{"id":12893,"date":"2026-01-30T10:35:21","date_gmt":"2026-01-30T08:35:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/?p=12893"},"modified":"2026-03-30T20:50:03","modified_gmt":"2026-03-30T20:50:03","slug":"operation-absolute-resolve-a-tactical-assessment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kedisa.gr\/en\/operation-absolute-resolve-a-tactical-assessment\/","title":{"rendered":"Operation Absolute Resolve: A tactical assessment"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Ilias Tzanetoulakos, Analyst KEDISA<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The recent US operation against Maduro\u2019s regime provides a series of lessons concerning the complexity of modern warfare and the rising significance of informational dominance. The success of the\u00a0 \u201cOperation Absolute Resolve\u201d itself may not be worth examining, in the sense that it is undeniable that the US outweighs Venezuela militarily. The noteworthy part of the operation\u2019s development was the absolute absence of Venezuelan air defense participation in combat. Even though Venezuela had considerable air defense capabilities at its disposal, not one American aircraft was downed during the raid, among the hundreds that were deployed. There are numerous hypotheses on the How<\/em> and Why<\/em> this happened. Inadequate training of personnel, poor maintenance of air defence systems, insufficiency of Russia-made air defence systems, and Command & Control paralysis in part of Venezuela are the most relevant hypotheses analysts are examining. The scope of this piece is to address the most likely explanation behind the absolute defeat.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Venezuela was known to employ at least two S-300VM long-range surface-to-air missile systems, an older version of Russia\u2019s current S-400, and several Buk-M2E SA-17 Grizzly medium-range surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, Maduro had stated that he had 5.000 Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles at \u201ckey air defense positions\u201d, possibly referring to the Russian Igla-S man-portable (MANPAD-Man Portable Air Defence Systems). The Venezuelan air force consists of some American-made F-16s and more modern Russian-made Su-30 fighter jets. The overall picture showed a state ready to fight back, and the US analysts were well aware. Memos of the Department of Justice, during the planning of the operations, wrote: \u201cIt is expected that US forces will face significant resistance on the approach. There are as many as 75 anti-aircraft battery sites along the approach route to Fort Tiuna\u2026Risks to the mission are significant. Success will depend on surprise.\u201d After the operation, Mark Cancian, a defense expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Russian-made air defenses in Venezuela were “pretty formidable on paper,” adding that it was “quite impressive that, essentially, they did no damage to the US force.”<\/p>\n

On the US side, according to President Trump and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, the US deployed more than 150 aircraft, including F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, F\/A-18 Super Hornet, E\/A-18G, E-2D Hawkeye, B-1 Lancer, various hellicopters and \u201cnumerous remoted pilot aircraft\u201c which could mean drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper or SkyGuardian, the RQ-4 Global Hawk, or potentially highly secretive assets like the RQ-170 and RQ-180 stealth surveillance platforms. Though half of the US aircraft, if not the majority, served an Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) purpose, supplemented by at least three different UAVs on the same mission: informational superiority.<\/p>\n

According to available open sources to date, the core of Venezuela\u2019s air defense did not fire one shot during the raid. Additionally, the only reference to American aircraft taking damage mentions a helicopter that stayed operative, therefore battle-ready. A helicopter taking damage but not going down leads to a confident assumption that it was not hit by any missile system, but a machine gun at best. Venezuela lost on the informational level. If the ISR- the radars – had worked, shots would have been fired, and in this scenario, we could examine Russian Systems\u2019 firing accuracy. Additionally, if the radars had worked, the Venezuelan Air Force would have taken off, which did not happen.<\/p>\n

The successful operation of Air-Defense involves many steps: (1) Detection and monitoring of the zone of interest to provide early warning. (2) Identification of the object of interest (Friendly\/Hostile\/Civilian). (3) Integration of all the information from various sensors into a single operational picture and prioritization of targets. (4) Decision-making and rules of engagement. (5) Engagement and assessment of results. (6) Adaptation and Correction.<\/p>\n

As an adversary, intercepting these steps creates the necessary freedom of movement in the air to support the operations on the ground. It is argued that the US forces managed to intercept the above sequence at the very beginning, denying the land forces the ability to shape informed decisions. C4ISR* superiority allowed the US to shape the operational battlespace in its favor, diminishing the significance of \u201craw\u201d firepower.<\/p>\n

\u201cOperation Absolute Resolve\u201d serves as a great example in practice of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which introduces the term of Netcentric Warfare and places \u201cdecision superiority\u201d and \u201cdominant battle-space awareness\u201d as top operational priorities. Multi-Domain Warfare touches this concept operationally, connecting air, land, maritime, cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains to generate continuity of effects.\u00a0 While this connectivity is necessary to create a comprehensive operational picture, it also invites deception risks. All of these different fields of information allow Cognitive Warfare to be more relevant than ever. Generating uncertainty via jamming, signals manipulation, and EW is enough to paralyze the decision-making processes of the adversary.<\/p>\n

Venezuela\u2019s air defense failed to provide an early warning to the combat body. A combination of preparatory SIGINT, HUMINT, and advanced reconnaissance systems on the US side during the operation has formed the battle\u2019s result. Systems alone do not define the outcome of a battle. During this century, decision architectures supplemented by reliable battle-space information will have the primary role on the tactical and operational level of conflicts.<\/p>\n

*Command & Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Army Technology (accessed 22\/1\/26). What US aircraft were used in Operation Absolute Resolve?<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.army-technology.com\/features\/what-us-aircraft-were-used-in-operation-absolute-resolve\/<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Breaking Defense (accessed 22\/1\/26). After US raid on Venezuela, analysts weigh lessons about Russian air defenses<\/p>\n

https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2026\/01\/after-us-raid-on-venezuela-analysts-weigh-lessons-about-russian-air-defenses\/<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Business Insider (accessed 22\/1\/26). Russian-made air defenses in Venezuela didn’t shoot down a single US aircraft during the Maduro raid. Here’s what that means.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/venezuelas-russian-air-defenses-didnt-shoot-down-us-aircraft-2026-1<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Business Insider (accessed 22\/1\/26).\u00a0 The US expected ‘significant resistance’ from Venezuela’s air defenses, Maduro raid planning memo reveals<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/us-expected-resistance-from-venezuela-air-defenses-maduro-raid-memo-2026-1<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Center for Strategic and International Studies (accessed 22\/1\/26). Imagery from Venezuela Shows a Surgical Strike, Not Shock and Awe<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/imagery-venezuela-shows-surgical-strike-not-shock-and-awe<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Ferris, John. \u201cNetcentric Warfare, C4ISR and information operations\u201d Secret Intelligence: A Reader, edited by Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, Wesley K. Wark, Routledge, 2020, pp. 545-565.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Geopolitical Monitor (accessed 22\/1\/26). Why Venezuela\u2019s Air Defenses Never Fired https:\/\/www.geopoliticalmonitor.com\/why-venezuelas-air-defenses-never-fired\/<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

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