{"id":22945,"date":"2017-05-30T08:34:41","date_gmt":"2017-05-30T08:34:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/why-the-uk-has-failed-to-deal-with-international-terrorism\/"},"modified":"2026-02-10T01:14:51","modified_gmt":"2026-02-10T01:14:51","slug":"why-the-uk-has-failed-to-deal-with-international-terrorism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/why-the-uk-has-failed-to-deal-with-international-terrorism\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the UK has failed to deal with International Terrorism?"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Konstantinos Vlachos, Analyst KEDISA<\/strong><\/p>\n

There is no doubt that the Manchester attack on May 22nd<\/sup> 2017, came to confirm that we have already entered into a dark as well as a pessimistic period concerning the nexus of international security. Acting on the occasion of the Manchester attack, I do approach two of the main pillars that reveal the way of thinking behind the British antiterrorism strategy.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

<\/a>\u00a0Papers Discussion<\/h4>\n

The British discourse on the problem of radicalization, is circumscribed by a series of documents, which focus on the draw of the general antiterrorism policy rather than attempting to issue the problem itself. First of all, we will outline the British policy framework through document development in order to understand the way that British governments try to deal with the problem.<\/p>\n

In 2003, the Home office, adopted a counterterrorism strategy, which is based on four main pillars, which are: \u201cpreventing terrorism\u201d, \u201cpursuing terrorists\u201d, \u201cprotecting the public\u201d and \u201cpreparing \u2018the public\u2019 for the consequences\u201d[1]<\/a> This four \u2013pillar counterterrorist strategy which named \u201cContest\u201d, included a long analysis about domestic terrorism and released in 2006 and subsequently amended two times in 2009 and 2011.\u00a0 The first of the four pillars \u201cpreventing terrorism\u201d or \u201cPrevent\u201d, lies in the problem of terrorist\u2019s radicalization.\u00a0 As we have already stressed, the term radicalization was transformed significantly after the 9\/11 attacks and therefore the model that British government used about radicalization before 2006 is blurry. One year before, in 2005, a \u201cthree-tier\u201d model was created in order to analyze the importance of connection between targets and the core of the Al Qaeda by the \u201cJoint Terrorism Analysis Center\u201d, which is part of British security services. However, this document did not developed in any public document and seemed to be neglected.\u00a0 The milestone for the shift of the British government in relation with the conception of terrorist\u2019s radicalization came as a consequence of 7\/7 bombings.<\/p>\n

Indeed, the 7\/7 events mobilized quickly the British government in order to draw a more specific strategy about terrorism and the result was the 2006 \u201cCountering International Terrorism\u201d Contest. In this new pivotal document, the first strand clearly indicates the notion of Prevent, which now is \u201cPreventing terrorism by tackling the radicalization of individuals\u201d.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 The new conception about the doctrine of \u201cPrevent\u201d consists of three main tiers, which are: \u201cTackling disadvantage and supporting reform, Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists and Engaging in the battle of ideas\u201d[3]<\/a> . The corresponding \u201cContests\u201d of 2009 and 2011 are based to 2006 document and subsequently analyze further the concept of radicalization.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

<\/a>\u00a0Countering International Terrorism<\/h4>\n

As we mentioned, the first complete analysis of radicalization by the British government is reflected by the official document, which called Countering International Terrorism: The Great Britain\u2019s Strategy.\u00a0 <\/em>It is worth to notice that the publication of the above paper came two months after the warning of Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee which in May 2006 had stated the following \u201cacross the whole of the counter-terrorism community the development of the home-grown threat and radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.\u201d[4]<\/a> Ergo, we can cautiously claim that the July 2006 strategy was a type of response to the above challenge.<\/p>\n

As we can read in the Countering International Terrorism paper, radicalization constitutes the first significant step, which could have the violence as a possible outcome. More exactly, the paper distinguishes the procedure of radicalization in a way similar to a pyramid model with three tiers. Thus, if we want to adapt the above to a corresponding pyramid model it could be as revealed by the next figure<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\"Figure

Figure 1: the three-tier explanation<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/h4>\n

The Prevent Strategy<\/h4>\n

Between 2006 and 2009, the British government evolved its ideas around the problem of radicalization. More exactly, there is a shift from external sectors like foreign policy and international dynamics to internal like the circumstances in the country itself. The new document concerning the counterterrorism strategy stresses in five \u201cstrategic factors\u201d that have causal link with \u201cviolent extremism\u201d. These factors have as follows: \u201cUnresolved regional disputes and conflicts\u201d in which applies the same concept with the 2006 paper, which superseded. \u201cViolent extremist ideology associated with al Qaeda\u201d which respects most governments in Muslim nations as \u2018un-Islamic\u2019 or renegade. \u201cModern Technologies\u201d which give the opportunity to terrorists in order to conduct their propaganda. \u201cRadicalization the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, joins terrorist groups. Radicalization has a range of causes (including perceptions of our foreign policy), varying from one country and one organization to another\u201d.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

As applied in the Countering International terrorism paper, the definition about radicalization does not include just the terrorists but people who help them. Moreover, if we deal with this definition, we also must consider that radicalization is inherent to violence. To put it in a more simple way, according to a research of the \u201cResearch, Information and Communications Unit (RICU)\u201d, the greater part of the interviewees may dismiss the methods which are used by terrorists, however, they \u201csympathized with the causes allegedly espoused by terrorists and felt that their grievances were legitimate\u201d.[6]<\/a>\u00a0 From the above research arises the following question: Are these people are being considered as radicalized or not?<\/p>\n

Another pillar, in relation to the prevention is the doctrine of \u2018promoting of share values\u2019. This doctrine unfolded sufficiently by the former Prime Minister David Cameron on February 2011. During a security conference in Munich, the former Prime minister talked about radicalization and Islamic extremism.[7]<\/a>\u00a0 During this speech Cameron pointed out that Islamist extremism is a threat for the British society as well as for all Western societies. He also stressed on the issue that some of the attacks were carried out by Muslim British citizens, who find it hard to identify themselves with Britain, be integrated and feel that they belong in this country \u201csome young Muslims feel rootless\u201d.[8]<\/a> He portrayed Islamist radicalism as the inverse of the western, liberal society and as a risk to national identity and cohesion. Thus, according to this speech, the problem seems to be the different values between \u2018us and them\u2019, given that the use of violence is barely mentioned. The proposed solution is that \u2018young Muslims\u2019 (in order not to be radicalized) should learn the British values and be integrated in the British society. Even if the British PM repeatedly stressed the difference between Islam and Islamist extremism, he still provoked strong reactions.<\/p>\n

Indeed, the above pillar consists of two documents related to the prevention of violent extremism in universities and higher education colleges. More exactly the first document conceptualizes the goal as \u201cpromoting good campus relations, fostering shared values and preventing violent extremism in universities and higher education colleges\u201d. The second, among others states that \u201ctotally key to this exertion [of empowering groups ‘to oppose radical impact and eliminate terrorism’ is our journey to build up our feeling of shared values: the values that tie groups together. These values have a place with everybody in Britain … it is totally important that organizations encapsulate these estimations of openness, free discussion and resistance\u201d.[9]<\/a> Therefore, we could claim from the above that a path, which was helpful in order to deal with terrorism, has upgraded to a necessity in order to face terrorism. Moreover, we understand that through this way, government\u2019s willingness is to persuade young Muslims that to be radicalized does not mean necessarily that they must climb to the above tier of the pyramid. This is the crucial point from which the term radicalization becomes blurrier since it is opens to broader conceptions. On the other hand no one can guarantee that someone who has grown up in an environment of hate, can be a peaceful activist but not a terrorist. Therefore, the above sector seems to be more a placebo rather than a solution in a realistic way. Ergo, we could agree with Anthony Richards in the argue that \u201ccounterterrorism action ought to be constrained to intercessions where there is a reasonable, distinguished risk of gatherings or people experiencing radicalization to atrocities\u201d.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: pp. 1-3<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Ibid. p. 1<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ibid. pp. 1-2<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Great Britain, Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee\u2019s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,London<\/em>:The Stationery Office (Cm. 6786). Available from: https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/world\/uk\/govres_7july.pdf<\/a>, [Accessed 18\/8\/2016]\n

[5]<\/a> HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare, The Great Britain\u2019s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism<\/em>, London: Home Office, March 2009, p. 11<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Research, Information and Communications Unit, \u2018Counterterror message testing\u2019<\/em>, March 2010, p. 3 [The eleven focus groups consisted of six or seven individuals each and included men and women aged between 18 and 55 from \u2018a range of social and educational backgrounds\u2019. The research\u00a0\u00a0 was completed in April 2008 and was carried out in Bradford, Birmingham and London]\n

[7]<\/a> David Cameron\u2019s Munich Speech on Multicalturalism,<\/em>\u00a0 (2011) Available from: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=VsGQvOq8cEs<\/a>,\u00a0 [Accessed 7\/9\/2016]\n

[8]<\/a>David Cameron\u2019s Munich Speech on Multicalturalism,<\/em>\u00a0 (2011) Available from: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=VsGQvOq8cEs<\/a>,\u00a0 [Accessed 7\/9\/2016]\n

[9]<\/a> \u2028Great Britain, Department for Innovation Universities & Skills, \u2018The role of further education colleges in preventing violent extremism: Next Steps<\/em>\u2019, Feb. 2009,\u00a0\u00a0 https:\/\/www.education.gov.uk\/consultations\/downloadableDocs\/17193_DIUS_Next_Steps.pdf<\/a>, [Accessed 1\/8\/2016]\n

[10]<\/a> R. Anthony, \u2018The problem with Radicalization\u2019: the remit of \u2018Prevent\u2019 and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK\u2019, International Affairs<\/em>, Vol. 87, Issue 1, 2011, p. 149<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Konstantinos Vlachos, Analyst KEDISA There is no doubt that the Manchester attack on May…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":98,"featured_media":23471,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1105,1107,1114],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22945","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyses","category-intelligence-and-security","category-terrorism-organized-crime-security"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22945","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/98"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22945"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22945\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22946,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22945\/revisions\/22946"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23471"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22945"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22945"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22945"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}