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CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ANALYSES

**The Transformative Power of the  
United Nations Peacekeeping in the  
Protection of Civilians - Part 2**

**Evangelos Koulis**

**Research Paper No. 13**

# **The Transformative Power of the United Nations Peacekeeping in the Protection of Civilians**

## **Part 2**

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# **The Transformative Power of the United Nations Peacekeeping in the Protection of Civilians**

## **PART 2**

### **Section Three**

#### **Analysis**

Section III comprises of an analysis of the UN documents and case studies relating to the POC. The first part analyses the most important UN documents that informed and shaped POC developments at a policy level. These primary sources are comprised of UNSC Resolutions, UNDPKO studies and political platforms from 1999 to 2014. In the second part, three case studies are analysed, namely (i) DRC, (ii) Ivory Coast, and (iii) Libya. Whilst the aim of the first part is to trace POC policy developments in a linear chronological progression, part two examines three seminal peacekeeping missions in terms of the implementation of their POC mandates. Part one illustrates the main UN POC developments since 1999. These consist of new, innovative tasks and techniques intended to guide peacekeeping missions and new priorities and coercive measures authorised by the UNSC to respond to violence against civilians. Part two discusses how these policy developments were put into practice arguing that the coercive measures used by the UN constitute the most significant developments.

#### **3.1) United Nations' Protection of Civilians' Document Analysis**

As demonstrated in the Literature Review (see Section II), the UNSC's increased attention on POC issues is reflected throughout the last 15 years in Secretary-General reports, UNSC meetings and resolutions, UN publications, and the General Assembly's meetings and resolutions. This part navigated through hundreds of UN documents to trace actual POC developments and not reiterations, wishes, and recommendations. Since 1999, although the issue of the protection of civilians is present in the majority, if not all, of the UN mandates, that in itself does not qualify as a POC development. This section analyses UNSC resolutions that introduce or add something new and significant to the POC. Thus, when a mandate *expressed* its willingness or *stressed* the importance of POC in armed conflict, it did not 'qualify' as a POC development because it is a reiteration rather than a specific strategy to tackle the issue. On the contrary, when a resolution *decides* actions to be taken to address POC issues in armed conflicts it means it actually 'goes a step forward' to address the issue. According to these criteria, the selected resolutions are as follows:

1. Resolution 1592, DRC & Introduction of R2P: Cordon and search tactics; Resolution 60/1
2. Resolution 1706, Sudan: Occupying key civilian areas
3. The Capstone Doctrine
4. Resolution 1856, DRC: Civilian protection as a top priority
5. Resolutions 1970 and 1973: Libya's 'No Fly Zone'
6. Resolution 1975, Ivory Coast: Destroying enemy rebel camps
7. Resolution 2098, DRC: Intervention Brigade and the use of unmanned aerial systems

### ***3.1.1) Resolution 1592, DRC & Introduction of R2P: Cordon and Search tactics; Resolution 60/1***

In a chronological order, UNSC resolution 1592 (UN, 2005a) on 30<sup>th</sup> March 2005 constitutes one of the first significant developments after the first resolution on the POC (i.e. Resolution 1265) in 1999. It relates to the UN mission MONUC in the armed conflict of the DRC. Besides the standardised language of the UNSC to authorise MONUC to 'use all necessary means' in order to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, the resolution moved a step forward by urging MONUC to make full use of the mandate (ibid). The UNSC decided specific operational tasks to tackle the targeting of non-combatants by authorising cordon and search operations (CASO's) and to disrupt the capabilities of armed groups posing a threat to the former (ibid). On October 24<sup>th</sup> 2005, the General Assembly Resolution 60/1 reflecting on the outcomes of the 2005 World Summit introduced the political concept of R2P (see Section 2.3.1). POC and R2P should not be equated, as whilst the former consists of a legal concept based on international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, the latter is a political concept limited to violations that constitute war crimes (UN, 2012). However, R2P has helped shape, operationalise, and create momentum for the POC in the international political 'arena' (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Therefore, in terms of the development of POC policies in theory and based on prominent academics like Bellamy and Williams (2011), R2P has to be considered a significant political platform and development of the UN to further develop POC policies.

### ***3.1.2) Resolution 1706, Sudan: Occupying Key Civilian Areas***

The following year, on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2006, the UN adopted Resolution 1706 expanding the UN mission UNMIS and its peacekeeping force by almost 20,000 thousand military and civilian personnel in Sudan's armed conflict. Additionally, it updated Resolution 1590 of 2005 to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and urged Member states to provide more resources for the mission (UN, 2006c). Resolution 1706 is important for various reasons like transborder monitoring of armed groups and the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. However, from a POC perspective the interest lies on the specific peacekeeping tasks that were explicitly spelled out by the UNSC. In an effort to address the POC issue, the UNSC

tasked the UN peacekeeping forces to occupy key areas such as buffer zones, IDP camps, and demilitarised zones surrounding the camps to protect civilians and deter any attempt of violence (ibid). Thus, on this occasion, the UNSC sought to tackle the issue in a proactive and direct way by placing peacekeepers around vulnerable Sudanese population.

### ***3.1.3) The Capstone Doctrine***

In 2008 the UN published the 'Capstone Doctrine', which mapped out the strategies and planning of peacekeeping missions (UN/DPKO, 2008). Among other issues, it grappled directly with the POC issues in different environments, and issues of robustness and use of force in peacekeeping mandates. The Capstone Doctrine is considered one of the first serious attempts of the UN to reflect and theorise the principles and guidelines of the UN (OCHA, 2009). However, it fails to provide any generalised practical guideline on what the 'protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' means for peacekeeping missions' planning purposes (ibid).

### ***3.1.4) Resolution 1856, DRC: Civilian Protection as a Top Priority***

Contrary to the Capstone Doctrine, the UNSC Resolution 1856 in late 2008 is seminal in terms of developing POC policies and practices. Like Resolution 1590 (see above), Resolution 1856 relates to the protracted armed conflict in the DRC and the mass atrocities committed against civilians. In a very strong language the resolution requested UN's mission MONUC to put the POC as a 'top priority' (UN, 2008a) in the mission's mandate. Additionally, alongside the tasks to facilitate humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and IDP's, the UNSC also requested the DDR of foreign and local armed groups (ibid). Although the latter is not a new task or development altogether in terms of peacekeeping, it retains the focus as it is specifically intended as an indirect way of protecting civilians and limiting the dangers posed to the Congolese population. 'Labelling' civilian protection as a top priority does not imply a better implementation of the mandate. Nevertheless, it constitutes a significant development considering that the POC issues were only included in a mandate in 1999 and have come to signify the most important objective for a peacekeeping mission in 2008.

### ***3.1.5) Resolutions 1970 and 1973: Libya's 'No Fly Zone'***

In late February in 2011, Resolution 1970, condemned the violence against civilians in Libya and imposed sanctions like travel bans, arms embargo, and assets freeze to Qadhafi's regime. A month later, the authorisation of Resolution 1973 constitutes a significant development for the POC issues in armed conflicts. After the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with UNSC's demands and the deteriorating situation for the Libyan population, the UNSC adopted a stricter line of measures to protect Libyans. Along with the continuation of the sanctions to the Libyan authorities, resolution

1973 introduced a 'No Fly Zone' establishing a ban “on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians” (UN, 2011b: 3). The only exceptions to the 'No Fly Zone' were flights intended to provide humanitarian assistance and medical and food supplies to Libyan people. The 'No Fly Zone' is a considerable development in many ways. On one hand, the UNSC sought to respond to the escalation of violence targeting non-combatants whilst excluding any discussion for ground intervention in Libya. On the other, Resolution 1973 constitutes the first time that the UNSC decided to act against the nominal consent of the host state, one of the three fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Despite the differences among the member states over the interpretation of Resolution 1973, the importance lies in the fact that the nominal consent of a state principle was breached in the name of protecting civilians and the deterioration of the situation in Libya.

### ***3.1.6) Resolution 1975, Ivory Coast: Destroying Enemy Rebel Camps***

On 30<sup>th</sup> March 2011, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1975. The resolution reiterated the UN-France led mission UNOCI authorisation of 'use all necessary means to protect civilians' also adding the prevention of the use of heavy weapons against civilian population (UN, 2011c). Resolution 1975 passed after the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (RFCI) initiated a number of attacks and took control of several towns massacring 800-1000 civilians (Harding, 2011). What is extraordinary about this resolution is the addition of the unusual reference to prevent heavy weapons against civilians. This reference came under scrutiny after the UN and French helicopters bombed heavy weapons stockpiles in rebel bases, helping turning the battle in favour of Quattara. However, in terms of the development of POC policies, Resolution 1975 consists of a very important example of the UNSC's coercive reaction towards civilian casualties.

### ***3.1.7) Resolution 2098, DRC: Intervention Brigade and the Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems***

On 28<sup>th</sup> March 2013, the UNSC authorised Resolution 2098. This came as a result of the continuation of the mass rapes and atrocities committed against civilians by the 23<sup>rd</sup> March Movement (M23) and other Congolese and foreign armed groups. However, like Resolution 1973, Resolution 2098 marks a new era in the development of new POC policies and practices. Along with the extension of the UN's mission MONUC, for the first time in its history, the UN authorised the Forces Intervention Brigade (FIB) reposed of three infantry battalions, one artillery, and one Special force and Reconnaissance company. Besides the standardised UNSC's language of ensuring the POC under imminent threat, the significance lies in the tasks of the intervention brigade. FIB was tasked to “carry out targeted offensive operations...in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” (UN, 2013: 6) to neutralise armed groups that posed threats to civilian population. After 15 years of conflict in the

DRC, which accounted for almost 6 million deaths by various interrelated factors, the UN decided to explicitly bypass another key peacekeeping principle, i.e. the non-use of force for the purpose of protecting the Congolese population. FIB would indirectly protect civilians by neutralising M23 rebels and other armed groups. Although breaching one of the UN's peacekeeping fundamental principles obviously sparked many concerns over the UN's legitimacy to conduct such operations, it nevertheless constitutes a seminal development in terms of acting to address the reoccurring violations and abuse of millions of civilians in the DRC.

Resolution 2098 is also significant for another reason. In an attempt to further tackle the issue of civilian abuses by armed groups and enhance its surveillance capabilities in the eastern borders of the DRC, the UN authorised the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's). UAV's would specifically be used to monitor the UN's arms embargo in the region as well as to observe and track the flow of military personnel posing a threat to the civilian population. The importance of this development is twofold: on one hand, the UN further acted to gather intelligence for future dangers on the Congolese population, and on the other, this reflects an effort to use technological advances and innovative ways in order to achieve this objective. Although the UN has previously used drones for surveillance purposes, Resolution 2098 constitutes the first time that they were explicitly used to further enhance the POC.

The above UN Resolutions demonstrate a slow but consistent development of new POC policies. Since 1999, the UN has sought to respond to POC issues through developing new tasks, incorporating new technologies, and authorising coercive mandates to protect civilians in danger. For example, whilst Resolution 1592 in 2005 introduced CASOs, Resolution 1706 included the task of occupying key civilian areas to improve POC. More importantly, in 2011 and 2013 the UN further developed its POC policies by authorising three coercive mandates to halt abuse against civilians. In terms of success and failure, the recurring civilian deaths in armed conflicts would show that the UN has unquestionably failed to tackle the issue. However, judging strictly by the UNSC POC policy developments, the UN has definitely made efforts to improve its effectiveness on the issue and surely did not remain inactive.

### **3.2) Case Studies' Analysis**

Having looked at some of the most important UN POC policy developments, attention is drawn on their implementation in three peacekeeping missions. The following three case studies contextualise the POC policy developments and demonstrate how the UN has sought to implement them in peacekeeping missions. The case studies present events where the UN did or did not respond to violence against civilians and the specific actions it proceeded to achieve that. Thus, the aim is to investigate if the POC policy developments were actually implemented, and their impact on civilians.

#### ***3.2.1) Case study 1: Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo***

The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUC) was established in 1999 by Resolution 1258 following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Initially, MONUC was mandated to be an observing and monitoring mission although later on its responsibilities changed. DRC may constitute the most complex armed conflict in the world. Alongside decades of an abusive state authority, DRC was tormented by the spill over of civil wars in neighbouring countries (e.g Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan) and the illegal exploitation of its vast mineral resources (OCHA, 2009). Despite the fact that MONUC was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat, this was not reflected either in the Secretary-General's reports or as a central planning objective for the mission. The mission objectives consisted of DDR of ex-combatants and guarding the UN facilities and supplies (ibid). As the Secretary-General bluntly accepted “[the UN forces]...will not be able to extract other United Nations personnel at risk, or accompany humanitarian convoys, nor will they be able to extend protection to the local population” (UN, 2001:77para). Since the armed conflict in the DRC consists of almost 15 years of UN presence, the analysis of the implementation of POC policies is broken down into six sections demonstrating the changes that occurred.

- a) From the Lusaka Accords to the massacre in Kisangani (2000–03)
- b) From crisis to crisis: Ituri and Bukavu (2003–04)
- c) From reaction to pursuit (2004-2006)
- d) The end of the beginning (2006-2008)
- e) Putting protection first (2008-2009)
- f) Extreme measures (2013-present)

##### **3.2.1.a) From the Lusaka Accords to the Massacre in Kisangani (2000–03)**

The first major humanitarian crisis in the DRC occurred in May 2002. The Rwandan-backed group Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), in a process of suppressing a mutiny within its ranks, massacred 103 civilians in Kisangani. This occurred despite the presence of almost 1,000 UN

troops and their Deputy Commander in the area (OCHA, 2009). Although adequately informed about the violent incidents, the UN troops observed the gunfire in the city and only managed to provide safety to some civilians (ibid). Thus, although mandated to protect civilians, MONUC, not only did not follow its mandate, but responding to criticisms, the Secretary-General argued that MONUC was not adequately resourced and trained to carry out such objectives (UN, 2002a). Following the events in Kisangani, throughout 2002, RCD-Goma troops carried on civilian massacres killing at least 77 civilians (OCHA, 2009). Responding to these events, the Secretary-General in his 12<sup>th</sup> report issued a warning for the rapidly escalating situation and the need for better POC strategies (UN, 2002b).

### **3.2.1.b) From Crisis to Crisis: Ituri and Bukavu (2003–04)**

The worrying events in Kisangani were only the start of a series of civilian massacres in different regions in the DRC. Exactly a year later, amid the withdrawal of 7,000 Ugandan UN troops from the Ituri region and despite the deployment of two new MONUC Task Forces in the Kivus, the situation in Bunia rapidly escalated (UN, 2004a). Over two weeks, various militia deliberately killed 563 civilians and 2 UN unarmed observers while the 411 UN troops left behind in Bunia were unable to prevent or stop the bloodshed (ibid). Apart from the anger of the local population towards the inability of the UN to protect them, the Ituri crisis reflected once more the confusion within the UN, but more importantly an avoidance of any responsibility. For example, the UN 'lessons learned' report argued that the UN troops were only tasked to perform static guard duties and that did use force when defending themselves, however they did not use force to retake the town of Bunia (UN/DPKO, 2004). Contrary to the report, the first Force Commander of the mission argued that not only was the mission poorly operated, but also despite some protection offered to civilians, the mission failed its mandate and themselves by letting defenceless civilians die (OCHA, 2009). The tragic events of Ituri led to Resolution 1484 and the creation of the French robust Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF)—known as 'Operation Artemis'— which was sent to Congo to de-escalate the situation. In 2003, the UNSC authorised Resolution 1493, which expanded MONUC's mandate under Chapter VII, authorising more troops and emphasising on the importance of POC in Ituri and Kivus (UN, 2003). Similarly, in North Kivu, the erupted conflict between dissident RCD-Goma officers and the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique de Congo (FARDC) ended up with officer Nkunda of the former group taking over Bukavu town in June 2004. Whilst the UN officials were thoroughly informed of the potential repercussions to civilians amidst the retreat of FARDC, political leadership instructed MONUC to stay out of what they considered to be internal affairs. The consequences were immediately felt as RCD-Goma troops killed 88 and displaced around 25,000 civilians (OCHA, 2009).

### **3.2.1.c) From Reaction to Pursuit (2004–06)**

The period between 2004 to 2006 can best be depicted by the efforts of the UN to reassess MONUC and its support to FARDC's efforts to DDR militias. By request of the Secretary-General, Resolution 1565 increased the size of peacekeepers by 5,900 troops and 341 civilian police, authorised MONUC under Chapter VII (UN, 2004b), and reiterated the importance of improving POC implementation.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, the Secretary-General reported the death of 9 UN troops during a patrol to protect an 8,000 IDP camp in the Ituri region. This was a retaliation against two MONUC operations that ended in capturing and disarming 140 militias posing a threat to civilians (OCHA, 2009). During a CASO, MONUC killed 60 combatants of the Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI) militia in Ituri where 2 UN troops were injured (ibid). Another positive indirect POC development constitutes the joint MONUC-FARDC operation in Kivu providing safe access to civilians and stabilising the security situation (UN, 2005b). Following these interventions, in Resolution 1649 (UN, 2005c), the UNSC welcomed the positive developments and encouraged MONUC to carry on the robust mandate. However, the death of 25 civilians in South Kivu (300 metres away from a FARDC checkpoint) in retaliation to MONUC-FARDC joint operations, once again cast doubts over their ability to protect civilians (OCHA, 2009). Amid the elections in 2006, the UNSC authorised the deployment of a European Union Force in the DRC (Eufor R.D.Congo), to assist MONUC in Kinshasa and contribute to the implementation of the POC operations (UN, 2006a).

### **3.2.1.d) The End of the Beginning (2006-2008)**

In 2006 MONUC was preparing for the general elections in the DRC. Apart from a few notable examples, MONUC avoided robust operations so as not to disrupt the voting process. During the erupted violence after the elections, two events are worth mentioning. First, the death of 8 Guatemalan MONUC troops by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in January of the same year (UN, 2006b), and the intervention of MONUC to stop Nkunda's advancement in Goma. In the latter, MONUC attacked Nkunda with infantry and helicopters, killing 200-400 troops forcing him to withdraw (OCHA, 2009).

In May and December of 2007, Resolutions 1756 and 1794 authorised the allocation of resources and the increase of UN troops to protect civilians among other tasks, making POC the top priority of the mission (UN, 2007a; 2007b). In his report in 2008, the Secretary-General claimed that due to the increased military-civilian cooperation and the provision of mobile operating bases for the POC, MONUC managed to protect more than 150,000 civilians in key urban areas (UN, 2008b). Additionally, MONUC protected another 150,000 civilians in Goma, and the areas of Kiwanja and Rutshuru (ibid). However, in his 26<sup>th</sup> report the Secretary-General argued that despite the previous

positive developments, whilst attacks between warring parties decreased, attacks on civilians, NGO's and the UN agencies increased in the areas of Kivu (UN, 2008c).

### **3.2.1.e) Putting Protection First (2008-2009)**

By late November 2008, a conflict between the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) and FARDC, had serious repercussions for MONUC and the POC implementation. As Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, CNDP occupied Kiwanja killing 150 civilians while MONUC troops were 1km away (OCHA, 2009). This incident gathered international attention leading to an in-depth investigation by the HRW. Among other things, the investigation highlighted MONUC's inadequate capabilities to protect civilians, competing priorities (e.g. rescuing humanitarian workers instead of civilians) and the problematic relationship with FARDC (HRW, 2008). Although this was not the first time that FARDC was accused of abuses against civilians, the fact that a FARDC Commander ordered his forces to open fire on peacekeepers and civilians is staggering (ibid). Despite the inability of MONUC to live up to its expectations, the above incident also demonstrates the dilemmas and the difficulties it faced while having to cooperate with an untrustworthy ally.

### **3.2.1.f) Extraordinary Measures (2013-present)**

The latest POC development in the DRC is the authorisation of the 3,000 strong FIB and the use of UAV's, amid the occupation of Goma (DRC's second largest city) and the mass violations committed by M23. It is too soon in terms of research papers and UN reports to see the effects of this latest development. However, so far FIB has made some striking gains. Two of these gains relate to the defeat of the M23 rebels and multiple offensive operations to halt civilian abuses (The International, 2014). FIB prevented a new humanitarian crisis in DRC by limiting the number of the civilian casualties. Additionally, the UAV's assisted MONUC in monitoring the movement of armed groups posing a threat to civilians, aiding in early warning assessments and interventions.

The almost 15-yearlong armed conflict in the DRC vividly highlighted cases where the UN manifestly failed to respond to the POC, and a lack of coordination and communication with the host state and the local population. However, it also demonstrated ways in which the UN troops responded to these 'calls'. These were CASOs, using force to disarm armed militias and lately the incorporation of UAV's and FIB to monitor rebel movements and attack militias rather than wait and use force only in self-defence.

### **3.2.2) Case Study 2: Protecting Civilians in Ivory Coast**

The UN operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) was established in 2004 following the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement. Its primary goal was to support the transition of the Government of National Reconciliation between Laurent Gbagbo and his political opponents (OCHA, 2009). UNOCI's first task was to create a Zone of Confidence (ZOC) between areas controlled by the government Forces Armees Nationales de Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the rebel group Forces Nouvelles (FN). UNOCI also had the French-led forces (operation Licorne) at their disposal to be placed under the tactical command of the former in case of an emergency. Part of the mission's mandate (resolution 1528) was the POC, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the return of IDP's. Since 2004 UNOCI's attention to POC issues has taken a few variations (ibid). In the first era (between 2004-2009), POC issues were treated as a secondary task to support the peace agreement, whilst becoming very important during humanitarian crises. In the second era (between 2009-present), although civilian casualties remained an everyday reality, POC issues became UNOCI's priority entailing quite forceful albeit ambiguous interventions.

The first major incident occurred in November 2004 when FANCI forces launched an attack killing 9 French soldiers (ibid). Licorne's response was forceful destroying almost the entire Ivorian air force causing massive riots, attacks and provocations directed to the UN and Licorne forces. The same event displaced thousands of people, 2,000 of which were provided shelter by UNOCI (UN, 2004c). Perhaps the most significant proactive POC development in the UNOCI mission was the establishment of a protection network by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2005. The network included NGO's (e.g. Red Cross), protection agencies and advisers with an aim of gathering, collecting and validating information to respond to civilian threats (OCHA, 2009). The goal was to tackle the lack of effective communication between the UN and the host population that had resulted in 'missing warnings signs' ending with civilians being massacred (ibid). This however, did not stop the violence as a series of attacks near DueKoue (near a FANCI checkpoint) cost the lives of more than 70 civilians and injured around 60 (ibid). Responding to the massacre, UNOCI troops who reached the villages first, provided assistance to the victims and conducted robust patrolling. A few months later (January 2006), amid a contested joint AU-UNSC recommendation over the peace agreement, the Young Patriots group launched a number of attacks and riots targeting UNOCI (ibid). After the death of five rioters who had stormed the UN compound in self-defence by UN troops and fears of violence escalation, UNOCI forces were withdrawn from five key cities leaving almost 14,000 IDP's and ethnic minorities unprotected (ibid).

The second era of UNOCI mission concerns the creation of the Ouagadougou agreement which established a transitional government of national unity leading to national elections. The agreement also regarded the withdrawal of UNOCI and Lincorne after the election (Bovcon, 2009). After many delays and violence from both Gbagbo's and Quattara's (the two main presidential opponents) supporters (Bellamy & Williams, 2011), the elections took place on 31<sup>st</sup> October 2010. Despite Quattara's victory, Gbagbo contested the result with the Constitutional Council cancelling 660,000 Quattara votes amid vote-rigging, thereby declaring Gbagbo the winner (ibid). This event sparked major violence around the country with Gbagbo demanding UNOCI troops to immediately withdraw. On the contrary, UNOCI reported that government forces had denied access to sites of suspected mass graves (ICG, 2011). Additionally, major organisations and countries (e.g. the UN, AU, France, US) explicitly criticised Gbagbo's actions and recognised Quattara as the de jure president (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

The grave concerns by the UN Special Advisers and the international community of an imminent threat to the civilian population were only confirmed a few months later. In March 2011 a rocket attack in a pro Quattara part of Abidjan area killed and maimed approximately 100 people with UNOCI strongly criticising the incident (ibid). Quattara's forces now named Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (RFCI) launched a major offensive and linked with the massacre of around 1,000 people in Duekoue. At the same period pro-Gbagbo mercenaries were linked with another attack causing the death of 100 civilians (ibid).

The aforementioned troubling events forced the UNSC to authorise Resolution 1975 reiterating the need to 'use all necessary means' to protect civilians and adding 'to prevent the use of heavy weapons' against them (UN, 2011c). Consequently, in April, UN and French helicopters attacked military camps destroying heavy weapons stockpiles, helping Quattara win the battle and providing proactive indirect protection to civilians (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Despite the criticisms by many countries over the interpretation of the resolution, the importance lies elsewhere. By shaping the outcome of the armed conflict in Ivory Coast in favour of Quattara, the UN seems to have bypassed another fundamental principle of peacekeeping, i.e. impartiality. However, impartiality was bypassed in an effort to further protect and address the violence against civilians.

### 3.2.3) Case Study 3: No-Fly Zone in Libya

The humanitarian crisis in Libya is chronologically similar with the latest crisis in Ivory Coast. As NATO's intervention lasted for only 222 days, inevitably this case study is shorter in comparison to the others (e.g. DRC). The March 2011 crisis in Libya rapidly escalated after some initial peaceful and violent protests. This was mainly because of (i) the political revolts in Tunisia and Egypt ('Arab Spring'), (ii) Qadhafi's regime crackdown, and (iii) its army defections leading to the establishment of the opposition armed group Interim Council (ibid). Despite the initial successes of the rebels, capturing some of the most important cities in Libya (e.g. Benghazi and Tobruk), Qadhafi's forces managed to retake most of the cities by mid-March 2011. Qadhafi's statements over rebels, threatening to crush the 'cockroaches' and 'execute any Libyan that takes arms against Libya' (Miller, 2011), heightened the fears within the international community over crimes against humanity. In February, the Secretary-General framed the issue as a POC one and reiterated Libya's responsibility to protect its citizens based on R2P (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Additionally, the AU, the League of Arab States (LAS), NATO, and prominent countries like the UK and France acted as 'gatekeepers' criticising the violence of Qadhafi's regime towards civilians and urging the UNSC to take enforcement measures (ibid).

The international community's criticism over the atrocities of Qadhafi regime led to the authorisation of Resolution 1970. Resolution 1970 urged Qadhafi to ensure access for international humanitarian assistance, imposed arms embargo, banned 16 members of the regime from travelling, and froze the bank accounts on six of those individuals (UN, 2011a). However, the unwillingness of the Qadhafi regime to ensure access to humanitarian assistance along with fears that the imminent fall of the rebel-held Benghazi would lead to massacres, paved the way for enforcement measures (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Despite the lack of consensus among the UNSC with Russia, China and Brazil being very cautious, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of March the UNSC authorised Resolution 1973 (see *e. Resolutions 1970 and 1973 above*). Resolution 1973 introduced a No-Fly Zone in order to protect civilians. Almost immediately Operation Unified Protector (OUP) consisting of 18 countries led by NATO started. NATO targeted Libya's air defences and ground forces destroying approximately 5,900 targets, 600 tanks and armoured vehicles and 400 artillery and rocket launchers posing an imminent threat to the Libyan population (BBC, 2011). OUP, assisted international humanitarian assistance, enforced a No-Fly Zone preventing Libyan aircraft bombing civilians, degraded Qadhafi's ability to target civilians and gave the Libyan National Transitional Council a big military advantage (NATO, 2014; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012). Consequently, the rebels secured control of the country, and captured and killed Qadhafi. Although allegations by Libyans, Russia and many NGO's raised concerns over civilian casualties committed by NATO, considering the amount of bombs and missiles used by NATO in

only 222 days, the air campaign had unparalleled precision and minimised collateral damage (ibid). However, the decision to change the regime blurred the POC objective.

Despite allegations over civilian casualties caused by NATO, judging by Libya's situation, NATO was the only organisation able to take enforcement measures within such a limited time frame. This made it the only option for the UN at the time. The significance in terms of this analysis is the fact that the UNSC proved willing to authorise the use of force in order to protect civilians for the first time against a host state, bypassing the last fundamental peacekeeping principle.

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To be continued