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International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022

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Disclosure Statement

The opinion expressed in this paper represents the author's personal views and in no way reflects the official position of the Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), the Hellenic Army, the Greek Government or any other Institute or Organization he is affiliated with.

16 January 2023

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Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
HR/VP	High Representative / Vice President
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Concept
NSR	National Strategic Review
NSS	National Security Strategy
PRC	People's Republic of China
USA	United States of America

Abstract

The present research examines the strategic documents related to international and national security which were issued in 2022. Its purpose is to briefly review the content of these documents in order to inform about the ongoing developments in the international security environment and highlight the essential role of strategy, hopefully leading to the establishment of a security culture among the academic community.

The bibliography of the research is mainly based on the official unclassified documents published by international organizations or states, taking into consideration the fact that in some cases several actors have issued an additional complementary classified document. Given the fact that the research presents only selected parts of each strategic document, the original source (link) for each strategic document is provided as a reference, so that it can be further studied.

The structure of the research is based on the chronological order that the strategic documents were published by the actors, namely the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States of America (USA), the Republic of France, and Japan. It also examines the latest developments in Greece, as far as the drafting of its National Security Strategy is concerned.

Introduction

Security is a broad term that can be defined as «*the state of being protected or safe from harm, [...] the state of being closely watched or guarded, [...] the state of being free from anxiety or worry : the state of being or feeling secure*».¹ When it comes to states though, national security is defined as the protection against external (outside of the state's borders) threats along with domestic threats, located in the homeland. In the first case, external national security is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry/Department of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Department of State, while in the second case, internal (domestic) security is usually the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior/Department of Homeland Security.

In order to coordinate the work of all the governmental agencies/departments and effectively counter both types of threats, most states have established a National Security Council (NSC) in order to apply a comprehensive approach regarding national security. One of the main responsibilities of the NSC is drafting the state's National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that describes the state's **Grand Strategy**, meaning «*[...] the identification of a national goal, a thorough assessment of the state's resources, and, ultimately, the marshaling of those resources in a highly organized manner to achieve the goal*».²

¹ The Britannica Dictionary. "security". <https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/security> (15/01/2023).

² Sibii, Razvan. "grand strategy". Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Jan. 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/grand-strategy> (15/01/2023).

Another way of accomplishing national security is through the formation of multilateral schemes (alliances, partnerships or international organizations) such as NATO and the EU. The first one was established on the basis of collective defensive among its member states, while the second one started off as an economic organization but slowly assumed a more complex role that led to the formation of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The latest strategic documents related to security issued by these two actors are the EU Strategic Compass and the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.

The EU Strategic Compass

European Union's strategic document was endorsed by the Council of the EU on **21 March 2022** by the title «A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security» (Annex A).³ It is a **64 pages** long document comprising of a foreword by the EU High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Joseph Borrell, an Executive Summary, an Introduction, Part 1 (The world we face), Part 2 (**Act**), Part (**Secure**), Part 4 (**Invest**), Part 5 (**Partner**) and Part 6 (Conclusion).

As stated inside the document, it «[...] *details how the European Union and its Member States will strengthen our security and defence. [...] provides the strategic perspective and details the tools and initiatives required to ensure more rapid,*

³ Council of the European Union. (21 March 2022). A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/> (16/01/2023)

decisive and robust EU action».⁴ Strategic Compass is mainly affected by **Russia's** invasion of Ukraine, stressing the return of power politics but also the need for effective multilateralism.⁵ It also acknowledges **China's** attempts to extend its spheres of influence, characterizing it as «[...] *a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival*»⁶ and the instability that prevails in the modern world, along with the emergence of new centers of global competition such as the Indo-Pacific.⁷

In addition, Strategic Compass defines **major threats and challenges** such as terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, climate change, environmental degradation, natural disasters and global health crises.⁸ In order not only to counter all these threats but also be prepared for the emergence of new ones, the EU defined a Strategy of four pillars -each one analyzed in Parts 2 to 5– providing the guidelines to the member states to «*Act more quickly and decisively when facing crises, Secure our citizens against fast-changing threats, Invest in the capabilities and technologies we need, and Partner with others to achieve common goals*».⁹

The main characteristic of the Strategic Compass is the fact that at the end of each Part, it sets out specific objectives along with timeframe to be accomplished.

⁴European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 62.

⁵ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 17.

⁶ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 18.

⁷ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 20.

⁸ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 20-23.

⁹ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 6.

The most challenging one is the creation of a fully operational EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 troops by 2025¹⁰, a capacity that will allow the EU to act as a **security provider**. A matter of concern though is the EU ambition to enhance its presence in the **Indo-Pacific**,¹¹ an action that will most probably provoke China.

NATO's Strategic Concept

NATO's grand strategy document titled «NATO 2022 Strategic Concept» (Annex B) was endorsed by the Alliance's member states, during the Madrid Summit that took place on **29-30 June 2022**.¹² It is a **13 pages** long document comprising of a Preface, three parts analyzing the «Purpose and Principles», the «Strategic Environment» and «NATO's Core tasks», and a final part titled «Ensuring the Alliance's Continued Success» acting as an epilogue.

In the Preface, collective defence is reaffirmed as NATO's key purpose along with **NATO's vision** which is «[...] *to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with*

¹⁰ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 30.

¹¹ European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 57.

¹² Koukakis, Georgios. "The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit: Background, key decisions and future considerations". "HERMES" Institute for Foreign Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. Briefing Note No "2/2022". September 2022, <https://nebula.wsimg.com/214630f378f315f99c8a8a245d889bc1?AccessKeyId=401F75AAF8C61A96E174&disposition=0&alloworigin=1> (15/01/2023).

*all who share these goals. We stand together, as Allies, to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world».*¹³

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept stresses the common values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law that connect the organization's member states, also reminding that NATO is a defensive Alliance.¹⁴ As far as the strategic environment is concerned, **Russia** and **terrorism** are characterized as the most significant and direct - conventional and asymmetric respectively - threats, also stating that *«NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation. We will continue to respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way».*¹⁵

In addition, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept describes the **People's Republic of China (PRC)** as ambitious and coercive actor that challenges the Alliance's interests, security and values, stating though that NATO members will *«[...] remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance's security interests».*¹⁶ As far as the global challenges are concerned, the Alliance mainly addresses climate change, considering it as defining for the future.¹⁷

¹³North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 1-2.

¹⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 3.

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 4.

¹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 5.

¹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 6.

The main characteristic of NATO 2022 Strategic Concept is that **it brings Deterrence back to the forefront** (Annex C), it defines as NATO's new¹⁸ key core tasks «Deterrence and Defence», «Crisis Prevention and Management» and «Cooperative Security», setting as an objective not only to manage crises but also to prevent them from happening.¹⁹ As far as the EU and the **Indo-Pacific** region is concerned, the document clearly states that «*NATO recognizes the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO*»,²⁰ and that it «*[...] will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests*».²¹

The National Security Strategy of the United States

On **12 December 2022**, the White House published its new National Security Strategy (NSS) (Annex D).²² The new strategic document is a **48 pages** long document comprising of a foreword by the US President, four parts analyzing the

¹⁸ The former key tasks that were identified on the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept were Collective defence, Crisis management and Cooperative security. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010). Strategic Concept for the defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (15/01/2023).

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 6-10.

²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 10.

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 11.

²² The White House. (12 October 2022). FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/> (15/01/2023).

«The Competition for what comes next», the «Investing in our strength», «Our global priorities» and «Our strategy by region», and a final Conclusion.

In the Forward, President Biden states that «[...] **our world is at an inflection point**. *How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come. [...] Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been*».²³

Later on, the document identifies two strategic challenges, namely the fact that «[...] *the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a **competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next***» and that «[...] *while this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, terrorism, energy shortages, or inflation*».²⁴

The goal that the USA have set according to its NSS, is to establish a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order and the way to achieve it by **investing** «*in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence*», **building** «*the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges*» and **modernizing** and **strengthening** «*our military so it is equipped for the era of*

²³The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 2.

²⁴ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 6.

*strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland».*²⁵

As far as **Russia** and the **People's Republic of China (PRC)** are concerned, it is stated that «*Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective*».²⁶ In order to counter these effects, the USA has set as a goal to out-compete China and constrain Russia.²⁷

The main characteristic of the new NSS is the fact that it **emphasizes on the development domestic sector**, addressing global challenges such as climate and energy security, pandemics and biodefense, food insecurity, along with traditional challenges such as arms control and non-proliferation and terrorism.²⁸ It also **leaves space for other actors to engage in several regions**, stating that «*It is time to eschew grand designs in favor of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional partners lay the foundation for greater stability, prosperity,*

²⁵ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 11.

²⁶ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 8.

²⁷ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 23.

²⁸ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 27-31.

and opportunity for the people of the Middle East and for the American people»²⁹ and that «Europe has been, and will continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges».³⁰

The National Strategic Review of France

France's new strategic document called «National Strategic Review» (Annex E) was announced by its President on **9 November 2022**.³¹ The new strategic document is a **60 pages** long document comprising of a foreword by the French President, three parts describing the «Strategic analysis», the «Challenges to be met», and «The strategic objectives», concluding with a list of acronyms, names of operations and abbreviations.

In the Forward, President Macron sets his vision stating that *«[...] By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, globally influential power, a driving force for European autonomy, and a power that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law»*.³²

Later on, the document stresses the fact that *«We are consequently moving from latent competition to open confrontation on the part of **Russia** and, increasingly,*

²⁹ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 42.

³⁰ The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy, 38.

³¹ France 24. (09 November 2022). Macron unveils shift in military posture as war returns to Europe. <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221109-france-reorientates-its-military-goals-as-war-returns-to-europe> (15/01/2023).

³² Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 1.

to greater competition with the **People's Republic of China (PRC)**»,³³ stating that the war in Ukraine revealed the need for nuclear power in order to confront revisionist actors like Russia. It also states that despite the fact that the United States have focused their foreign policy mainly on dealing with China, the Atlantic Alliance has been strengthened by the situation and France is reaching out to new partners.³⁴

As far as France's three **security priorities** are concerned, these include «Strengthening our strategic autonomy», «Attaining European Sovereignty and consolidating our Alliances» and «The defense of a stable international order based on the rule of law and multilateralism»,³⁵ while France is also trying to expand its strategic functions such as «Knowledge-Appreciation-Anticipation», «Deterrence», «Protection-Resilience», «Prevention», «Intervention» and «Influence».³⁶

The **ten strategic objectives** that France has set in order to achieve its President's vision include «A robust and credible nuclear deterrent», «A united and resilient France», «An economy contributing to a defence mindset», «First class cyber resilience», «To be an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area», «To be a driving force behind European strategic autonomy», «To be a reliable sovereignty partner and a credible provider of security», «Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty», «The capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields»

³³ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 9.

³⁴ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 14-15.

³⁵ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 20-21.

³⁶ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 21-24.

and «Freedom of action and the capacity to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations, autonomously or in a coalition, in all fields».³⁷

As far as the **Indo-Pacific**, the **EU** and **NATO** are concerned, the National Strategic Review states that «By 2030, France [...] *will contribute through its influence and with its partners to the stability of the Indo-Pacific area. It will defend its sovereignty and respect for international law within that area*»,³⁸ and that «*France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific*».³⁹ The main characteristic of the new National Strategic Review is the ambition of France to play an enhanced role as a security provider in the international security environment, also acting as a leading state among the European Union.

Japan's National Security Strategy

On **16 December 2022**, Japan published its second National Security Strategy (NSS) (Annex F).⁴⁰ The new strategic document was drafted by the National Security Council and approved by the Cabinet, and is a **36 pages** long document comprising of a foreword by the US President, nine parts namely «Purpose», «Japan's National Interests», «Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan's National Security» and «Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan's National Security

³⁷ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 27-28.

³⁸ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 27.

³⁹ Presidency of the Republic of France. (2022). National Strategic Review, 41.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (27 December 2022). National Security Strategy (NSS), https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html (15/01/2023).

Challenges», «National Security Objectives of Japan», «Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan», «Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan's National Security», «Duration, Evaluation, and Revision of the Strategy» and a «Conclusion».

As stated in the part **Purpose**, Japan's perception of the security environment is that *«We live in the world of a historical inflection point and in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Against this backdrop, Japan must protect its own national interests, including the peace, security and prosperity of Japan, the safety of its people, and the coexistence and coprosperity of the international community by steadfastly preparing for the worst-case scenario, including fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities»*.⁴¹

The three **national interests** defined require that Japan will *«[...] maintain its sovereignty and independence, defend its territorial integrity, and secure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals»*, *«[...] achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic growth, thereby consolidating its own peace and security»* and *«[...] maintain and protect universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and international order based on international law»*,⁴² while the main principle concerning its national security is the fact that *«The Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the provision*

⁴¹National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 2.

⁴² National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 4.

*of extended deterrence, will remain the cornerstone of Japan's national security policy».*⁴³

As far as the **Indo-Pacific** is concerned, Japan is «Guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific»,⁴⁴ stating that **People's Republic of China (PRC)** «China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, [...] to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others».⁴⁵

As far as **Russia** is concerned, Japan is highly concerned as «[...] Russia is accelerating its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Russia is also strengthening its armaments in the Northern Territories, which is an inherent territory of Japan. This is presumably due to the background that the Sea of Okhotsk plays as an area of activity for strategic nuclear submarines, an important part in Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Furthermore, Russia has been doubling down on strategic coordination with China».⁴⁶

Finally, it must be stressed that the main characteristic of the new National Security Strategy of Japan is that despite the fact that the Japanese Foreign Minister stated that «[...] the new NSS sets forth diplomatic capabilities as the first pillar of the

⁴³ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 5.

⁴⁴ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 8.

⁴⁵ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 8.

⁴⁶ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 10.

*main elements of comprehensive national power for Japan's national security»,⁴⁷ Japan will «[...] take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental **reinforcement of defense capabilities** and complementary initiatives, reach **2% of the current GDP**»⁴⁸ and «[...] further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. that is backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear».⁴⁹*

The case of Greece

As far as Greece is concerned, a Governmental National Security Council (GNSC) was established in 2019, having the responsibility of drafting Greece's first National Security Strategy.⁵⁰ Dr. Thanos Dokos, the Greek National Security Advisor (NSA), had stated on **25 January 2021** that «[...] the National Security Strategy and the Homeland Security Strategy are in the preparation stage».⁵¹ Despite the aforementioned statement though and the fact that on **12 October 2022**, the Greek

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (16 December 2022). Adoption of the new "National Security Strategy (NSS)" (Statement by Foreign Minister HAYASHI Yoshimasa), https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html (15/01/2023).

⁴⁸ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 20.

⁴⁹ National Security Council. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan, 22.

⁵⁰ Koukakis, Georgios. (Dec. 2022), , "Establishing the Greek National Security Council: A Comparative Case Study Analysis with the National Security Council of the United States". University of Buckingham Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS). Global Security and Intelligence Notes 6. https://www.buckingham.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/GSIN_6F.pdf (15/01/2023).

⁵¹ Dokos, Thanos. (25 January 2021). Thanos Dokos: Greek national security: An assessment and challenges. Ekathimerini. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/261588/thanos-dokos-greek-national-security-an-assessment-and-challenges/> (15/01/2023)

media reported that the Greek NSA presented the NSS to the GNSC,⁵² a NSS has not been published yet. The only update there is on the subject, is that Dr. Dokos published an article on **02 January 2023** proposing fifteen key strategic directions in the area of national security, also stating that «[...] *a national strategy cannot be successful without the state mechanism adopting a comprehensive approach to matters of security, without strong consensus at the societal level and without an understanding at the political level on national interests and security*».⁵³

Conclusion

The main conclusion of the research paper, is the fact that most actors issue some type of a strategic document in order to set their goals, define the means and describe the ways by which they are planning to accomplish them. This way, they provide the context in which all their subordinates are going to plan their respective sub-strategies. The importance of having a strategy lies in the fact of having a method (or more) to achieve a specific goal, aligning all efforts to this end. Otherwise:

«A goal without a plan is just a wish»⁵⁴

⁵² Newsroom. (12 October 2022). KYSEA discusses Turkey, Evros border wall, arms procurement. Ekathimerini. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1195458/kysea-discusses-turkey-evros-border-wall-arms-procurement/> (15/01/2023)

⁵³ Dokos, Thanos. (02 January 2023). Outwardness, deterrence, resilience. Ekathimerini. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1201305/outwardness-deterrence-resilience/> (15/01/2023)

⁵⁴ Carnegie, M., Herrick, K., & Maguire, K. (2017). A goal without a plan is just a wish. Rattler (Sydney), (123), 19–23. <https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/ielapa.244177846374173> (15/01/2023).

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
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Annex A. The EU Strategic Compass



Source: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf

Annex B. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept



Source: <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022


European Union, NATO, USA, France, Japan & Greece

Annex C. NATO's Strategic Concept Evolution Matrix

No	Date of Release/Approval	Code Name & Classification	Full Title of the Strategic Document	Key Elements	Fundamental Tasks	Related Documents
1 st	06/01/1950	DC 6/1 Classified	Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area	Deterrence	-	MC 14 DC 13
2 nd	03/12/1952	MC 3/5 Classified	Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area	Deterrence	-	MC 14/1
3 rd	23/05/1957	MC 14/2 Classified	Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area	Massive retaliation	-	MC 48/2
4 th	16/01/1968	MC 14/3 Classified	Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area	Flexibility & Escalation	-	MC 48/3
5 th	07/11/1991	None Unclassified	Strategic Concept	Partnership & Cooperation	4 tasks (mentioned descriptively)	MC 400
6 th	24/04/1999	None Unclassified	Strategic Concept	Partnership, Cooperation & Dialogue	1. Security 2. Consultation 3. Deterrence & Defence	MC 400/2
7 th	19/11/2010	None Unclassified	Active Engagement, Modern Defence	Open Door Policy, Consultation & Solidarity	1. Collective Defence 2. Crisis Management 3. Cooperative Security	MC 400/3
8 th	29/06/2022	None Unclassified	NATO 2022 Strategic Concept	Collective Defense, Open Door Policy & Resilience	1. Deterrence & Defense 2. Crisis Prevention & Management 3. Cooperative Security	-


Source: LTC Georgios KOUKAKIS

Annex D. The National Security Strategy of the USA




Source: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

Annex E. The National Strategic Review of France



Source: <http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2022/12/rns-uk-20221202.pdf>

Annex F. The National Security Strategy of Japan



Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html

About the author (Curriculum Vitae)



Georgios Koukakis was born in Heraklion, Crete and holds a Master of Arts in "Governance, Development and Security in the Mediterranean" from the Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean (Rhodes, Greece), while his master thesis focused on the Hellenic National Security Council. His research interests include National Security, Law of the Sea, International Organizations,

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