Era of 'Economic Peace'". *Hermes Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy*, November 2023. https://nebula.wsimg.com/1ce63b686059fb298514120c8978e0f8?AccessKeyId=401F75AAF8C61A96E174&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (01/02/202).

[75] Nedos Vasilis, "Using MI5 as a model for the reform of the new EYP: The Prime Minister's connections with former executive of the Security Service (MI5) and the reform plan" [In Greek]. *Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ*, 12 September 2022. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562036990/me-montelo-mi5-o-schediasmos-tis-neas-eyp/ (18/12/2023).

former Director of MI5 (Lord Jonathan Evans) published in *October 2022* revealing that he had acted as an unofficial adviser of the Greek Government as far as the reform of EYP is concerned.[76]

Nevertheless, there is **much more to be done** as far as the Greek national security system is concerned, such as the establishment of an Intelligence Community, the issuance of a National Intelligence Strategy, the establishment of a National Security Service for domestic intelligence matters and a National Intelligence Service for foreign intelligence, the definition of EYP's Director as a permanent member of the Governmental National Security Council (KYSEA) and the issuance of a National Security Strategy by KYSEA, an action that was announced by the Greek National Security Advisor (NSA) on 25 January 2021.[77] In fact, according to Greek media the Greek NSS was presented to the members of KYSEA the by the NSA on 12 October 2022,[78] yet it has not been published until the time of the writing of this paper.[79]

The Greek Ministry of National Defence should also proceed to the issuance of a **National Defence Strategy**, as the only strategic document related to National Defence is the **White Paper** (*Annex L*) that was published in late **2014**.[80] According to the forward of the Director General of National Defence Policy and International Relations, the White Paper should be periodically reviewed in order to be adjusted to the constant changes of

[76] Nedos Vasilis, "The former director of MI5 talks in 'K': Two EYPs with more transparency. The unofficial advisor of the Government proposes Domestic and External Affairs Service, and communication with citizens" [In Greek]. *Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ*, 03 October 2022. https://www.kathimerini.gr/opinion/interviews/562071325/o-proin-dieythyntis-tis-mi5-stin-k-dyo-eyp-me-perissoteri-diafaneia/ (18/12/2023).

[77] Dokos Thanos, "Thanos Dokos: Greek national security: An assessment and challenges". *Ekathimerini*. 25 January 2021. https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/261588/thanos-dokos-greek-national-security-an-assessment-and-challenges/ (15/01/2024)

[78] Newsroom, "KYSEA discusses Turkey, Evros border wall, arms procurement". *Ekathimerini*, 12 October 2022. https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1195458/kysea-discusses-turkey-evros-border-wall-arms-procurement/ (15/01/2024).

[79] The only relevant information is an article of the NSA published in Greek media on 02 January 2023, proposing fifteen key strategic directions in the area of national security. For further information visit: Dokos, Thanos, "Outwardness, deterrence, resilience". *Ekathimerini,* 02 January 2023. https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1201305/outwardness-deterrence-resilience/ (15/01/2024)

[80] Ministry of National Defence, *White Paper*. National Defence Policy Directorate, (Athens: Hellenic Army's Printing Office, 2015). https://ia801503.us.archive.org/1/items/WhitePaper/White_Paper.pdf (24/01/2024).

the geo-political environment, the global economy, and the national policies applied in other fields. The importance of the White Paper lies in the fact that:

> "*Through the publication of the White Paper, in 2014, Greece illustrates how it approaches the current security challenges. Its approach is comprehensive and takes into consideration the short-term restrictions and risks of the current geo-economic situation, as well as the long-term opportunities that emerge from the developments in the region. The White Paper shall constitute the mirror of our strategic concept required for the achievement of the above mentioned objectives, but should not, nevertheless, be considered a given fact*".[81]

Moreover, the Government of the Hellenic Republic can take advantage of the provisions of the EUMSS in order to promote the Greek national interests regarding the **delimitation of the Greek maritime zones with Türkiye**, since one of the basic principles of EUMSS is the resolution of disputes under UNCLOS. This principle is a long-standing position of Greece, yet not accepted by Türkiye, which rejects several fundamental provisions of UNCLOS.[82] EUMSS can therefore be used by Greece as 'leverage' against Türkiye, taking into account the fact that the neighbouring country is still a candidate country for accession to the EU and as such Türkiye must implement the EU policies and resolve all its disputes in order to become a EU member-state.[83]

Finally, the participation of military personnel in EUMSS activities such as operation POSEIDON in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea for the monitoring of the Greek-European maritime borders, contributes to the control of **migration flows** in the Aegean Sea and the protection of **freedom of movement** in the maritime environment which facilitates trade

[81] Ministry of National Defence, White Paper. Ibid, pp. 6-7.

[82] Koukakis Georgios, "Αποκλειστική Οικονομική Ζώνη (ΑΟΖ): Οι προσπάθειες οριοθέτησής της από τα κράτη της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου". *Center for International Strategic Analyses*, 07 February 2022. https://kedisa.gr/apokleistiki-oikonomiki-zoni-aoz-oi-prospatheies-oriothetisis-tis-apo-ta-krati-tis-anatolikis-mesogeiou/ (15/01/2024)

[83] Koukakis Georgios, "Η πορεία ένταξης της Τουρκίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (1999-2022)". *Center for International Strategic Analyses*, 08 March 2023. https://kedisa.gr/i-poreia-entaksis-tis-tourkias-stin-evropaiki-enosi-1999-2022/ (15/01/2024).

and leads to economic development. Given the world-wide-known Greek naval tradition in addition to the formentioned maritime security, Greece –just like Australia– must invest more in its national naval shipbuilding enterprise in order to develop autonomy in the naval field and maintain its strategic advantage.

Epilogue

In conclusion, it must be stressed that **intelligence** is crucial factor that contributes greatly to every aspect of national security due to the fact that it facilitates early warning and decision making, exploits the vulnerabilities of possible threats and takes advantage of the strategic circumstances. To this end, **information sharing** among allies and like-minded countries is of vital importance for ensuring national, regional and international security, as it reduces reaction time and fills in possible intelligence gaps. Cooperation and multilateralism between actors must therefore been seen as an enabler and not as a sign of weakness, because as **Franklin D. Roosevelt** stated:

> «*Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off*».[84]

[84] Michael Reiss von Filski, "Comment: Competition versus cooperation". *International Accounting Bulletin*, 25 February 2013. https://www.internationalaccountingbulletin.com/comment/commentscomment-competition-versus-cooperation/ (14/01/2024).

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Annex A. The Annual Threat Assessment of the USA



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Source: https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Annex B. The European Union Maritime Security Strategy



COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 24 June 2014
(OR. en)

11205/14

POLGEN 103
POLMAR 18
PESC 669
CSDP/PSDC 389
AGRI 458
TRANS 336
JAI 553
ENV 641
PECHE 326
POLMIL 60

NOTE

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Delegations
Subject:	European Union Maritime Security Strategy

Delegations will find attached the European Union Maritime Security Strategy as adopted by the Council (General Affairs) on 24 June 2014.

11205/14 DPG 1 EN

Source: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11205-2014-INIT/en/pdf

Annex C. The Integrated Review Refresh of the UK



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Source:https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf

Annex D. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia

Министерство иностранных дел
Российской Федерации

31.03.2023 15:00 №

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

Unofficial translation

APPROVED by Decree
of the President of the Russian Federation
No. 229, March 31, 2023

THE CONCEPT
of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

I. General provisions

1. This Concept is a strategic planning document which provides a systemic vision of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the domain of foreign policy, basic principles, strategic goals, major objectives and priority areas of the Russian foreign policy.

2. The Concept is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation, federal laws, other statutes and regulations of the Russian Federation governing foreign policy activities of the federal authorities.

3. The Concept specifies certain provisions of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and takes into account basic provisions of other strategic planning documents pertaining to international relations.

4. More than a thousand years of independent statehood, the cultural heritage of the preceding era, deep historical ties with the traditional European culture and other Eurasian cultures, and the ability to ensure harmonious coexistence of different peoples, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups on one common territory, which has been developed over many centuries, determine Russia's special position as a unique country-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power that brings together the Russian people and other peoples belonging to the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world.

Source: https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/

Annex E. The Defence Strategic Review of Australia



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

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

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Source: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review

Annex F. The National Security Strategy of Germany



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Source: https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf

Annex G. The Strategic Foresight Report of the EU

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Source: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/SFR-23-beautified-version_en_0.pdf

Annex H. The National Intelligence Strategy and the IC of the USA



Organization of the Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community is an integrated enterprise comprised of 18 Executive Branch agencies and organizations (generally referred to as "IC elements") that conduct a variety of intelligence activities and work together to promote national security. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the leader of the IC and sets IC strategic priorities through the National Intelligence Strategy. Each IC member contributes through the execution of its organization's mission in accordance with statutory responsibilities.

The IC is Comprised of the Following 18 Elements:

TWO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

1. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
2. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

NINE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ELEMENTS

The following elements also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD I&S)—

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
2. The National Security Agency (NSA)
3. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
4. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
5. U.S. Air Force Intelligence
6. U.S. Navy Intelligence
7. U.S. Army Intelligence
8. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence
9. U.S. Space Force Intelligence

SEVEN ELEMENTS OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

1. The Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
2. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and
3. The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard
4. The Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation and
5. The Drug Enforcement Administration's Office of National Security Intelligence
6. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
7. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis

In addition to collection, analysis, and production, IC elements serve in other roles. Functional managers oversee and coordinate a specific intelligence discipline or capability and advise the DNI on the performance of their functions within and across IC elements. Program managers are IC element heads responsible for the execution of their element's mission and budget. ODNI leads intelligence integration across these elements to deliver the most insightful intelligence and make the Nation more secure.

Source:
https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2023.pdf

Annex I. The Annual Risk Analysis of FRONTEX





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Source:https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/ARA_2023.pdf

Annex J. The Annual Cybersecurity Review of the UK

NCSC Annual Review 2023

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Timeline

2022

7 September
Lindy Cameron discusses international collaboration in deterring malign actors with industry, at the 13th Billington Cyber Security Summit in Washington

8 September
The NCSC mourns the death of Her Majesty the Queen whom we will always fondly remember for officially opening our doors in February 2017

20 September
The UK and our allies expose Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for exploiting cyber vulnerabilities for ransomware operations

12 October
The NCSC issues fresh guidance following recent rise in supply chain cyber attacks

14 November
Cyber Aware campaign launched to help keep online shoppers more secure in the run up to Christmas

9 December
The NCSC and DCMS publish code of practice for app store operators and app developers

2023

11 January
The NCSC provides support to Royal Mail following a cyber attack

19 January
The NCSC hosts members of the national Computer Emergency Response Team for Ukraine (CERT-UA) to discuss Russia's illegal invasion and building cyber resilience

3 February
Lindy Cameron visits India for a series of meetings with cyber security leaders on the shared opportunities and challenges the UK and India face in cyberspace

6 February
13 national teams claimed victory at the 2023 CyberFirst Girls Competition finals

27 February
Lindy Cameron speaks about the importance of good cyber hygiene among the public sector at Cyber Security Scotland

14 March
The NCSC publishes thought leadership piece on the security of large language models, following the rise in popularity of ChatGPT

21 March
The NCSC urges organisations to utilise its Cyber Action Plan and Check Your Cyber Security services as part of its Cyber Aware campaign

11 April
Anne Keast-Butler announced to succeed Sir Jeremy Fleming as the Director of Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ)

13 April
The NCSC and international partners share new advice to encourage software manufacturers to embed secure-by-design and secure-by-default principles into their products

17 April
The NCSC's Cyber Advisor launches to support small and medium-sized businesses without in-house cyber expertise

19 – 20 April
The UK's flagship cyber security conference CYBERUK is held in Belfast for the first time

19 April
New NCSC report assesses the threat to UK industry and society from the use of commercial cyber tools and services

NCSC Annual Review 2023

19 April
The NCSC issues warning of emerging threat to critical national infrastructure from a new class of state-aligned cyber adversary

20 April
UK and international partners publish joint guidance to help communities create secure smart cities

9 May
UK and international allies issue joint advisory exposing Snake malware and its use in operations carried out by Centre 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB)

13 May
The NCSC provides support to the Eurovision Song Contest to improve cyber security resilience

24 May
UK and its allies issue new warning about China state-sponsored cyber activity targeting critical national infrastructure networks

7 June
The NCSC works with UK organisations to respond to the MOVEit vulnerability and data extortion incident and publishes guidance

14 June
UK and international partners issue a new joint advisory warning of the enduring threat posed by the LockBit ransomware operation

14 June
Lindy Cameron emphasises the importance of building security into AI technologies in a major speech at the Chatham House Cyber 2023 conference

30 June
The NCSC marks 20th anniversary of first response to state-sponsored cyber attack

6 July
The NCSC's sixth annual Active Cyber Defence (ACD) report highlights success in preventing millions of cyber attacks from reaching the UK

23 July
New shadow IT guidance published to help organisations manage rogue devices and services within the enterprise

3 August
The NCSC and allies reveal most common cyber vulnerabilities exploited in 2022 in new advisory

24 August
The NCSC launches the research problem book, laying out the areas of cyber security that need cooperative research over the next 5-10 years

31 August
UK and allies support Ukraine calling out Russia's GRU for new Infamous Chisel malware campaign

3

Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Annual_Review_2023.pdf

Annex K. The Annual Report of Greece's National Intelligence Service





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Source: https://www.nis.gr/downloads/news/annual-report-2023.11.21-gr.pdf

Annex L. The White Paper of the Greek Ministry of National Defence





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Source: https://ia801503.us.archive.org/1/items/WhitePaper/White_Paper.pdf