{"id":27270,"date":"2026-07-28T08:50:27","date_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:50:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/?p=27270"},"modified":"2026-07-28T08:50:27","modified_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:50:27","slug":"the-clash-of-air-power-concepts-technological-superiority-and-asymmetric-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/the-clash-of-air-power-concepts-technological-superiority-and-asymmetric-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"The Clash of Air Power Concepts: Technological Superiority and Asymmetric Strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Mehran Atashjameh, Analyst KEDISA<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

West Asia, commonly referred to as the Middle East, occupies a strategic position in global politics due to its location at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa. The region hosts some of the world’s largest oil producers and contains critical maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Moreover, its close geopolitical and economic interconnection with North Africa together forming the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has made it a focal point of attention for major external powers.[i]<\/a> At the same time, the Middle East is one of the world’s most conflict-prone regions. Long-standing historical rivalries, unresolved territorial disputes, sectarian divisions, and competing geopolitical interests have created a persistent environment of instability. Consequently, conflicts in the region inevitably extend beyond its borders and influence broader international political, economic, and security developments.[ii]<\/a> Within this broader context, the Persian Gulf occupies a particularly significant position. As the center of global energy production and a key arena of regional power competition, developments in the Persian Gulf have far-reaching implications for the international order. The recent conflict, which began on 28 February with a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iranian officials and the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, triggered a new phase of confrontation[iii]<\/a> that warrants careful examination. Against this background, this study examines the role of air power in shaping the dynamics of this conflict. Specifically, it analyzes how the employment of air power influenced military operations, strategic decision-making, and the broader trajectory of the confrontation, while assessing its implications for regional security.<\/p>\n

Iran-US, The Clash of Logics<\/strong><\/p>\n

Air power and the ability to project military power through the air domain occupy a central place in the military doctrines of both sides of the conflict. However, the capabilities, strategic approaches, and tactical logic underlying their respective doctrines differ significantly. As a result, this conflict represents a confrontation between two distinct approaches to warfare in the air domain. On one side, the United States[iv]<\/a> possesses overwhelming advantages in advanced aerial capabilities, including Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)[v]<\/a> assets, and an extensive command-and-control network, enabling it to establish and maintain air superiority. Together with Israel’s highly advanced air force and integrated air defense systems, this approach emphasizes control of the air as a prerequisite for successful military operations. On the other side, Iran has adopted an asymmetric approach[vi]<\/a> centered on missile arsenal, long-range strike capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated Drones. Although Iran possessed one of the most advanced air forces in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, its conventional air capabilities gradually deteriorated in the post-revolutionary period. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War, decades of international sanctions, limited access to spare parts and modern aircraft, and insufficient investment in fleet modernization prevented the development of a competitive air force. Despite repeated attempts to procure advanced combat aircraft from Russia, China, and several post-Soviet states, Iran’s efforts were largely constrained by international sanctions, diplomatic pressure from Western countries, and political considerations.[vii]<\/a> Consequently, Tehran shifted its defense strategy toward developing an indigenous missile program, expanding its drone warfare capabilities, and strengthening passive air defense measures. This strategic adaptation enabled Iran to pursue long-range strike capabilities despite its relative weakness in conventional air power.<\/p>\n

Backgrounds of Conflict<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although the establishment of air superiority and freedom of action in the air domain became a primary objective of the United States, its ability to conduct extensive strikes deep inside Iranian territory did not emerge overnight. Rather, it was the result of a gradual degradation of Iran’s integrated air defense network over the preceding years, creating a favorable operational environment for U.S. and Israeli air operations. Beginning in 2024, Iran’s air defense infrastructure experienced three successive waves of strikes conducted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). These operations primarily targeted key components of Iran’s integrated air and missile defense system, with particular emphasis on long-range air defense assets, including S-300 batteries deployed around Isfahan and other strategic assets in western Iran. In addition to destroying launchers and radar systems, these strikes disrupted elements of Iran’s early warning, command-and-control, and air surveillance architecture, thereby reducing the effectiveness of its layered air defense network.[viii]<\/a> The cumulative effect of these operations was the gradual erosion of Iran’s ability to detect, track, and engage hostile aircraft at long ranges. Consequently, when the 2026 conflict erupted, the United States did not confront an intact and fully operational Iranian air defense system. Instead, it faced a network that had already been significantly degraded. Previous Israeli operations had substantially weakened Iran’s upper-tier air defense coverage and early warning capabilities, creating a window of opportunity for U.S. forces to establish relative air superiority and conduct deep-strike missions with considerably greater operational freedom than would otherwise have been possible. While Iranian short- and medium-range air defense systems continued to pose localized threats, the degradation of long-range defensive capabilities reduced the overall effectiveness of Iran’s integrated air defense system and limited its ability to contest hostile air operations across the country’s airspace. This degradation of Iran’s air defense network was also consistent with the broader strategic objectives of the United States. According to official statements, the principal aims of the campaign were to significantly reduce Iran’s missile capabilities and neutralize its nuclear infrastructure.[ix]<\/a> Within this strategic framework, the establishment of air superiority was not an objective in itself but an operational prerequisite for achieving these broader goals. Without suppressing Iran’s air defenses, sustained precision strikes against strategic targets deep inside Iranian territory would have been considerably more difficult and costly. From an operational perspective, the campaign followed a classic Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)[x]<\/a> approach. The initial phase focused on degrading Iran’s integrated air defense system by targeting long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, radar installations, early warning assets, and command-and-control nodes. Once a sufficient level of air superiority had been achieved, U.S. and Israeli aircraft were able to conduct follow-on strikes with greater freedom against missile production facilities, ballistic missile launch sites, storage depots, military infrastructure, command centers, and nuclear-related installations. In this sense, the suppression of Iranian air defenses constituted the enabling phase of the broader campaign rather than an end in itself, creating the operational conditions necessary for the systematic targeting of Iran’s strategic military capabilities.<\/p>\n

Characteristics of the Air Campaign<\/strong><\/p>\n

The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf exhibits several characteristics that distinguish it from previous military confrontations in the region. Although missiles played a significant role, the defining feature of this conflict was the projection of military power through the air domain. Air operations, supported by extensive ISR capabilities, became the principal means through which both sides sought to achieve their strategic objectives. While both Iran and the United States relied heavily on Drones, their employment reflected fundamentally different strategic concepts shaped by their respective military capabilities and operational constraints. From the Iranian perspective, the overwhelming conventional air superiority of the United States required the adoption of an asymmetric approach. Rather than contesting control of the air directly, Iran relied on the survivability of its missile and drone forces by employing shoot-and-scoot tactics[xi]<\/a>, mobility, deception, camouflage, and passive defense measures.[xii]<\/a> Missile launchers were rapidly relocated following launches to reduce their vulnerability to air strikes, while critical assets were dispersed and concealed within hardened underground facilities. Iran’s extensive network of missile bases, many of which are constructed inside mountain complexes, significantly increased the survivability of its strategic forces.[xiii]<\/a> These hardened and geographically protected facilities complicated U.S. targeting efforts by reducing the available engagement window and requiring persistent intelligence to detect launch preparations before launchers could be relocated. Consequently, time became a decisive factor for U.S. forces. Detecting mobile missile launchers before they displaced required continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage over vast areas. In this context, drones became indispensable. Compared to manned aircraft, drones offer significantly longer endurance, enabling persistent ISR missions over potential launch areas for extended periods. Their ability to remain airborne for many hours provided U.S. forces with a continuous surveillance capability, increasing the likelihood of identifying time-sensitive targets and supporting dynamic targeting operations against mobile missile and drone launchers. Nevertheless, despite these advantages, drones also exhibited important operational limitations. Most long-endurance drones operate at relatively low or medium altitudes and relatively slow speeds, making them vulnerable to optical and passive air defense systems. Unlike conventional radar-guided air defense systems, passive optical systems operate without emitting electromagnetic signals, making them considerably more difficult to detect, locate, and suppress. Their ability to remain electronically silent allows them to conduct ambush engagements against low-flying aerial platforms, particularly unmanned systems conducting ISR missions. This vulnerability was reflected in the number of U.S. drones reportedly intercepted during the conflict.[xiv]<\/a> In one notable case, an advanced fifth-generation fighter aircraft was successfully engaged by Iranian air defenses. Although the aircraft managed to escape and return safely, the incident demonstrated that even technologically superior platforms remained vulnerable when operating within contested airspace.[xv]<\/a> A second defining characteristic of the conflict was the unprecedented pressure placed on air and missile defense systems. The highly missile-intensive nature of the campaign required the United States and its regional partners to sustain prolonged defensive operations against continuous waves of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The participation of Arab states in the Persian Gulf further increased demand for interceptor missiles, raising concerns regarding the sustainability of interceptor inventories during a prolonged conflict.[xvi]<\/a> These concerns extended beyond purely military considerations and evolved into an economic challenge. Modern interceptor missiles are highly sophisticated and expensive, often costing hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per engagement, whereas many one-way attack drones can be produced at only a fraction of that cost. This unfavorable cost-exchange ratio placed significant financial and logistical pressure on defending forces, particularly during sustained operations involving large numbers of inexpensive aerial threats. As a result, regional actors increasingly explored more economical counter-drone solutions. This search extended beyond the Middle East, with several Persian Gulf Arab states examining lessons from the war in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, where similar challenges had accelerated the development of cost-effective counter-drone technologies. Rather than relying exclusively on high-cost interceptor missiles, attention shifted toward low-cost interception methods.[xvii]<\/a><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

In sum, the recent conflict between Iran and the United States demonstrates that contemporary warfare in the Persian Gulf is fundamentally a contest over the air domain. For the United States, the campaign centered on establishing and exploiting air superiority through technological superiority, advanced ISR capabilities, precision-guided strike systems, and the degradation of Iran’s integrated air defense network. Air superiority enabled sustained operations against strategic targets and provided the operational freedom necessary to pursue broader military objectives. For Iran, by contrast, the conflict was fought through an asymmetric strategy designed not to contest air superiority directly but to undermine its effectiveness. Relying on ballistic missiles, one-way attack drones, mobile launchers, hardened underground facilities, and passive defense measures, Iran sought to preserve its strategic strike capability while imposing military and economic costs on its adversaries. Continuous missile and drone attacks forced the United States and its regional partners to expend significant interceptor resources, placing sustained pressure on air and missile defense systems throughout the conflict. A further lesson concerns the economics of modern air warfare. The widespread employment of relatively inexpensive drones against high-value defensive systems reinforced the unfavorable cost-exchange ratio that has become increasingly evident in recent conflicts. Although the war in Ukraine had already demonstrated the strategic implications of mass drone warfare and the strain it places on interceptor inventories, the Persian Gulf Arab states entered the conflict without fully adapting their air defense architectures to this emerging threat. As a result, they faced many of the same challenges observed in Eastern Europe, including the rapid consumption of costly interceptor missiles against large numbers of inexpensive unmanned aerial systems. Ultimately, the conflict illustrates that future wars will not be determined solely by technological superiority in the air.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sources-Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n

[i]<\/a> Steven A. Cook, Major Power Rivalry in the Middle East<\/em> (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/reports\/major-power-rivalry-middle-east<\/a><\/p>\n

[ii]<\/a> Lizza Bomassi, Ondrej Ditrych, Steven Everts, Caspar Hobhouse, Rossella Marangio, Tim R\u00fchlig, Katarzyna Sid\u0142o, and Giuseppe Spatafora, War in the Middle East: What Implications for the EU and the World?<\/em> (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2026), https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/commentary\/war-middle-east-what-implications-eu-and-world<\/a><\/p>\n

[iii]<\/a> Holly Dagres, Dennis Ross, Dana Stroul, and Robert Satloff, The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran<\/em> (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2026), https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/us-and-israel-strike-iran<\/a><\/p>\n

[iv]<\/a> David A. Deptula, \u201cThe Enduring Primacy of Air Superiority in Modern Warfare,\u201d Air & Space Power Journal<\/em> 36, no. 1 (2026), https:\/\/www.airuniversity.af.edu\/Portals\/10\/ASPJ\/journals\/Volume-36_Issue-1\/Deptula.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[v]<\/a> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Force (NISRF)<\/em> (Brussels: NATO, 2026), https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/deterrence-and-defence\/nato-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-force-nisrf<\/a><\/p>\n

[vi]<\/a> Steve Feldstein, The Unintended Consequences of Iran\u2019s Asymmetric Strategy and America\u2019s AI War<\/em> (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026), https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2026\/05\/the-unintended-consequences-of-irans-asymmetric-strategy-and-americas-ai-war<\/a><\/p>\n

[vii]<\/a> Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran\u2019s Conventional Military Forces<\/em> (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), https:\/\/iranprimer.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/PDF%20Military_Cordesman_Conventional%20Military.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[viii]<\/a> Mehran Atashjameh, \u201cIran\u2013Israel Conflict: Long-Distance Rivalry, Strategies, Toolkits, and Struggle for Penetrating Rival\u2019s Strategic Depth,\u201d Institute of New Europe<\/em>, June 24, 2025, https:\/\/ine.org.pl\/en\/iranisrael-conflict-long-distance-rivalry-strategies-toolkits-and-struggle-for-penetrating-rival82117s-strategic-depth\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[ix]<\/a> The White House, \u201cPresident Trump\u2019s Clear and Unchanging Objectives Drive Decisive Success Against Iranian Regime,\u201d The White House<\/em>, April 1, 2026, https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/releases\/2026\/04\/president-trumps-clear-and-unchanging-objectives-drive-decisive-success-against-iranian-regime\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[x]<\/a> Joseph Speed and Panagiotis Stathopoulos, \u201cSEAD Operations of the Future: The Necessity of Jointness,\u201d Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) Journal<\/em> 26 (Spring\/Summer 2018): 38\u201343, https:\/\/www.japcc.org\/articles\/sead-operations-of-the-future<\/a><\/p>\n

[xi]<\/a> Robert Chambers, \u201cStatic to Strategic: Re-Learning Shoot and Scoot,\u201d Field Artillery Professional Bulletin<\/em>, Issue 2 (2024), U.S. Army Field Artillery, August 1, 2024, https:\/\/www.lineofdeparture.army.mil\/Journals\/Field-Artillery\/FA-2024-Issue-2\/Static-to-Strategic<\/a><\/p>\n

[xii]<\/a> Mehran Atashjameh, \u201cPassive Defense Measures in Saving Iran\u2019s Ballistic Missile Arsenal,\u201d Middle East Studies Insights<\/em> 15, no. 4 (2024), Marine Corps University Press, https:\/\/www.usmcu.edu\/Outreach\/Marine-Corps-University-Press\/MES-Publications\/MES-Insights\/MES-Insights-vol-15-no-4<\/a><\/p>\n

[xiii]<\/a> Mehran Atashjameh, \u201cPassive Defense Measures in Saving Iran\u2019s Ballistic Missile Arsenal,\u201d Middle East Studies Insights<\/em> 15, no. 4 (2024), Marine Corps University Press, https:\/\/www.usmcu.edu\/Outreach\/Marine-Corps-University-Press\/MES-Publications\/MES-Insights\/MES-Insights-vol-15-no-4<\/a><\/p>\n

[xiv]<\/a> Richard Thomas, \u201cHow Many Aircraft Has the US Lost in Iran War?\u201d Airforce Technology<\/em>, April 2, 2026, https:\/\/www.airforce-technology.com\/features\/how-many-aircraft-has-the-us-lost-in-iran-war\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[xv]<\/a> Oren Liebermann, \u201cUS F-35 Damaged by Suspected Iranian Fire Makes Emergency Landing, Sources Say,\u201d CNN<\/em>, March 19, 2026, https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/03\/19\/politics\/f-35-damage-iran-war<\/a><\/p>\n

[xvi]<\/a> The Economist<\/em>, \u201cAre Gulf States Running Out of Missile Interceptors?\u201d The Economist<\/em>, March 3, 2026, https:\/\/www.economist.com\/middle-east-and-africa\/2026\/03\/03\/are-gulf-states-running-out-of-missile-interceptors<\/a><\/p>\n

[xvii]<\/a> Sania Kozatskyi, \u201cUSA and Gulf States Discuss Ukrainian Interceptor Drones to Counter Iranian Shahed Attacks,\u201d Militarnyi<\/em>, March 11, 2026, https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/en\/news\/usa-gulf-states-talks-ukrainian-interceptor\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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