{"id":23346,"date":"2025-04-27T16:22:30","date_gmt":"2025-04-27T16:22:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/hungarys-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court-an-alarm-for-the-international-law-and-the-european-union\/"},"modified":"2026-01-21T22:32:19","modified_gmt":"2026-01-21T22:32:19","slug":"hungarys-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court-an-alarm-for-the-international-law-and-the-european-union","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/hungarys-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court-an-alarm-for-the-international-law-and-the-european-union\/","title":{"rendered":"Hungary\u2019s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court: An alarm for the International Law and the European Union?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By Konstantinos Anagnostakis, Analyst KEDISA<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In November 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor <strong>Orb\u00e1n<\/strong> extended an invitation to his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, to visit Hungary. On April 3rd, the meeting was held, with Netanyahu arriving in Budapest despite an active arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Shortly after the visit, Hungary announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC after 23 years of membership. During a joint press conference with Netanyahu, <strong>Orb\u00e1n<\/strong> defended the move by accusing the Court of devolving into a politically motivated and corrupt institution (Kottasov\u00e1, 2025). Rather than upholding its rule of law-based objectives, he argued, the ICC has developed antisemitic tendencies, targeting democratic countries like Israel (Kottasov\u00e1, 2025).<\/p>\n<p>This paper explores Hungary\u2019s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and its implications for the European Union. It examines Hungary\u2019s recent political trajectory, and the external pressures influencing this decision, notably US sanctions on the ICC. Then, the paper discusses the legal, political, and diplomatic consequences of Hungary\u2019s departure, the potential for further fragmentation within the EU, and the need for urgent decisions to preserve the Union\u2019s unity and global influence.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Hungary<\/em><\/strong><strong><em> in the international community<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Hungary is an active participant in numerous international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a UN member since 1955, the country is automatically a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which forms an integral part of the UN Charter. Regarding the International Criminal Court, Hungary was among the original 60 states to ratify the Rome Statute \u2014the treaty that established the ICC\u2014 in 2001, contributing to the Court\u2019s official establishment in 2002. While Hungary now intends to withdraw from the ICC, it follows the example of Burundi in 2017 and the Philippines in 2019, both of which previously withdrew from the Court. However, Hungary will be the first European Union member state to do so, marking a significant shift in an era of uncertainty, crises and political, economic and social instability worldwide.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><strong><em>What has changed?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Over the past decade, Hungary\u2019s legal and constitutional systems have undergone major changes under Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n and the Fidesz party, significantly affecting the rule of law. In 2015, a state of emergency was declared, enabling the government to bypass standard legislative procedures (M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros, 2024). Several amendments were introduced, including to the Asylum Act and the Fundamental Law, which further expanded the government\u2019s power to rule \u2018by decree\u2019, sidelining Parliament and civil society (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, 2024). This fast-track legislative process has centralized power, bypassed third-party consultation and overridden judicial oversight. This is reflected in the World Justice Project\u2019s Rule of Law Index, where Hungary scores last in the factor \u2018Constraints on Government Powers\u2019 among EU countries (World Justice Project, n.d.). As a result, Orb\u00e1n has concentrated unprecedented powers, enabling his ruling party to shape the country\u2019s future with little to no accountability.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, external pressures have played a significant role in shaping the momentum behind the Hungarian PM\u2019s decision. For instance, the Executive Order 14203, which US President Donald Trump signed on February 6, 2025, imposing sanctions on ICC (The White House, 2025). This order was a direct response to the court\u2019s actions concerning investigations into alleged war crimes involving US personnel and allies.\u200b It imposes visa restrictions and financial penalties on individuals associated with the ICC who are involved in investigating or prosecuting U.S. citizens or officials from allied nations. This includes targeting ICC officials, such as its Chief Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan KC who has prosecuted and issued arrest warrants against Israeli PM Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Gaza conflict (International Criminal Court, 2024). According to the Ambassador of Israel in the US, these sanctions are expected to expand within the next few weeks, putting more pressure to ICC members.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Are there any consequences?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Despite Orb\u00e1n\u2019s plan to withdraw from ICC membership, the process requires formal notification to the United Nations Secretary-General and takes one year to take effect. Until the withdrawal is official, Hungary remains obligated to respect and implement the ICC\u2019s decisions. This entails two key points: first, Hungary is still required to adhere to the Court\u2019s rulings; second, it may face political, diplomatic, and economic sanctions or consequences from the Court, its members, or fellow EU states. Like other international courts, ICC is powerless to force member states to comply with its decisions, even \u2013 as in this instance \u2013 when they fail to execute an arrest warrant issued by the Court. Since the court itself has no enforcement mechanism over sovereign states, it is ultimately only public opinion and the reputation of the States Parties that can lead states to comply with their international law obligations.<\/p>\n<p>It is worth noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin, close ally to Orb\u00e1n, faced an arrest warrant issued on March 17, 2023. Nevertheless, the Russian President traveled to Mongolia \u2014also an ICC member\u2014 for official talks in September 2024, without being detained. Despite the members obligation to detain individuals-suspects under the Rome Statute upon them entering its territory, Mongolia ignored calls from the international community and welcomed the Russian President. To date, no consequences have been announced by the ICC regarding Mongolia\u2019s actions (Al Jazeera, 2024). On the other hand, there were cases where an arrest warrant had a deterrent effect. In 2023, South Africa was plunged into a domestic and international diplomatic crisis over Putin\u2019s expected attendance at the annual summit for BRICS in Johannesburg. In the end, Russia\u2019s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended, in the President\u2019s place, after the two countries reportedly reached an agreement.\u00a0This outcome suggests the ICC arrest warrant did have an impact on this occasion, deterring Putin\u2019s travel plans and influencing his diplomatic positioning (Green, 2024).<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>What are the implications for the EU?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Hungary\u2019s departure from the ICC has serious implications for the EU. From a legal standpoint, it undermines the EU\u2019s collective commitment to international justice and the rule of law \u2014principles that form the foundation of the Union\u2019s identity. It also signals an alarm in Western coherence and unity, at a moment when international law is needed the most \u2014particularly in response to the Russian war crimes in Ukraine and efforts to ensure accountability.<\/p>\n<p>The political ramifications are equally significant in the context of changing global dynamics. Hungary\u2019s close ties with Russia combined with a fragmented transatlantic partnership \u2014particularly under the Trump administration\u2014 turns the move into a politically charged act. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s decision aligns with the US president\u2019s antagonism toward the ICC and further weakens the Western bloc\u2019s stance on international justice. Moreover, Hungary has consistently been one of Russia\u2019s most vocal European supporters, blocking or delaying EU sanctions and resisting military aid to Ukraine through its veto power. In this context, Hungary\u2019s exit from the ICC may appear as an \u2018indirect shield\u2019 to Russia, particularly concerning the ICC\u2019s arrest warrant for President Putin over his role in the Ukraine conflict. <em>This raises the prospect of Putin being able to visit Hungary without fear of arrest, echoing how the Israeli PM has similarly avoided ICC enforcement.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Final remarks<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In a world already plagued by multiple crises, Hungary\u2019s withdrawal from the ICC proves once again that the EU is in reality far away from functioning like a unified, cohesive organization. Beyond its commitment to the rule of law, Hungary\u2019s decision exposes the EU\u2019s internal fragility and political dichonoia. These internal divisions, combined with external pressures such as the impact of Trump-era policies, keep getting in the way of the EU\u2019s ability to address present and future challenges effectively.<\/p>\n<p>Yet, every crisis provides the ground for transformation. From this perspective, Hungary\u2019s move could act as a catalyst for renewed debates within EU institutions over the need for enforcement mechanisms or penalties to ensure member\u2019s adherence to international treaties. Should other countries follow Hungary\u2019s example, the EU risks further fragmentation in its stance on international law and global governance.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, the EU cannot afford to underestimate the wider implications of Hungary\u2019s withdrawal. Instead, it must initiate discussions on how to preserve its unity and effectiveness in addressing global challenges \u2014discussions that must lead to concrete actions. The EU has to find a careful balance to ensure it can speak and act with one voice. Failing to do so could accelerate the divisions within the Union and further diminish its influence on the world stage.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>References<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Al Jazeera. (2024, August 30). Russia&#8217;s Putin to visit ICC member Mongolia despite arrest warrant. <em>Al Jazeera<\/em>. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/8\/30\/russias-putin-to-visit-icc-member-mongolia-despite-arrest-warrant\">https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/8\/30\/russias-putin-to-visit-icc-member-mongolia-despite-arrest-warrant<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Green R. (2024, September 30). <em>Putin\u2019s visit to Mongolia defies ICC arrest warrant as world looks on<\/em>. International Bar Association. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ibanet.org\/putin-visit-to-mongolia-defies-icc-arrest-warrant-as-world-looks-on\">https:\/\/www.ibanet.org\/putin-visit-to-mongolia-defies-icc-arrest-warrant-as-world-looks-on<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. (2024). The state of danger would be extended again with a one-sentence justification. HCLU. https:\/\/hclu.hu\/en\/articles\/the-state-of-danger-would-be-extended-again-with-a-one-sentence-justification<\/p>\n<p>International Criminal Court (May 20, 2024). Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/news\/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine | International Criminal Court<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Kottasov\u00e1 I., April 4, 2025. Hungary says it will pull out of ICC as <strong>Orb\u00e1n<\/strong> hosts Israel\u2019s Netanyahu \u2013 who is wanted by the court. CCN World. <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/04\/03\/world\/hungary-withdraws-icc-intl\/index.html\">Hungary says it will pull out of ICC as it hosts Israel\u2019s Netanyahu \u2013 who is wanted by the court | CNN<\/a><\/p>\n<p>M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros, G. (2024). How misuse of emergency powers dismantled the rule of law in Hungary. Israel Law Review, 1-20.<\/p>\n<p>The White House (February 6, 2025). Imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/02\/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court \u2013 The White House<\/a><\/p>\n<p>World Justice Project. (n.d.-b). Rule of Law Index: Hungary (2024). World Justice Project. <a href=\"https:\/\/worldjusticeproject.org\/rule-of-law-index\/country\/2024\/Hungary\/\">https:\/\/worldjusticeproject.org\/rule-of-law-index\/country\/2024\/Hungary\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/04\/KEDISA---------------.jpg\" data-rel=\"penci-gallery-image-content\" ><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-8534\" src=\"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/04\/KEDISA---------------.jpg\" alt=\"KEDISA--\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b7\" width=\"800\" height=\"449\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Konstantinos Anagnostakis, Analyst KEDISA &nbsp; In November 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n extended&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":242,"featured_media":23606,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1105,1115,1117],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23346","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyses","category-eu-nato","category-international-developments"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23346","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/242"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23346"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23346\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23347,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23346\/revisions\/23347"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23606"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23346"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23346"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23346"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}