In the 21st century, insurgency irrefutably constitutes the most prevalent type of war throughout the world. Scholars and strategists hotly debate how an insurgency can best be countered. The Greek Civil War (1946–1949) stands out as one of the rarest occasions of a conclusive and permanent victory of a government over an insurgency during the Cold War. This book aspires to explore the main factors which ultimately caused the downfall of an insurgency that in mid-1947 appeared to be on the verge of victory. Contrary to other works on the same subject, this book utilizes the theory of International Relations and Strategic Studies to interpret the new data from hitherto inaccessible archives in a comprehensive way. This book, in other words, serves a “dual purpose”: first of all, it interprets a controversial episode of modern Greek history objectively and, secondly, it offers insights into the theory and practice of insurgency / counter-insurgency by using the Greek Civil War as a case study.
Dr Spyridon Plakoudas: Assistant Professor in Strategy and IR, American University in the United Arab Emirates; Research Analyst of KEDISA