{"id":27623,"date":"2026-10-31T10:11:13","date_gmt":"2026-10-31T10:11:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/?p=27623"},"modified":"2026-10-31T10:11:13","modified_gmt":"2026-10-31T10:11:13","slug":"one-threat-many-perceptions-realism-and-the-limits-of-european-defense-unity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/one-threat-many-perceptions-realism-and-the-limits-of-european-defense-unity\/","title":{"rendered":"One Threat, Many Perceptions: Realism and the Limits of European Defense Unity"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Spyros Tsaparas, Junior Analyst KEDISA<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Introduction<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

When Russia launched its \u201cspecial military operation\u201d against Ukraine on February 24th<\/sup>, 2022, the E.U. reacted with its member states raising defense budgets throughout the union. Specifically, the year that Russia attacked Ukraine, the E.U. collective defense budget was 270 billion euros and now, four years later, it is projected to reach 454 billion euros [1]<\/a>. The rise came to counter further potential Russian aggression on the continent, and one would expect a common strategy to follow suit, but it hasn\u2019t. While the E.U. is spending hundreds of billions of euros on weaponry, the states comprising it still haven\u2019t agreed on a common strategy against the Russian threat. The puzzle created by this contradiction finds its answer in political realism. Specifically, this piece will use it to argue that the European states perceive the Russian threat, not only by its size but by their geographical distance from it.<\/p>\n

Economic Data<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The response that emerged from the European states supports that exact point. Every state raised their defense budget, in relation with their GDP, but the countries closer to Russia raised it significantly more. As of 2025, Poland\u2019s defense budget rose to 4.48% of its GDP, exceeding even that of the U.S.\u2019 while the defense budget of countries further away from Russia like Belgium, Italy or even Spain have defense budgets at around 2% or even less [2]<\/a>. All of the mentioned states participate in the common European trend of preparing against a potential Russian aggression with raised defense budgets but the states bordering Russia are in more immediate danger rather than those further away from it. It is the application of the proximity argument that realism advocates for, as it will be explained in detail later on the analysis. However, it is important to address the exceptions that were put into effect for Slovakia and Hungary at the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Because of their reliance on Russian energy, they were given a temporary exception from banning Russian oil and gas imports, as a response to Russian aggression [3]<\/a>. In accordance with common European trends, they also raised defense budgets despite importing Russian energy.<\/p>\n

Common Strategy<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Europe regards a common set of actions against Russian aggression, advocating for Ukraine and showing their support to it with all means but military action. When Russia launched its attack, most E.U. states condemned it and placed sanctions on Russian imports. However, states like Hungary, under prime minister Viktor Orban, refused to completely adopt Ukraine\u2019s side and continued importing gas and oil to support their economy. Actions like this are what make a common strategy, a political nightmare for the E.U. to implement as in cases like Hungary\u2019s it overlaps with states\u2019 national interests. Interestingly enough, the same national interest that drove states to reject a common E.U. strategy, are the same ones that define state policy towards Russia alongside their geographical proximity to it. Poland, for example not only borders Russia, but also 92% of Poles see Russia as a threat and 77% of them see the likelihood of war with them high or very high [4]<\/a>. On the other hand, southern states like Italy with no immediate military threat from a Russian attack, when asked about it 65% of them view a potential military conflict with Russia low or non-existent [5]<\/a>. The tendency of the population to see a military conflict imminent depends on the states\u2019 geographical proximity to the threat which in turn, the populace views shape policy. The exception to such a case within the E.U. is Spain. Although 74% of Spaniards see Russia as a threat (a percentage higher than Germany\u2019s 72% and France\u2019s 69%) and considering the country\u2019s historical alignment with European norms, Spain rejected the 5% NATO target at the 2025 summit [6]<\/a>. Although an exception to the European trend against Russia, Spain like other western states actively provides military equipment to Ukraine and publicly voices its support for it [7]<\/a>. As the war in Europe drags on, realism through the fundamental works of its scholars, provides the explanation behind the patterns that dictate European policy on the Russo-Ukrainian war.<\/p>\n

Realism<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Political realism argues that a large enough enemy is a uniting force for smaller states to work together as an act of balance of power [8]<\/a>. This reoccurring theme revealed itself when the West united against communism and forced the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Russian attack on Ukraine has created a danger severe enough for the European states to collectively raise their defense budgets. It would be expected therefore that a common strategy to combat Russia has been agreed upon the whole E.U. but the reality is that a common strategy has not been reached. While realism reveals the historical trend, it also gives an answer to this puzzle. Every European state feels the Russian threat, but they don\u2019t feel it the same because of their geographical proximity to the threat. It is emphasized by realist theory that power is separated from threat, and threat depends on proximity as well as strength [9]<\/a>. States closer geographically to Russia (Poland, the Baltic countries etc) are advocating for more millitaristic approaches as they are the first ones to absorb Russian attacks in a full-scale war. States further away from the Russian border advocate for diplomatic approaches while also supporting dialogue with Russia. This pattern is the proximity argument as developed by Walt\u2019s work \u201cThe origins of alliances\u201d.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>Conclusion<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

To conclude, the Russian threat was big enough that mobilized all E.U. member states to raise their defense spending and offer Ukraine public support as well as millitaristic one. Where the states failed at is collectively agreeing on a common strategy against Russia. The puzzle created by that contradiction, is solved through the lenses of realism which the theory explains, through proximity to the threat being the driving factor behind it. States closer to Russia advocate for a more direct militaristic approach while countries further away from Russia advocate for a more balanced diplomatic approach. This is the case because the closer a state is to the threat the more likely it is to feel threatened by it, as documented from \u201cthe origins of alliances\u201d through the proximity argument.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

European Council. \u2018EU Defence in Numbers\u2019. 2025. https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/defence-numbers\/.<\/p>\n

European Union. \u2018Standard Eurobarometer 105\u2019. Accessed 18 October 2026. https:\/\/europa.eu\/eurobarometer\/surveys\/detail\/3613.<\/p>\n

\u2018Europeans See an Increased Risk of War with Russia.\u2019 Spotmedia.Ro<\/em>, 4 December 2025. https:\/\/spotmedia.ro\/en\/news\/social\/europeans-see-an-increased-risk-of-war-with-russia-almost-half-consider-donald-trump-an-enemy-of-europe-survey.<\/p>\n

Franciszek J\u00f3zef Besz\u0142ej. \u2018What Poles Dread More than in Any Other European Nation\u2019. 4 December 2025. https:\/\/tvpworld.com\/90380683\/poles-most-afraid-in-europe-of-open-war-with-russia-study.<\/p>\n

Martin Fornusek. \u2018Spain Unveils $1.2 Billion in Military Aid for Ukraine\u2019.<\/p>\n

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances<\/em>. Cornell University Press, 1987. https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.7591\/j.ctt32b5fc.<\/p>\n

Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics<\/em>. Reiss. Waveland Press, 2010.<\/p>\n

Yahoo Finance. \u2018European Defence Spending: Poland Spends Larger Share of GDP than US\u2019. 22 June 2026. https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/economy\/articles\/european-defence-spending-poland-spends-045132134.html.<\/p>\n

Yahoo News. \u2018Hungary Threatens Block EU Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine Pipeline Dispute\u2019. 22 February 2026. https:\/\/www.yahoo.com\/news\/articles\/hungary-threatens-block-eu-sanctions-173043108.html.<\/p>\n

\u00a0Endnotes<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> European Council, \u2018EU Defence in Numbers\u2019.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Yahoo Finance, \u2018European Defence Spending\u2019.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Yahoo News, \u2018Hungary Threatens Block EU Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine Pipeline Dispute\u2019.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Franciszek J\u00f3zef Besz\u0142ej, \u2018What Poles Dread More than in Any Other European Nation\u2019.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> \u2018Europeans See an Increased Risk of War with Russia.\u2019<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> European Union, \u2018Standard Eurobarometer 105\u2019.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Martin Fornusek, \u2018Spain Unveils $1.2 Billion in Military Aid for Ukraine\u2019.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Waltz, Theory of International Politics<\/em>.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Walt, The Origins of Alliances<\/em>.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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